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ABSTRACT 
 
MOTHERS, DAUGHTERES, WIVES, AND WIDOWS:  
THE POLITICS OF INDIA’S SOCIAL PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN, 1985-2015 
Prakirti Nangia 
Devesh Kapur 
Why is social policy for women in the global south increasingly focused on women as 
mothers?  While existing literature explains the rise of maternalist (mother-focused) social 
policy in 20th-century Europe and the United States, I show that it does not account for 
the newest wave of maternalist social policy, which is unfolding in developing countries 
around the world.  Using India as a case study, I compare the surprising and divergent 
trajectories of two contemporaneous women’s programs to unearth the causes of growing 
maternalism in the global south.  One of the programs, Janani Suraksha Yojana (Mother 
Protection Scheme, or JSY), had modest origins but is among the most generously funded 
women-specific programs in the country and among the largest conditional cash transfer 
programs in the world today.  The other, Indira Mahila Yojana (Indira Woman Scheme, 
or IMY), was designed to overhaul India’s social policy for women’s socioeconomic 
advancement but turned out to have only a short life of limited consequence.  The study 
of these programs shows that India’s growing attention to women as mothers results from 
two factors.  First, international organizations such as the UN have placed maternal 
health on the global development agenda more successfully than they have advocated 
gendered interventions in other fields such as higher education, paid work, and political 
participation, creating incentives for national actors to design programs for pregnant 
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women.  Second, social policy thinking in India conflates gender with poverty, treating 
them as a single dimension of social stratification.  This leads to efforts to address gender 
by solving poverty and undercuts arguments for women-specific programs for 
educational, economic, and political empowerment.  The result is a system of social 
provisioning that is uncommonly attentive to adult women, but almost exclusively during 
their pregnancies. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
I. Motivation and question 
States vary in the extent to which they make policy for women as mothers.  Some, such as 
the United States of the Progressive Era, provide maternal health services and grant social 
assistance to mothers to enable them to care for their young children.  Others, such as the 
present-day United States, do much less for women as mothers, instead promoting 
women’s paid employment and leaving individual women or families to make private 
arrangements for their childcare and (maternal) health needs.  In the broadest sense, this 
dissertation asks when and why a state comes to focus policy effort on women as mothers 
versus women in other roles.  For reasons explained below, it asks this question in the 
context of the global south in general, focusing on India in particular. 
 Over the last two decades, observers of women’s social policy have noted that the 
advanced democracies of the world are bidding “farewell” to maternalist – or mother-
focused – social policy and moving toward a policy model that assumes and encourages 
“employment for all.”1  What has received less attention is a countervailing trend in social 
policy in the developing world: the rising profile of women-as-mothers in social policy.  
Although quantitative data on and cross-country studies of this trend are rare, work on 
three policy domains presents at least suggestive evidence of rising maternalism in social 
policy in the global south.  These are: cash transfer programs, especially in Latin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Orloff, “From Maternalism to ‘Employment for All’: State Policies to Promote Women’s Employment 
across the Affluent Democracies”; Lewis, “The Decline of the Male Breadwinner Model: Implications for 
Work and Care”; Ciccia and Bleijenbergh, “After the Male Breadwinner Model? Childcare Services and 
the Division of Labor in European Countries,” 52-53; Crompton, Restructuring Gender Relations and 
Employment: The Decline of the Male Breadwinner; Creighton, “The Rise and Decline of the ‘Male Breadwinner 
Family’ in Britain”; Meyer, “Retrenchment, Reproduction, Modernization: Pension Politics and the 
Decline of the German Breadwinner Model.” 
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America, which grant cash assistance to mothers for enrolling children in school and 
ensuring that they receive regular health checkups2; the policy rhetoric of various 
international organizations, which foregrounds child well-being and admits women into 
the conversation only as mothers bearing primary responsibility for children3; and 
domestic programming on and foreign aid for maternal health, the latter of which has 
more than doubled in real terms between 1990 and 2016, growing faster than all health-
related development assistance since 2010.4 
 This gives rise to a puzzle: while rich democracies are departing from the 
maternalist social policy model, lower-income countries of the global south are embracing 
maternalism in social policy.  The reasons behind the first shift have already been 
investigated elsewhere.5  Those behind the second, however, are yet to be studied 
systematically.  Hence, this project studies maternalist social policy in the developing 
world.  Instead of conducting a cross-country comparison of maternalist policy, however, 
I conduct a within-country comparison of maternalist and non-maternalist policy.  This 
strategy allows me to overcome a key limitation of existing studies of maternalism: their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Molyneux, “Mothers at the Service of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s 
Conditional Transfer Programme,” 434-437; Tabbush, “Latin American Women’s Protection after 
Adjustment: A Feminist Critique of Conditional Cash Transfers in Chile and Argentina,” 446; “Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia: How to Get Children out of Jobs and into School”; Bradshaw, “From Structural Adjustment 
to Social Adjustment,” 198; Handa et al., “Income Transfers and Maternal Health: Evidence from a 
National Randomized Social Cash Transfer Program in Zambia,” 228.  
3 Jenson, “Lost in Translation,” 465; Jenson, “The Fading Goal of Gender Equality: Three Policy 
Directions That Underpin the Resilience of Gendered Socio-Economic Inequalities,” 547-550; Porter, “A 
Woman’s Right to Choose: Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights 40 Years On,” 138. 
4 Global Health Data Exchange, “Financing Global Health”; Dieleman et al., “Development Assistance for 
Health: Past Trends, Associations, and the Future of International Financial Flows for Health,” 2539; Jehan 
et al., “Improving Access to Maternity Services: An Overview of Cash Transfer and Voucher Schemes in 
South Asia.” 
5 Orloff, “From Maternalism to ‘Employment for All’: State Policies to Promote Women’s Employment 
across the Affluent Democracies”; Lewis, “The Decline of the Male Breadwinner Model: Implications for 
Work and Care.” 
 
	  
3 
inability, stemming from their exclusive focus on maternalist policy, to show that rising or 
declining maternalist spending is not simply a function of rising or declining overall 
spending on women.  By tracking both maternalist and non-maternalist policymaking, I 
can assess with greater confidence whether maternalist policy effort has changed relative 
to other types of policy effort for women. 
 I conduct this study in India for several reasons.  Chapter 3 explains case selection 
in detail, but a short explanation is in order here.  First, India is a developing country that 
is home to a sixth of the world’s women.  This makes India an especially consequential 
case for study of women’s social policy.  Second, existing literature hints at India’s 
growing maternalism,6 which makes India a suitable setting for the study of rising 
maternalism in the global south.  In fact, as Figure 1.1a shows, inflation-adjusted federal 
spending on maternalist women’s programs in India has outpaced that on non-
maternalist – or “individualist” (a more refined category referring to programs that target 
women not as mothers or in other familial terms but as individuals in their own right) – 
women’s programs, particularly since 2003-04.7  The recent divergence in maternalist 
and individualist expenditures provides both time-series and cross-sectional variation in 
the composition of women’s social programming that can be exploited to gain insight into 
rising maternalism. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Shiffman and Ved, “The State of Political Priority for Safe Motherhood in India”; Jat et al., “The 
Emergence of Maternal Health as a Political Priority in Madhya Pradesh, India: A Qualitative Study.” 
7 Terminology such as “individualist” is explained in detail in Chapter 2 
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Figure 1.1a: Decomposition of real spending on women-specific programs into 
maternalist and individualist spending8 
  
 
Third, Indian maternalism is somewhat surprising given that (1) its growth in India has 
coincided with loosening of conservative attitudes on gender in the country, (2) high and 
rising spending on maternal health – which represents a large share of India’s maternalist 
spending – coexists with public health expenditures considered very low by international 
standards; and (3) rising maternalism in India runs counter to the domestic policy rhetoric 
on gender, which emphasizes gender parity in all domains and problematizes in 
particular the recent decline in women’s labor market participation rates.  Finally, India 
also presents a “crucial” case for the study of maternalism because the absence in India of 
existing common explanations of maternalism in social policy – pronatalism driven by 
concerns about depopulation, advocacy by women’s charitable organizations, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chapter 3 explains how spending estimates presented in this chart were calculated.  INR = Indian Rupee.  
Nominal spending data were converted to real (constant 2014) data using an online tool: “Inflation 
Calculator India: Calculate India’s Inflation between Any Two Years from 1971 to 2016.” For sources used 
to gather data for this figure, see sources for Figure 3.2 
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ideological influence of organized religion (usually Catholicism) – makes the country a 
“least likely” place for social policy maternalism from the perspective of existing 
literature.9  
The key research question this dissertation seeks to answer, then, is: what explains 
the increasingly maternalist orientation of social programming for adult women in India?  In other 
words, how do we account for the spending trends depicted in Figure 1.1a?   
II. Why study social policy for women? 
Before we proceed to answering the above question, let us consider why it is important to 
study social policy for women, especially in the context of development.  The obvious 
reason is that women’s social policy has consequences for the women who receive benefits 
from it.  As Chapter 4 shows, between 2005 and 2015, Janani Suraksha Yojana – just one 
of India’s 65 social programs for adult women identified in this project – disbursed cash to 
83 million pregnant women in the country.  That number equals more than a quarter of 
the entire population of the United States in 2018.  Second, since social policy is a 
response to collective perceptions of legitimate social need, studying it provides a window 
into how notions of need are constructed in society and government.  In other words, it 
reveals why some potential needs, vulnerabilities, or deprivations come to be seen as 
deserving of redressal by state action while others do not.  Since rates of women’s political 
participation tend to be lower than those of men, it is even more important to know how 
women’s needs are being interpreted in the polity.  Finally, incipient welfare arrangements 
in countries of the global south today are likely to serve as foundations for the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” 11. 
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elaborate welfare states of tomorrow.  For this reason, too, it is important to understand 
the type of gendered “social citizenship” – the element of citizenship that entitles citizens 
to economic and social rights – that social policy is producing in the context of 
development.10  Chapter 2 discusses in further detail the reasons for studying women’s 
social policy.  
III. Scope of the study 
Social policy is a broad term.  What elements of social policy fall under the purview of 
this study, and which are outside its scope?  Most decisions regarding the scope of this 
project are discussed in Chapter 3.  Three key scope conditions merit introduction here, 
however. 
First, I focus on social programs, which means legislation and general public service 
spending are excluded from the analysis.  Within the universe of social programs, I study 
women-specific programs – that is, programs that provide targeted cash or in-kind benefits 
exclusively to women, girls, or women and children.  This excludes gender-blind 
programs (those that serve both men and women, without making any special 
arrangements for women) and gender-sensitive programs (those that serve both men and 
women while making special dispensations, such as quotas, for women), allowing me to 
focus instead on the most explicitly gendered social policy for women qua women.  
Although data on all women-specific programs were collected, only those pertaining to 
spending on programs for adult women were analyzed systematically.  The choice to focus 
on adult women – that is, to exclude girl-specific programs – was made both because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For more on social citizenship, see Chapter 2 and Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class. 
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key objective of this study was to understand programming for adult women and because 
doing so improved the analytical clarity and consistency of the analysis.11 
It should be noted here that the phrase “women-specific” is not used to imply that 
the programs are, in the final analysis, designed for women’s benefit.  In fact, as this 
project will document, in many cases women-specific programs are formulated for the 
benefit for children or families.  Hence, the descriptor “women-specific” is used not to 
indicate the identity of the final intended beneficiaries but merely to denote that women 
are the first-order recipients of benefits from the programs examined here.   
Second, the social programs studied here are programs of the central government, 
not of state governments.  Although states carry the primary responsibility for social 
welfare in India, the role of the central government in agenda-setting and social 
policymaking is large, influential, and expanding.  Hence, while examining central 
spending alone does not provide a complete picture of women’s social programming, it 
reveals an important part of the picture.  In addition, since health in particular falls under 
the purview of states in India’s federal system, state spending on maternal health is likely 
to be higher than central spending on it.  Because maternal health spending accounts for 
most maternalist spending in India, excluding state spending from our analysis should 
bias our estimate of maternalist spending downward – that is, against the direction of the 
arguments of this work.  That we still find wide divergence in maternalist and 
individualist spending at the central level thus makes the arguments stronger. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Preliminary analysis of spending on girl-specific programs shows that incorporating this spending in our 
study reduces to some extent, but does not close entirely, the gap between maternalist and individualist 
spending.  This suggests the ratio of individualist to maternalist spending is higher for girls than for women, 
a pattern reminiscent of the Millennium Development Goals, which include individualist goals for girls 
(gender parity in education) and maternalist goals for women (improved maternal health). 
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Lastly, there are three tiers of social provisioning in India.  I focus on government 
social programs for the public (tier III), which means that the benefits the central 
government provides exclusively to its own employees (tier I) are not included in the 
analysis.  Also excluded are private-sector safety nets – such as private health insurance 
programs, employer-financed paid leaves, or contributory, employment-based retirement 
benefits (tier II).  Benefits available to government employees do not merit inclusion 
because they are not for the public at large; private-sector benefits are not included 
because they are not financed by the central government.  In addition, because more 
than 90% of India’s workers are employed in the informal sector, outside the scope of 
formal-sector benefits, tiers I and II cover a very small part of the country’s workforce.  
Finally, unlike tier I and II programs, the tier III programs under study here are usually 
tied not to employment but poverty status and provide government-financed, non-
contributory benefits.  Due to these differences, this study focuses only on programs in tier 
III: the bottom tier of welfare that exists to serve the majority of the population not 
covered elsewhere.   
IV. Synopsis of the argument 
I argue that there are two key reasons behind growing maternalism in India’s women-
specific social programming.  First, the international development community, through its 
population conferences, world conferences on women, and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), has placed maternal health high on the global development agenda.  
Among the MDGs, for instance, the only goal that relates to adult women is that which 
seeks to improve maternal health.  To be sure, this emphasis on maternal health per se 
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represents a reduction of the broader campaign for women’s reproductive health that 
many actors in international development initially waged.  Yet, due to opposition from 
the Catholic Church, conservative groups in the United States, and several countries with 
Muslim-majority populations, what began as a campaign for reproductive health was 
stripped down to an effort against maternal mortality.  This resulted in the incorporation 
of improved maternal health as an explicit and only goal for adult women among the 
MDGs. 
The high stature of the Goals, the unprecedented global consensus and attention 
that they enjoyed, and the vigorous effort by UN actors to lobby governments to 
incorporate the goals in national development plans combined to spotlight maternal 
health, creating pressure on governments in the global south to enact policy to improve it 
(see Figure 1.1b below).  The spotlight effect worked in five ways.  First, development 
discourse linked mainstream concerns, such as population growth in the developing 
world, with the formerly peripheral issues of women’s reproductive rights, drawing the 
latter into the center of the development discourse.  For political expediency, the project 
for broader reproductive rights was later narrowed to one for maternal health.  Second, 
the placement of maternal health on the international development agenda boosted the 
availability of international financing for interventions in this area.  Third, the progress-
reporting requirements imposed on all parties to the Millennium Declaration – the 
agreement from which the MDGs were partly derived – as well as consistent media 
attention to countries’ performance on the MDGs created incentives for governments to 
implement policies and programs geared to achieving the Goals.  Fourth, in the world of 
international development, the emphasis placed on maternal mortality as the de facto key 
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indicator of women’s well-being in the context of development sparked a sense of 
embarrassment among domestic policymakers about India’s high (though lower than ever 
before) maternal mortality numbers.  Finally, the global consensus around the desirability 
of anti-maternal mortality interventions allowed India’s health ministry, the body in 
charge of maternal health programming, to expand existing maternal health 
programming and launch new ones, all with minimal opposition. 
This contrasts with the experience of actors, such as the women’s ministry, who 
faced insurmountable opposition from within the government in their efforts to expand 
individualist programs, including programs for women’s socioeconomic empowerment.  
Not only do such programs not benefit from the type of international fiat against 
maternal mortality that led to intensification of maternal health interventions,12 they are 
further undermined by the tendency among policymakers in India to view them as an 
unnecessary and wasteful duplication of existing sex-unspecific, anti-poverty programs.  
Hence, women-specific individualist programs are periodically terminated in favor of (or 
“merged” or “rationalized” with) sex-unspecific programs operating in the same general 
policy area.  Inadequate appreciation of gender as a distinct axis of inequality – combined 
with, as we find in Chapter 5, the assumption that poverty, not gender, lies at the root of 
women’s troubles – drives attempts to terminate women-specific socioeconomic 
programs. 
Together, the spotlight cast on maternal health by the international development 
community and the effort to address gender through other means, such as by solving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The MDGs did include “gender equality” goal, but its scope was narrowed through its operationalization 
as an educational parity goal between boys and girls. 
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poverty, in India are thus responsible for the growing maternalism of India’s women-
specific social programming. 
Figure 1.1b: Decomposition of real spending on women-specific programs into 
maternalist and individualist spending, before and after the MDGs13 
 
 
*Note: This is the same as Figure 1.1a, except for the red dotted line, which represents the 
introduction of the MDGs and is added to facilitate comparison between pre- and post-MDG 
periods.  Although initially formulated in 2001, the Goals were ready to be implemented after 
2003. 
 
V. Methods and design 
How did this project arrive at the above arguments?  For the descriptive analysis in 
chapter 3, I identified women-specific programs of the government of India, gathered 
expenditure data for these programs, and used the information collected to generate 
estimates of maternalist and individualist spending.  This allowed me to ascertain that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For sources used to gather data for this figure, see sources for Figure 3.2. 
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maternalist spending is indeed increasingly outpacing individualist spending, as indicated 
by Figure 1.1a.   
The empirical core of the project, however, is to be found in Chapters 4 and 5, 
which present a paired comparison of the evolution of two women-specific programs in 
India: Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), a maternalist program for cash assistance to 
pregnant women, and Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY), an individualist program for 
women’s socioeconomic betterment.  The two programs were chosen because of their 
common origins: both were proposed by the same political party in the same electoral 
platform in 1989 and were launched together by the same administration in 1995.  At the 
time that they were introduced, IMY held greater promise: it was announced with much 
fanfare, earned many expressions of support from the incumbent party and coverage in 
the media, was promised an enormous budget outlay, was modeled after existing state-
level programs that were recognized for their success with women, and was based on a 
detailed program blueprint devised at the highest levels of the federal bureaucracy.  JSY, 
on the other hand, had yet to be named, received little attention from the very party 
proposing it as well as from the media, and was nothing more than a throwaway, one-line 
pledge buried in a campaign document. 
Today, however, the fates of the programs have reversed: JSY is among the most 
generously funded of women’s programs in India and is often called the largest 
conditional cash transfer program in the world, while IMY remained small and 
insignificant in terms both of funding and coverage, was dissolved in 2008, and, despite 
repeated efforts by supporters, has never since been revived.  Figure 1.2 shows the 
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contrast in spending on JSY (and its precursor, National Maternity Benefit Scheme, or 
NMBS) and on IMY (and its successor, Swayamsiddha scheme). 
Figure 1.2: Planned and incurred expenditures on JSY and IMY, 1991-201714 
    
The wide divergence between incurred expenditures on NMBS/JSY and 
IMY/Swayamsiddha as well as that between planned and incurred expenditures on 
IMY/Swayamsiddha are a dramatic illustration of the dynamic this project seeks to 
explain: the prioritization of maternalist over individualist programs.  The arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 NMBS refers to National Maternity Benefit Scheme, a precursor to JSY.  For NMBS/JSY, data from 
1995 to 2004 pertain to NMBS; the rest pertain to JSY.  IMY’s name was changed to “Swayamsiddha” in 
2001.  Incurred expenditure data on IMY are not available between 1995 (when the program was 
launched) and 1998.  Incurred expenditure data pertain to IMY from 1998 to 2001 and to its successor, 
Swayamsiddha, after 2001.  Expected expenditure data pertain to a program called Integrated Programme 
of Development for Women and Children (IPDWC), which was initially formulated in 1989 and later 
renamed and launched as IMY in 1995.  IPDWC policy documents did not estimate the expenditure on the 
program beyond 1996-97, but the program was expected to continue after this date.  All expenditure 
figures used in this project are nominal unless indicated otherwise.  For sources, see Figures 4.1 and 5.1. 
 
	  
14 
summarized above are drawn from a comparative analysis of the histories of these two 
programs. 
VI. Alternative explanations 
The existing explanations of maternalism in social policy and the explanations offered by 
this study in the context of India are introduced in sections above.  There are, however, 
alternative explanations possibly consistent with the patterns depicted in Figure 1.1a that 
ought to be addressed.  Subsequent chapters tackle them in detail as they arise.  For now, 
the table below provides a snapshot of possible competing explanations and brief 
reasoning for why they cannot account for the patterns observed in India. 
Table 1.1: Alternative explanations and refutations 
No. Alternative explanation Reason(s) they do not suffice 
1. India’s high maternal and 
infant mortality rates 
create an obvious need for 
better maternal and infant 
health programs in India 
--Before the early 2000s, maternal and infant 
mortality received far less attention despite 
having been higher than in the years after 
--The largest increases in maternal health 
spending have followed, not preceded, sharp 
declines in maternal mortality15 
--Notions of “need” are socially 
constructed/interpreted and vary by place and 
time16 
--There may be an infinite number of need-
based claims on the state at any given time, but 
only a few of these come to be seen as 
legitimate and worthy of state response 
2. The maternalist 
orientation of women-
--This cannot explain the existence of 3 to 5 
times as many individualist women-specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Figures 1.1, 3.5-311, and 4.2  
16 Fraser, “Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation”; Langan, “The Contested Concept of 
Need”; Saugeres, “The Social Construction of Housing Management Discourse: Objectivity, Rationality 
and Everyday Practice,” 97; Beveridge, Special Educational Needs in Schools, 1; Molyneux, “Mothers at the 
Service of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s Conditional Transfer 
Programme,” 438. 
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specific social 
programming makes sense 
given that women-specific 
programs address concerns 
unique to women (like 
maternal health) and sex-
unspecific social programs 
address concerns shared by 
both men and women    
programs as maternalist programs in any given 
year17 
--This cannot explain the initial ambitious 
vision for and planned expenditure on IMY, a 
women-specific individualist program18  
3. India is investing in 
maternal health because, 
unlike before, it can now 
afford to do so 
--Maternalist spending in India has risen not 
only in absolute terms but also as proportion of 
public expenditure 
4. India is a socially 
conservative country, so 
familialist social policy for 
women is to be expected 
--The familialization of women’s social policy 
in India has coincided with liberalization of 
social attitudes about gender roles 
5. Maternalist programs are 
simpler to implement than 
individualist programs 
--Simplicity of implementation depends on 
program design rather than program type 
--JSY, one of India’s key interventions for 
maternal health, began as a “simple,” 
unconditional cash transfer program with a flat 
benefit, but was later converted to a much 
harder-to-implement, conditional cash transfer 
program with complex eligibility criteria and 
varying levels of benefits19 
6. India’s economy cannot 
accommodate greater 
workforce participation by 
women, so the dearth of 
(employment-focused) 
individualist programs 
makes sense 
--For years, policy rhetoric in India has 
problematized not an excess of women’s 
employment but its low and declining rates 
--By theory, we expect market economies to 
want to put people to work 
--In the past, India’s smaller economy 
accommodated greater labor market 
participation by women.  It is unclear why the 
much bigger economy of today would be 
considered incapable of accommodating 
female labor 
--IMY, which began as a “holistic” 
empowerment program, was transformed into 
a livelihoods program over time.  The 
explanation is inconsistent with this shift   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Figure 3.9 
18 See Figure 1.2 
19 See Table 4.1 
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7. There is little to no 
demand for individualist 
programs, so the state does 
not supply them 
--On the contrary, civil society groups and 
state feminists have voiced demands for 
interventions for women’s economic 
empowerment since the 1970s and 1980s20  
--The state does supply them – there are three 
to five times as many individualist programs as 
maternalist programs in any given year – but 
does not fund them to the same degree as 
maternalist programs 
--Civil society groups, international 
organizations, and the women’s ministry 
objected to the termination of Swayamsiddha 
in 2008, but their objections were overridden21   
8. Maternal health policy in 
India is used as a cover to 
advance population control 
objectives 
--The evolution of JSY, including removal of a 
sterilization incentive and elimination of 
eligibility criteria limiting coverage by number 
of children, is inconsistent with this 
explanation22  
9. It is less a concern with 
maternal health, and more 
one with infant health, that 
is driving maternalist 
expenditure in India 
--High infant mortality is a contributor, but the 
study of JSY makes clear it is not infant 
mortality alone, or even primarily, that drives 
that program 
10. The trend toward “gender 
mainstreaming,” promoted 
by international 
organizations, explains the 
dearth of funding for 
individualist programs23 
--Arguments for terminating individualist 
programs or merging them (and their funding) 
with sex-unspecific programs invoke not the 
rationale behind or language of gender 
mainstreaming (i.e., the need to make all 
programs gender-sensitive) but the idea that 
women-specific programs are a wasteful 
duplication of existing sex-unspecific (usually 
anti-poverty) programs 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Sudarshan, “Women Workers: Addressing Constraints to Work,” 429-30; Kumar, The History of Doing, 
102; Hameed and Jain, “Summary: Feminist Economists Engage with India’s Eleventh Five Year Plan,” 6-
7.  
21 See Chapter 5 
22 See Table 4.1 and Chapter 4 
23 “What Is Gender Mainstreaming.” 
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VII. A roadmap 
An average woman in India today is expected to live to about 70 and have 2.2 children 
through the course of her life.  Yet, much of India’s social programming for women deals 
only with the 20 or so months – about 3% of the 624 months of adulthood – that an 
average woman spends pregnant.  Why?  This chapter has outlined briefly the reasons 
behind India’s growing maternalism.  The following chapters provide further detail. 
Chapter 2 discusses how the key terms used in this study – maternalism, 
familialism, individualism, and others – are conceptualized and operationalized, reviews 
existing literatures on maternalism, reveals why they are unable to account for 
maternalism in India today, explains the research design deployed by this study, and ties 
its findings into a theory of budding maternalism in the global south. 
Next, Chapter 3 provides a topographical view of the landscape of women-specific 
programs in India, arguing that, on a range of measures of maternalist and individualist 
policy effort, maternalism is growing relative to individualism in women’s social 
programming. 
Chapters 4 and 5 then trace the histories of a maternalist program (National 
Maternity Benefit Scheme/Janani Suraksha Yojana) and an individualist program (Indira 
Mahila Yojana/Swayamsiddha), respectively, to both discover why. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, considers the extent to which the findings of 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 may be generalized to other programs in, and to countries beyond, 
India.  It ends with an assessment of the immediate outcomes of India’s maternalist 
efforts.  
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CHAPTER 2: Concept, Literature, Design, and Theory 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter serves four broad purposes.  First, section II draws on existing literature to 
conceptualize and operationalize maternalism, distinguishing it from paternalism on the 
one hand and individualism on the other.  It shows that although different conceptions of 
maternalism prevail in the literature, in the context of social policy these can be boiled 
down to a common phenomenon: the practice of making women’s roles as mothers the 
bases for women’s social entitlements.  Next, section III reviews existing literatures on 
maternalism, showing that the richest of these has usually attributed the rise of 
maternalist policy and practice to the presence of one or more of three factors: support 
for pronatalism, advocacy by women’s charitable associations, and influence of political 
Catholicism or Christian Democracy.  It then critiques the literature to reveal its 
limitations; discusses the outcomes and ideologies that have historically been associated 
with maternalism; and, using language of social citizenship, makes the case for studying 
women’s social policy.  Section IV then describes the research design used for this study, 
justifying case selection and explaining how causal inferences are drawn.  Finally, section 
V presents the theory proposed by this dissertation: that the roots of contemporary 
maternalism can be found in the emphasis that the world of international development 
has placed on maternal mortality as a key indicator of women’s well-being in 
development as well as on the conflation of gender and poverty in social policy thinking 
in India. 
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II. Conceptualizing and operationalizing maternalism 
Broadly speaking, maternalism refers to the practice of identifying women as mothers first 
and foremost.  Given the wide range of meanings this general definition of maternalism 
encompasses, it is unsurprising that historical research on maternalism has applied the 
term to denote multiple phenomena.  In a single 1993 edition of the Journal of Women’s 
History, for instance, contributors used the term variously to describe (1) the ideas of mid-
nineteenth-century American women who sought to reclaim motherhood from male-
dominated obstetric and pediatric medicine24; (2) the use of women’s maternal role by 
German feminists as grounds for women’s participation in the public sphere25; (3) 
conflation of women with mothers and policies based on the assumption that “all women 
are potential mothers capable of nurturing children for whom they hold primary 
responsibility”26; (4) an ideology that presented motherhood as a service to the state and a 
rationale for male wages high enough to support the dependent family27; (5) the rise of 
charities to support maternal and child welfare in tsarist Russia28; and (6) a “belief in 
motherhood as an idea validating policies or public actions” in turn-of-20th-century 
Japan.29 These definitions represent a small sample of the range of meanings that have 
been associated with maternalism across time and space. 
In the more specific context of social policy too, understandings of maternalism 
vary.  In this context, “maternalist” is used to describe policies that “recognize and 
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25 Allen, “Maternalism in German Feminist Movements,” 99-100. 
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27 Ladd-Taylor, “Toward Defining Maternalism in US History,”110. 
28 Lindenmeyr, “Maternalism and Child Welfare in Late Imperial Russia,” 118. 
29 Uno, “Maternalism in Modern Japan,” 127. 
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reward care as a female responsibility,”30 address the welfare needs of mothers and 
children,31 or provide support to mothers to enable them to care for children at home,32 
among others.  One definition that captures this range of meanings concisely comes from 
Sainsbury (1996).  Although Sainsbury rarely uses the term “maternalism,” she 
distinguishes models of welfare provision on various dimensions, one of which is the basis 
on which entitlements are provided.  Sainsbury finds that in Western welfare states 
women’s entitlement has often “derived from their status as mothers and wives.”33 
This provides a useful way to conceptualize not only maternalist social policy but 
also the larger universe of gendered social policy.  Drawing from this framework, I define 
maternalist social policy and programs as those under which women’s status as current or 
potential mothers is the basis for the benefits women receive.  Let us unpack this 
definition briefly.  First, the use of “policy and programs” above suggests that both 
general state policy and particular social programs may be classified as maternalist.  
Second, “current or potential mothers” indicates that programs for women who are not 
yet mothers qualify as maternalist if they assume future motherhood and direct benefits 
on this basis.  Examples include programs for pregnant women.  Finally, “basis for the 
benefits women receive” suggests that only benefits for which women qualify due to their 
(current or potential) motherhood can be characterized as maternalist. 
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It is also worth considering here whether programs for family planning and 
contraceptive services qualify as maternalist under this definition.  In the usual usage of 
the term, maternalism is associated with a pro-birth or pro-child stance, as the paragraphs 
above and below document.  On the surface, then, this association would seem to 
disqualify policies and programs designed to control, delay, or prevent birth from being 
identified as maternalist.  Yet, in practice this distinction dissolves quickly.  Two examples 
will clarify the point.  First, in some countries (such as India), the programs that provide 
antenatal and postnatal care to women often also provide family planning services.  While 
the former type of benefits may be considered pro-birth or pro-child, the latter would 
help prevent or delay birth.  Yet the two converge in the same programs, calling a sharp 
practical distinction between birth-promoting and birth-preventing into question.  
Second, at least some measures that normally prevent or delay birth, such as spacing 
methods, might be considered pro-child if framed as measures that keep mothers in better 
health, lower health risk to babies from future pregnancies, and allow mothers to provide 
the best possible care to an existing child without being distracted by another pregnancy 
or a younger child.34  Both these examples blur the line between pro-birth/pro-child and 
birth-preventing.  Given this blurred distinction, in this study family planning programs 
are considered maternalist if they meet the above definition of maternalist programs, 
regardless of whether they appear to be birth-promoting or birth-preventing at first 
glance. 
Our definition of maternalist also indicates that not all programs that place 
women in the home automatically qualify as maternalist: to be characterized as 
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maternalist, they must target women as mothers.  What of programs that target women as 
wives, however?  Borrowing from Skocpol (1992), I distinguish maternalist policy from 
paternalist policy, which directs benefits not to mothers for their care work but to 
breadwinning fathers/husbands as maintenance for their families (including their children 
and wives) or directly to wives in recognition of their dependent status (see Figure 2.1).  
The difference between paternalist and maternalist policy thus amounts to differences in 
the identity of the direct recipient of benefits (mother v. wife) and the purpose for which, 
or the principle based on which, benefits are distributed (principle of care v. principle of 
maintenance).35  While paternalist policies might comprise, for instance, a “family wage,” 
couples’ or family pensions, or other social insurance benefits for men who are then 
assumed to provide maintenance to their wives and children, maternalist policies channel 
benefits to mothers to enable them to provide care for their children.36 
The distinction between paternalist and maternalist measures is not always made 
clear in the gender and welfare literature, where authors have often used the terms 
interchangeably or characterized both maternalist and paternalist initiatives using a 
common label: the male breadwinner model.  Yet, others have argued that paternalist 
and maternalist measures are based on different assumptions about women’s roles in 
society and have different consequences for women.37  Persuaded by the latter argument, 
in this project I distinguish between the two to the extent possible.  I further distinguish 
the paternalist and maternalist policy types from a third type, which we might call the 
“parentalist” model.  Under this type, benefits are channeled neither to the 
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husband/father nor to the wife/mother but to one or both parents, regardless of gender, 
for care of dependent children.38  
Despite their differences, however, all three types of social programs discussed 
above – maternalist, paternalist, and parentalist – do derive from the same general model 
of social policy: one in which entitlements are based on family relationships (mother, wife, 
father, husband, parent) rather than on individual citizenship.39  Here I use the term 
“familialist” to characterize social policies in which familial relationships serve as bases of 
entitlement.  The opposite type of policy, in which benefits are channeled to recipients as 
individuals rather than as members of families, may be described as “individualist.” 
The label “individualist” is borrowed from Karen Offen, who uses it to describe 
the feminist tradition that invoked “abstract concepts of individual human rights and 
celebrated the quest for personal independence (or autonomy) in all aspects of life, while 
downplaying, deprecating, or dismissing as insignificant all socially defined roles and 
minimizing discussion of sex-linked qualities or contributions, including childbearing and 
its attendant responsibilities.”40  Offen distinguishes this feminist tradition from what she 
calls “relationalism” (and what I have called familialism): a set of ideas that grounds 
claims for women’s rights not in women’s individuality and humanity but in their 
childbearing and nurturing capacities.41  Individualist social policy consist of programs 
that address recipients in their roles outside the family, typically as workers, and can be 
broken down further into policies and programs that provide socioeconomic benefits on 
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the one hand and those that target beneficiaries as civic and political actors on the other.  
Although civic and political programs are not usually examined in the welfare literature 
on the grounds that they are not negative or protective measures that the term “welfare” 
implies and instead constitute positive or promotional programs, I include them in the scope 
of the study here because the focus here is broader social policy rather than more 
restricted world of “welfare.”42  
The distinction between familialist and individualist approximates the popular 
distinction proposed by Molyneux (1985) between “practical gender interests” and 
“strategic gender interests.”  The former are “a response to an immediate perceived need 
[of women], and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women’s 
emancipation or gender equality.”43  An example may be access to clean water, since 
women are traditionally responsible for the cooking and cleaning tasks that require a 
large supply of water.  The latter derive “from the analysis of women’s subordination and 
from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those 
which exist.”44  Examples include elimination of institutionalized gender-based 
discrimination, freedom from male violence and control, and political equality.45  In our 
formulation, familialist policies would  orrespond to practical gender interests since they 
work within the framework of the sexual division of labor and individualist policies may 
be considered linked to strategic gender interests because they represent a challenge to 
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the sexual division of labor that is at the core of women’s subordinate status in most 
societies. 
   The above discussion suggests categories of social programs that can be used to 
classify programs for either or both sexes.  Narrowing them to women-specific social 
programs, which are the focus of this study, leads to the typology below (see Figure 2.1).  
The parentalist type is omitted from the figure because, by default, it comprises of 
programs that assist either or both parents, not mothers specifically, and therefore cannot 
be included among women-specific programs. 
Figure 2.1: Typology of women-specific programs 
 
What would some examples of each ideal type look like?  Examples of women-
specific paternalist social programs would be programs that channel benefits to women 
based on their status as current or former wives: old-age pensions for dependent wives, 
old-age pensions for divorced women, and pensions for widows without dependent 
children, among others.  Maternalist programs are programs that provide benefits to 
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mothers: family allowances to mothers, maternal and infant health benefits,46 maternity 
grants, social assistance to poor mothers, pension credits to mothers for childrearing, and 
others.  Examples of women-specific individualist programs of the socioeconomic type 
include benefits for working women, such as jobs or entrepreneurship programs for 
women, and for female students, such as women’s scholarships or vocational training 
programs, among others.  Civic and political individualist programs include initiatives 
designed to promote women’s political participation and community leadership. 
The above categories are ideal types.  In reality, not all women-specific social 
programs fall neatly in one category or another.  Some programs, for instance, fall at the 
intersection of one or more categories: maternity leave programs that assist employed 
women during their pregnancies may be considered part-maternalist and part-
individualist since they address women both as mothers and workers.  Benefits for lone 
mothers, which target women both as mothers and in relation to an absent male partner, 
might be considered part-maternalist and part-paternalist.  These examples suggest that, 
although not every women-specific program can be sorted easily into a single category, 
the fact that these programs can still be described well by reference to the intersection at 
which they fall suggests that the overall typology is useful in understanding the universe of 
women-specific programs. 
How should familialism and individualism in social policy – or social policy effort 
for women as members of families and women in roles outside the home – be measured, 
however?  Policy “effort” is sometimes used interchangeably with policy “attention” and 
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policy “action.”  A common way to operationalize “policy attention” to a given a topic in 
political science literature is by counting the number of legislative hearings on the topic.47  
There are two problems with this approach.  First, it measures “what is being discussed in 
various forums – rather than what the government is actually doing” (emphases added).48  
Second, it directs attention to discussion in the legislature rather than action by the 
executive, which for our purposes means that it directs attention away from the branch of 
government responsible for social policymaking in India.  Since records of deliberations 
in Government of India’s executive branch are not centrally stored and not open to the 
public, counting references to women-as-mothers or women-as-workers (and so forth) in 
executive deliberations is also not an option.  Other possible indicators of policy 
attention/action applicable to India – such as the number of parliamentary questions on 
a given topic, laws, bills, court decisions, and speeches49 – suffer from one or both of these 
drawbacks as well. 
This leaves us with one way in which policy effort for women as mothers, workers, 
etc., can be operationalized: by using social spending as proxy.  At the outset, it should be 
noted that the relationship between social spending and policy effort is not always 
straightforward: budgetary provisions often lag shifts in policy priorities, policy effort can 
occur without causing a visible change in budget outlays, and total spending figures do 
not signify the character of other components of policy effort, such as the extent of 
coverage and degree of generosity of given programs.   
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Despite these limitations, this project uses social spending to operationalize policy 
effort on women in specific roles because (1) there is ample precedence, especially in 
welfare research, for using social spending to measure levels of policy action or policy 
effort50; (2) in India the executive branch both allocates budgetary funding and makes 
social policy, so focusing on budgets allows us to train our attention on the very part of 
the government that leads social policymaking; (3) the expenditure of funds not only 
denotes issue salience but also suggests existence of policy effort since the money has to be 
spent on some action relating to the issue at hand; (4) unlike legislative hearings or 
political speeches, whose differences in length or intensity can render a simple count of 
their number a misleading estimate of policy effort, money is a uniform unit of account, 
which makes comparisons across programs and over time easier; and (5) data on 
budgetary allocations by the Government of India exist and could be accessed for all 
relevant social programs throughout the timeframe of this study. 
III. Literature on maternalism: explanations and limitations 
A. Existing explanations for maternalism 
Now that we understand what maternalism is, let us consider how existing literature has 
sought to explain how it comes to be.  There are two main sources of information on 
maternalism.  The first is the historical welfare literature focusing on advanced 
democracies of the West.  The second is contemporary literature on maternalism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See O’Connor, “Convergene or Divergence?: Change in Welfare Effort in OECD Countries 1960-
1980”; Jensen, “Less Bad than Its Reputation: Social Spending as a Proxy for Welfare Effort in Cross-
National Studies”; Anand and Ravallion, “Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private 
Incomes and Public Services”; Tangermann, “Response to the Article on ‘How Useful Is the PSE in 
Determining Agricultural Support?’ By Arie Oskam and Gerrit Meester”; “Commitment to Development 
Index 2013.” 
 
	  
29 
maternal health in the global south.  The paragraphs below summarize the findings of 
both these bodies of work. 
1. Historical welfare literature (with focus on Europe and the US) 
The richest source of knowledge about maternalism in the English language is 
literature that examines historical welfare arrangements, typically in Europe and the 
United States in the late 1800s and early-to-mid 1900s, often to understand the origins of 
the welfare states that came later.  This sub-section describes the causes of maternalism 
identified by this literature.  However, because the literature often fails to distinguish 
between maternalist and paternalist varieties of familialist social programs, it is not always 
possible to isolate the determinants of maternalism alone.  For this reason, while most of 
the following information pertains to explanations of purely maternalist social policy, in 
some cases literature probing the emergence of programs that we would classify as part-
maternalist and part-paternalist – and in some cases even programs that would best be 
classified as part-maternalist and part-individualist – is also incorporated due to the light 
it shines on the rise of maternalism in social policy. 
Many of the explanations identified by this literature can be divided into three 
categories.  The first of these shows how pronatalism contributes to the rise of 
maternalism; the second demonstrates the pivotal role of women’s charitable 
organizations in lobbying states for maternalist initiatives; and the third examines the role 
of organized religion, especially Catholicism, in fomenting familialist policy.  Let us 
examine each in turn. 
According to welfare state literature, one common cause of maternalism is 
pronatalism, an ideology that promotes population expansion through an increase in 
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birthrates and infant survival rates.  Early 20th-century France provides an example.  
Through the 1800s, birth rates in France declined rapidly.  This triggered fears of 
“depopulation,” which generated support for pronatalism.51  Political elites of all stripes 
spoke publicly about the impending decline of an “empty” France, several private 
organizations were formed to raise awareness about the threats posed by depopulation, 
and popular culture too reflected pronatalist ideals, romanticizing childbearing and 
discouraging contraception.52  This national problematization of low birth rates “fostered 
a civic culture that placed motherhood, fertility and breastfeeding on stage and in the 
public eye.”53  The efforts of a dense network of private associations formed in part to 
fight depopulation resulted in the introduction of arrangements for maternal and infant 
health in France at the turn of the century.54  The arrangements included maternal and 
infant healthcare services, maternity leave, public subsidies to private societies such as 
mutualités maternelles that offered maternity programs, efforts to popularize breastfeeding, 
and others.55  In this way, pronatalism in France begot maternalism. 
Another example comes from Mussolini’s Italy.  During the First World War, 
“when…catastrophic death tolls aggravated concerns about population replacement,” the 
Italian government began to take interest in maternalist and, to some extent, paternalist 
measures.56  In addition to banning abortions – a policy that, because it addresses women 
in their roles as mothers, can be considered maternalist under our definition – it 
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implemented programs for “family allocations, maternity insurance, marriage and birth 
loans, career preferment for fathers of big families, and special institutions established for 
infant and family health and welfare.”57  One such institution was the National Agency 
for Maternity and Infancy (ONMI), which the Mussolini government reorganized in 
1933, turning it into an organization not only for infant care but also for maternal 
welfare, particularly of solo or poor mothers.58  Concerned that unwed mothers were 
likely to abort fetuses or give birth in unsanitary conditions without medical help, ONMI 
organized antenatal checkups for, provided financial assistance to, and reimbursed some 
of the medical expenses of unmarried pregnant women.  In addition, it organized infant 
health services, promoted prenatal and postnatal care, and counseled pregnant women to 
deliver under supervision of trained medical personnel.59  It also encouraged women to 
breastfeed their babies and, in case of solo mothers, to determine paternity to obtain 
financial support from the fathers of the children.60  Here too, then, pronatalism gave rise 
to maternalism. 
The second causal factor identified by the literature on maternalism is women’s 
mobilization through women’s voluntary organizations.61  Early twentieth-century United 
States presents the quintessential example.  Between 1911 and early 1930s, 46 American 
states passed laws providing mothers’ pensions to widowed mothers to help them care for 
their children at home.  Based on the view that all women were current or potential 
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mothers, several states also formulated protective labor regulations for women in the paid 
labor force.  For instance, in the first three decades of the 20th century, nearly all states 
imposed limits on the number of hours women could work for pay on the grounds that 
safeguarding the health and well-being of potential or current mothers by keeping them 
from overextending themselves or being exploited in the workplace was in the country’s 
interest.  As state-level maternalist policies emerged, the federal government too followed 
suit by passing its own maternalist measures: in 1912, for instance, it established the 
Children’s Bureau to look after mothers and children across the country.  Run entirely by 
women, the bureau campaigned successfully for a federal social program, called the 
Sheppard-Tower Infancy and Maternity Protection Act, that provided grants to states to 
establish programs for maternal and infant healthcare.62  Advocacy by middle-class 
women’s voluntary organizations – a dense network of which emerged from women’s 
religious groups, informal cultural and literary clubs, the temperance movement, 
women’s participation in trade unions, and others – lobbied for the passage of each 
measure identified above.63  In addition to advocating maternalist social policy, such 
voluntary organizations enacted their maternalism in other ways too: they were women’s 
organizations, for and by women, and they used language not of equal rights but, 
paradoxically, of women’s different and special nurturing capacities in the private sphere 
of the home to justify women’s public initiatives on behalf of less fortunate mothers and 
children.64  As one analyst of women’s clubs wrote: 
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Women’s place is Home.  Her task is homemaking.  Her talents, as a rule, are 
mainly for homemaking.  But Home is not contained within the four walls of an 
individual home.  Home is the community.  The city full of people is the Family.  
The public school is the real Nursery.  And badly do the Home and the Family 
and the Nursey need their mother.65  
 
This wider conception of the “home,” and therefore of the natural domain of 
women’s activities, drove maternalist measures in early 20th-century Argentina as well.  
Women-led charitable organizations such as Sociedad de Beneficencia ran the earliest 
programs for maternal and infant health in Argentina, providing a foundation for later 
state initiatives such as the Infant-Maternity Programmes that began in the 1930s.66  The 
“powerful” women who ran the Sociedad campaigned for expansion of state provisions for 
mothers and children.  Over time, as male physicians began to claim the maternal-and-
child-health space formerly occupied by women’s organizations, state institutions grew 
stronger and expanded their reach, and women’s collective voice weakened due to 
internal divisions, women’s influence on social policy waned.67  Thus, although women’s 
organizations did not shepherd maternalist social policy through all stages of 
development, their early initiatives for and advocacy on behalf of mothers and children 
“paved the way for future developments of the welfare state and, consequently, state-led 
maternal and child provisions at the national level.”68 
A third social phenomenon driving maternalist policymaking is political 
mobilization of organized religion, especially political Catholicism or Christian 
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Democracy.69  Christian Democracy has been defined as “a political movement inspired 
by Christianity, independent of the Church but rooted in Christian tradition.”70  It is 
considered the most successful political movement in western Europe since 1945,71 with 
presence in the form of political parties in at least 13 European countries in recent years.72  
The contemporary Christian Democratic parties evolved from Catholic parties that 
emerged in the late 1800s and early1900s in several countries across Europe, including 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and France.73  Christian Democratic 
ideology emphasizes the principles of (1) subsidiarity, which holds that social functions 
should be performed at the lowest possible level (for instance at the level of family or 
community) rather than at the level of the state, and (2) the desirability of the traditional 
family consisting of a breadwinner male and a caregiving female.74  In practice, 
subsidiarity and glorification of the traditional family lent themselves to familialist social 
policy, including both its paternalist and maternalist variants.75  For instance, postwar 
Germany, anxious to place women back in the home as caregivers after the tumultuous 
Nazi years, introduced no-interest marriage loans to incentivize young (heterosexual) 
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couples to marry, as long as the bride agreed to leave or remain out of the workforce.  
With each child that the newlywed woman had, one-quarter of the loan was forgiven.  A 
married woman who bore four children could have the entire loan waived.76  Analysts 
have attributed such familialist/maternalist benefits to the Christian Democratic 
influence in Germany.77  
The association between politically mobilized organized religion and a policy 
framework that encourages traditional family arrangements is confirmed through cross-
national analyses as well.  For instance, one influential study found that out of eight 
countries (Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and 
France) with the strongest Catholic or Protestant political parties, seven (all except 
Switzerland) had family policy that approximated what the author calls the “general 
family support” model, which provides support to the nuclear family and assumes the 
existence of a male breadwinner and a female caregiver.78  The model comprised 
programs such as cash allowances for minor children, family tax benefits for minor 
children, and public daycare services for minor children older than three.79  These 
programs may not have been overtly gendered, but in practice they tended to promote a 
traditional division of labor, especially in absence of measures (such as maternity leave) 
specifically incentivizing or enabling female labor market participation.  If programs such 
as public daycare for very young children and paid maternity and paternity leave too 
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existed in the countries characterized by the general family support model, they were 
likely to be weak.80  The overall orientation of family policy in these countries was 
therefore familialistic, driven in large part by the political strength of religious parties 
idealizing the traditional family. 
Taken together, the above three explanations for historical maternalist social 
policy form the critical mass of explanations offered in the literature examining the 
(origins of) the west European and American welfare states.  What of social policy 
maternalism in recent times, however?  The section below examines works on 
contemporary maternalism.   
2. Literature on contemporary maternalism 
In addition to the historical welfare literature on maternalism summarized above, 
a smaller, more contemporary literature exists that illuminates policymaking on women 
as mothers in countries around the world today.  There are two strands of this literature: 
one examines the emergence in social policy in middle- and lower-income country 
contexts and internationally of ideas about the social responsibilities of motherhood (that 
is, ideas of mothercraft), and the other examines rising attention to the biological aspects 
of motherhood (that is, to maternal health) in the global south.  In other words, the first 
strand examines social maternalism while the second studies biological maternalism. 
a. Contemporary literature on social maternalism 
Much of this strand of the literature responds to the argument, made largely in the 
welfare literature of affluent Western countries, that advanced democracies of the West 
are bidding “farewell to maternalism” and switching to an “adult-worker model” of social 
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policy that encourages women to work for pay and supports them primarily as paid 
workers who happen to also have caregiving responsibilities that are to be delegated or 
reconciled with paid work.81  This change, the literature argues, is apparent in the Nordic 
countries, Italy, United States, and in even the “former bastions” of familialist policy: the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands.82 
The “farewell” scholarship attributes the abandonment of the maternalist model 
in the West to a range of factors, including changes in cultural notions of appropriate 
gender roles, the second-wave feminist movement, women’s mass entry into the 
workforce, welfare state retrenchment, economic stagnation that has impeded the ability 
of many families to attain an acceptable standard of living through the male wage alone, 
and – in the face of labor shortages, opposition to immigration, and overstretched 
pension systems – the state’s interest in expanding the pool of working people who can 
pay taxes and make pension contributions.83  The policy shift has taken various forms, 
such as elimination of or reduction in support for full-time motherhood (even in case of 
lone mothers), introduction of labor activation policies that encourage workforce 
participation, tax reforms that favor employed mothers over those who provide care full 
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time, and others.84  While motherhood has not lost its cultural cachet, the possibility of 
using motherhood as a basis for entitlements is shrinking.85  Both societies and states are 
thus responsible for the shift away from maternalism/familialism. 
While other scholars of affluent democratic welfare states concur that such a shift 
is indeed underway,86 analysts of social policy in other parts of the world have pushed 
back against the farewell-to-maternalism thesis.  The rebuttal takes two forms: the first 
focuses on resurgent familialism (in both its paternalist and maternalist manifestations) in 
specific countries such as Poland, Hungary, Mexico, and Iran87 and the other reveals the 
maternalist character of social policy pronouncements emerging on the international 
stage, including from groupings of affluent Western democracies that may have rejected 
maternalist social policy domestically but promote social policy of a maternalist character 
in their international policy rhetoric.88  The following examples illustrate the two types. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of the country-focused type of rebuttal is 
research on an innovative conditional cash program in Mexico that is now emulated 
across South America and other middle- and low-income economies.  Established in 
1997, the program was first called Progresa, renamed Oportunidades, and has most 
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recently been known as Prospera.  Based on the theory that poor families’ inability to 
invest in the human capital of their children is what transmits poverty to future 
generations, the program seeks to provide cash incentives to poor mothers to make such 
investments.  The funds are dispensed directly to mothers in recognition of “the potential 
of mothers to use resources effectively and efficiently in a manner that reflects the 
immediate needs of the family.”89  In return for the cash, mothers are made responsible 
for: 
…taking children for regular health checks, meeting targets for ensuring their 
children’s attendance at school, attending workshops on health and programme 
coordinators’ meetings, and contributing a set amount of hours of work to the 
programme, typically cleaning buildings or clearing rubbish.  Failure to comply 
with the requirements can lead to being struck off the programme.90 
 
In this way, Progresa and its successor programs both assume and reinforce the idea that 
mothers are primarily responsible for caregiving.  The integration of women as mothers 
does not end there, however.  In addition to compensating women in cash for their efforts 
on behalf of their children, the program also provides healthcare benefits to pregnant 
women and infants, again making impending motherhood the basis for the benefits that 
women receive from the program.91  Hence, contrary to the “farewell to maternalism” 
observed in literature examining western Europe and the US, analysts studying other 
parts of the world find that cash transfer programs such as Progresa are (re)introducing 
maternalism in social policy.92 
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The other form of rebuttal examines not specific policies and programs as case 
studies but the content of policy agendas formulated at the international level.  It finds 
that the social policy ideas that organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have adopted and 
reproduced derive from the “social investment” perspective, which favors public spending 
to build human capital.  The social investment perspective focuses especially on children, 
the primary responsibility for whose well-being and appropriate development is assumed 
to rest with mothers.  Just like in the case of Progresa, then, an overarching concern with 
the child incorporates women solely as mothers, leading to maternalism in social policy.93 
Thus, although the literature on contemporary maternalism is not nearly as vast 
as that on early maternalism in the incipient European and American welfare states, it 
does serve to counter arguments, derived from analyses of the changing nature of the 
same welfare states, that maternalism is a thing of the past.  It shows that, at least in some 
parts of the world and in international policymaking, the maternalist ideology is alive, 
kicking, and shaping social policy relevant to women.   
b. Contemporary biological maternalism (or maternal health) literature 
The second strand of contemporary maternalism literature relevant for this 
project studies the politics of the biological aspects of motherhood – that is, of maternal 
health – in the context of development.  Although scholars writing in this genre do not see 
themselves as writing in the maternalist tradition or even invoke the term “maternalism,” 
the subject matter of this literature qualifies as maternalist both because it relates to 
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women in their current or potential roles as mothers and because the historical welfare 
state literature has traditionally studied maternal health programs as part of maternalist 
social policy.  Following this convention, here I consider the contemporary maternal 
health literature a subset of the contemporary maternalist literature.   
Motivated by the observation that attention to maternal health is rising both 
within some countries and internationally, this literature seeks to explain what has 
prompted this change.  However, because this scholarship is at an early stage, it is not yet 
able to offer consolidated and well-specified theories about when and why maternal 
health gains political salience.   Instead, it uses single-country or subnational case studies, 
cross-country comparisons, and examination of international policy processes to 
contribute a series of narrower hypotheses for public policy effort on maternal health. 
The hypotheses are many and varied, and thus difficult to cover comprehensively 
in this review.  To provide a small sample, however, the following list introduces some of 
the causes of maternalism identified by this literature: evidence of the magnitude of the 
problem of poor maternal health, usage of human-rights and social-justice frameworks to 
frame the issue, focusing events, media attention to maternal health, existence of 
inexpensive policy solutions, evidence of prior policy failures, supportive policy 
environment, the electoral salience of social equity issues, political transitions, linkage 
with key national priorities, domestic ownership of available policy solutions, support 
from domestic and international actors, advocacy by civil society, consonance with 
international policy priorities, countries’ aspirations on the global stage, and others.94  
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This literature attribute growing policy attention to maternal health to all these factors, 
and others not listed here.  
B. Advancing the literature 
The literatures identified above thus add much to our understanding of the causes 
of maternalist social policy, but each literature also displays shortcomings that are 
important to note.  The following paragraphs consider the blind spots of each type of 
literature: the historical welfare literature and scholarship on contemporary maternalism, 
(including works on social maternalism and maternal health). 
1. Limitations of the historical welfare literature 
As we saw above, students of social policy maternalism owe a great deal to the 
historical welfare literature, which usually focuses on the 20th-century roots of west 
European and American welfare states, for its systematic attention to maternalism.  This 
scholarship not only recognized the existence of maternalist social policy as a 
phenomenon worthy of study but also explicated what constitutes maternalism, what 
brings it about, and how it shapes gender relations.  These factors make the historical 
Western literature on welfare the richest English-language source of information on 
maternalist social policy.   
Yet, this literature has various shortcomings.  First, it fails to pay attention to, let 
alone conceptualize, social policy and programs that are overtly gendered but that do not 
address women through a familial lens.  In other words, this literature ignores the 
possibility of the existence of programs that we have classified as “individualist” – 
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programs that are meant specifically for women but that assist women in their roles as 
students, paid workers, entrepreneurs, political and civic actors, and others.  Because this 
scholarship does not consider the possibility of such programs, its claims about the extent 
to which overall social policy for women in a given country was familialist/maternalist are 
suspect.  Readers are led to assume, rather than be persuaded through explicit 
argumentation and substantiation, that the thrust of social policy is familialist in nature.  
Without information on the individualist components (if any) of a given country’s social 
policy arrangements, however, the reader cannot weigh the degree to which familialism 
dominates social policy and therefore cannot determine if the overall orientation of 
women-relevant social policy is familialist, individualist, or an equal mix of the two.  For 
this reason, the reader is not able to adjudicate if the claim that social policy for women is 
heavily familialist/maternalist is reasonable or overblown. 
To be fair, it is likely that the lack of conceptualization of the opposite of 
familialist social policy – individualist social policy – results from the manner in which the 
term “welfare” has usually been interpreted: as negative measures (those designed to keep 
people from falling below an acceptable standard of living) rather than positive ones (those 
designed to help people advance socioeconomically).  Yet, the distinction is often 
arbitrary and not followed consistently: The Oxford Handbook on Welfare States, for instance, 
includes labor activation policy and education policy – both of which would usually be 
considered positive or promotional social policies rather than negative or preventive – as 
examples of welfare policy.95  For this reason, the lack of attention to individualist policy 
for women, although understandable, undermines the extent to which the historical 
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Western welfare state literature can credibly claim that social policy for women in early 
20th-century western Europe and the United States was heavily familialist/maternalist. 
Second, this literature rarely probes the possible causal effect of regional, 
transnational, or international phenomena on familialist/maternalist policies in particular 
countries.  Focused on single country case studies or cross-country comparisons, it 
attributes social policy maternalism largely to domestic factors: domestic pronatalism, 
domestic women’s movements, domestic religious parties, and others.  Yet, the fact that 
so many European countries enacted familialist policies for women around the turn of the 
20th century at least raises the possibility that transnational or international factors played 
in role in shaping social policy.  For instance, it is possible that women’s organizations 
forged regional or international partnerships that allowed them to exchange ideas, 
coordinate strategies, and learn from each other.  Along similar lines, perhaps the 
Christian Democratic parties in various countries established contact and sought to align 
their political platforms to some degree, or political actors, policymakers, and bureaucrats 
in each country attempted to monitor the social policy experiences of their neighbors.  
Alternatively, it is possible that social policy researchers in each country interacted with 
their counterparts in other countries to exchange lessons on best practice.  The literature 
on familialism in welfare sheds little light on the above questions, leaving the possibility – 
or, more appropriately, the probability, given the simultaneity of social policy expansion 
in western Europe in the late 1800s and early 1900s, – of transnational or international 
influences on the familialist model unexplored. 
Again, the roots of this oversight are understandable.  Unable to conduct scientific 
experiments on countries and societies, social policy scholars have had to make use of one 
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of the few tools at their disposal that allow them to make causal inferences: the 
comparative method.  For this reason, works exploiting differences in the social policy 
arrangements of different countries abound in the literature and have added 
tremendously to our understanding of multiple causal factors and pathways.  Yet, this 
focus on the differences between social policy arrangements has obscured a basic 
commonality: the almost-contemporaneous emergence across western Europe of social 
policy arrangements that not only prefigured soon-to-come welfare states but also made 
women’s positions as wives and mothers the key bases for women’s entitlements.  That 
such cross-country similarity existed suggests cross-country forces were at play.  The 
existing historical welfare literature is largely inattentive to such forces, implicitly 
conveying the impression that they either did not exist or did not matter.  Analyses of 
maternalism have thus remained country centric and the possible roles of developments 
occurring at the transnational and international levels – including, but not limited to, the 
formation of the International Labour Organization and the League of Nations during 
the interwar period – in fomenting maternalist social policy are not adequately 
understood. 
Finally, the historical welfare literature illuminates familialism of the 20th-century 
affluent democracies but serves us less well if our objective is to understand the current 
maternalist wave, which consists in particular of programs for maternal health and which 
is spreading across the global south.  There are several reasons why the explanations 
offered by this literature do not travel easily to other parts of the world.  First, the 
“problems” to which familialism/maternalism was a response in 20th-century Europe do 
not exist or do not have the same resonance in the global south.  Depopulation-driven 
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pronatalism, for instance, is a non-starter as an explanation for maternalism in most 
developing countries because there is little threat of de-population in these countries.96  
Second, the types of actors who drove familialist social policy in the Western welfare 
states are either missing or not equally powerful in the global south.  The dense networks 
of middle-class women’s voluntary organizations that lobbied for maternalist measures in 
20th-century United States, for instance, find no equivalents in contemporary India, 
which (as the next chapter will show) has decisively focused policy attention on women as 
mothers.  While elite feminist organizations and women’s activist groups demanding state 
attention to maternal health exist, the penetration of such groups across levels of 
government and sections of society is so limited that,97 unlike women’s groups in the 
Progressive Era United States, they cannot be deemed to represent anything like a mass 
movement of women.  And finally, the ideological sanction that political Catholicism or 
Christian Democracy provided to familialist social policy in Europe is missing in many 
countries of the global south, where political Catholicism is less powerful a force than it 
was in 20th-century Europe or where, in countries such as India, the sociopolitical arms of 
the dominant religions have taken little interest in women’s public programming.98 
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2. Limitations of the contemporary literature on maternalism 
If the historical welfare literature has limitations, so do both strands of the 
contemporary literature on maternalism.   
a. Limitations of contemporary literature on social maternalism 
The first strand – which self-identifies as scholarship on maternalism and 
examines social policy that codifies women’s social responsibilities as mothers – is limited 
usually due to its examination of single case study programs (such as Progresa in Mexico).  
This focus means that, just like historical welfare literature, this pioneering contemporary 
literature cannot tell us about the balance of maternalist and non-maternalist programs in 
the women’s social policy landscape.  Are there other programs in same country that also 
channel benefits to women based on their work as mothers?  Are there other programs 
that target women in non-familial roles?  Without this big-picture view, we cannot assess 
if maternalism is a marginal phenomenon in women’s social policy in the countries 
covered by these studies or a central one.  Even where multiple examples of maternalist 
policymaking are provided,99 in absence of discussion of any non-familialist/non-
maternalist policies that might also be in place, the overall incidence of maternalism in 
social policymaking is unclear, leaving us unable to assess the pervasiveness of 
maternalism in women’s social policy. 
Second, this literature too focuses usually on domestic policymaking, rarely 
placing the emergence of maternalist social policy in one country in its regional or 
international contexts.  This means that, once again, the cross-country character of the 
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newest wave of maternalist policymaking is obscured, allowing domestic explanations to 
occupy pride of place and the roles of influential international or transnational 
developments to be relegated to the background.  Works that are more systematically 
attuned to maternalist developments in international policy rhetoric, on the other hand, 
have the opposite limitation: they focus on maternalist policy rhetoric rather than policy 
action and allocations.  The result is that we know a bit about the maternalist bent of 
international policy rhetoric and about a small number of prominent maternalist policy 
initiatives in various countries, but do not have a sense of the extent to which maternalism 
in social policy in one country is a unique occurrence or part of a general trend toward 
maternalism in similar countries. 
Finally, this literature focuses on the way social policy codifies social 
responsibilities of motherhood, a focus that draws attention away from the other, likely 
more pervasive, form of maternalism in social policy: biological maternalism, or 
maternalism under which the biological aspects of motherhood (such as pregnancy and 
nursing) become the bases for the benefits women receive.  This strand of the 
contemporary maternalist literature does not examine the extent to which programs for 
pregnant women and nursing mothers dominate social policy for women, potentially 
missing a large component of programming dealing with mothers in their maternal roles.  
Of course, the aim of these works is usually to explore why and how the social 
responsibilities of motherhood come to be reinforced through policy, so the choice not to 
study programs dealing with biological aspects of motherhood is understandable.  Yet, the 
biological-maternalist programs are not devoid of ideas about the proper duties of 
motherhood.  Many require, or at least urge, women to improve their diets during their 
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pregnancies, undergo prenatal tests, deliver with assistance from trained medical 
personnel, breastfeed their newborns, ensure that the infants undergo appropriate 
medical tests in the days after birth, monitor the newborns’ health, get children 
immunized at the right intervals, and others.  Thus, although maternal health initiatives 
deal largely with the physical aspects of pregnancy and childbirth, they – like social 
maternalist programs – assume and reinforce ideas about proper mothercraft.  By not 
including these programs in its scope of study, then, this first strand of the contemporary 
maternalist literature misses out on important instances of maternalism in social policy 
today. 
b. Limitations of contemporary literature on biological maternalism 
The second strand of the literature, on the other hand, focuses squarely on 
biological maternalism, helping us understand if, where, why, and how maternal health 
has become politically salient.  While, like the other literatures discussed above, this 
scholarship adds to our knowledge of maternalism in social policy, it too has various 
limitations. 
First, this literature does not self-identify as maternalist or see the links between its 
own subject matter and that of any maternalist literature discussed above.  Because this 
literature does not see itself as part of the rich tradition of the study of maternalism, it is 
unable to use the findings of other works on maternalism to illuminate its own.  The 
resulting studies are thus both ahistorical, in that they do not place the contemporary 
political salience of maternal health in the historical context of a similar maternalist turn 
in Europe and the US in the past, and oblivious to the way the biological maternalism of 
maternal health programs shares similarities with social maternalism of other, coexisting 
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programs.  And, in not seeing its subject matter as maternalist, the maternal health 
literature misses the deeply political reasons why maternal health programs are worthy of 
study: not only because they deal with an important facet of women’s health, but also 
because of the way they which they become inextricably linked with questions of 
population size and quality, futures of races and nations, gender roles, gender relations, 
and the bases for women’s social citizenship (more on this below).  Studies of the politics 
of maternal health that treat maternal health as a technical matter thus miss the true 
politics of maternal health: the demographic, racial, and gender anxieties that often drive 
attention to it in the first place. 
The second limitation of contemporary maternal health literature is that it is not 
yet able to offer coherent theories of when and why governments become interested in 
maternal health.  As we saw above, the literature does offer many explanations for rising 
attention to maternal health, but it does not analyze them enough to suggest which 
among the dozens of explanations highlighted, often in a single study, have the most 
explanatory power.  One study, for instance, highlights eleven predictors of political 
priority to maternal health: policy community cohesion, leadership, guiding institutions, 
civil society mobilization, internal frame, external frame, policy windows, global 
governance structure, credible indicators of the problem, severity of the problem, and 
effective interventions.100  These are then sorted into four broader categories: actor 
power, ideas, political contexts, and issue characteristics.101  While this provides a 
comprehensive and much-needed framework for analysis for a budding literature, it 
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serves us less well if our objective is to understand the relative importance of the 
predictors identified and formulate a concise theory of the political salience of maternal 
health.  To be fair, ranking predictors in order of importance and building a grand theory 
of the politics of maternal health were not the explicit aims of the study above.  Yet, a 
long list of factors that matter can explain political phenomena only to some extent; the 
remaining explanation must come from a detailed analysis of the handful of factors that 
matter most.  So, while the exhaustive approach that characterizes this literature 
produces studies that catalog thoroughly the many and varied causes of policy effort for 
maternal health, thus far it has impeded deeper exploration of which of the many factors 
has/have the highest explanatory power and why.  For this reason, it remains difficult to 
derive parsimonious theories of the political salience of maternal health from this 
literature. 
  Finally, the maternal health literature rarely uses the comparative method to 
bolster its claims.  While there are select exceptions, such as Smith and Shiffman’s (2016) 
work comparing political priority for maternal survival to that for newborn survival,102 
most work in this genre does not use explicit comparative cases as counterfactuals.  The 
level of attention to or spending on maternal health is not examined in relation to that on 
other comparable health issues or other comparable policy areas of relevance to women.  
Attention to maternal health is also rarely compared across countries.  As a result, 
although this literature tracks processes associated with rising policy effort for maternal 
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health, it misses the opportunity to deploy a comparative design to make its causal claims 
even more persuasive.         
It is on the above dimensions that this project seeks to adds value.  Before we 
proceed to a discussion of the research design it deploys and the theory it puts forth, let us 
discuss the merits of maternalism in social policy. 
C. Assessing maternalism 
The above paragraphs may convey the impression that maternalism is a simple, 
apolitical, even technical phenomenon – one that serves as grounds for women’s greater 
public participation, involves greater attention to the well-being of mothers and children, 
brings medical knowledge to bear on maternal and child health, and recognizes care work 
as work.  In many ways, this sanguine interpretation holds true.  Hundreds of thousands of 
women, if not more, have undoubtedly benefited over the years from improvements in 
maternity care and provision of financial support to mothers resulting from the 
maternalist policies described above.  And many others, it is clear, exercised agency and 
found empowerment in carving out space for themselves in the otherwise masculine 
public sphere. 
Yet there exists a darker, less salutary aspect to maternalism: its historical 
association with sexual control and repression, restrictive interpretations of acceptable 
family forms, eugenics, racism, and class prejudice.  The paragraphs below examine this 
checkered past of maternalism, arguing that maternalism’s link to children, on whom 
anxieties regarding the future of the family/race/nation/religion/culture/social 
order/economy/military tend to be projected, makes it uniquely susceptible to 
permeation or cooptation by reactionary ideologies. 
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In its early pages, this chapter described the role of Christian Democracy in 
fomenting support for mothers in social policymaking in Germany, Austria, and others.  
Yet, it is important to note that the influence of the Church did not lead to support for all 
mothers.  In 1929 in the Netherlands, for instance, Catholic and Protestant groups 
lobbied to exclude unmarried mothers from the maternity benefits provided by the Dutch 
health law.  The benefits were financed by employer and employee contributions, and 
took the shape of paid maternity leave and medical care for pregnant women in industrial 
occupations.103  Originally, the act made no distinction between married and unmarried 
women.  Catholic and Protestant groups argued, however, that providing maternity 
benefits to married and unmarried mothers alike would undermine the traditional Dutch 
family, which was built around marriage, and cause moral pollution.  Although feminist 
groups initially opposed the exclusion of unwed mothers, religious parties used their 
parliamentary majority to restrict eligibility to married women alone.104  In this way, 
religious parties used maternalist and familialist arguments to further sexual control and 
repression: only sexual activity that occurred in the context of marriage was deemed 
appropriate, and only pregnancies and children resulting from such activity were said to 
deserve care and financial support.  Unwed mothers and their children could not claim 
equal rights to either. 
Italian maternalism of the early 20th century advanced a similarly circumscribed 
notion of appropriate sexuality and acceptable family forms.  First, it was accompanied by 
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a crackdown on (female) prostitution under which sex workers were imprisoned or 
compelled to work in state-run brothels.  This ensured that while men still had access to 
sexual services, the women providing such services lived under constant police 
harassment and threat of imprisonment.  The crackdown was part of an effort to draw a 
distinction between “good” and “bad” women and to reinforce the illicitness of sex and 
motherhood occurring outside the marital context.105  Second, the Italian state 
criminalized not only abortion but also the dissemination of information about birth 
control as well as the act, even indirectly, of publicly encouraging women to use 
contraception or obtain an abortion.  In practice, this meant that abortions continued but 
were driven underground and became less safe.106  Third, to elevate the traditional family 
(comprised of a man, his wife, and their children) above all other family forms, the state 
refused to grant equal inheritance rights to children born out of wedlock and ONMI, the 
same state agency that looked after the needs of lone mothers, encouraged unmarried 
couples with children to “legalize their illegitimate unions.”107  In these ways, Italian 
maternalism worked in tandem with policies designed to further sexual control and a 
narrow definition of what constitutes a legitimate family. 
Equally troubling have been the links between maternalism and eugenics.  In 
Germany and Romania, for instance, the same women who used maternalist arguments 
to draw attention to the plight of poor mothers and children in the 1920s participated also 
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in eugenic organizations.108  Concerned about “crowding, pollution, and ill health in the 
urban environment” as well as the decline of the traditional family (as in western Europe), 
they advocated measures designed not to maximize the size of the population but to 
optimize its “quality.”109  In the United States, too, maternalists and eugenicists were 
linked in many ways: prominent maternalists, who campaigned successfully for various 
state programs for mothers, allied with eugenic organizations; maternal and child health 
initiatives were often justified using the language of racial progress; a renowned 
organization designed to study and prevent infant mortality included a section on 
eugenics; the women’s clubs that led the drive for maternalist measures lobbied also for 
eugenic sterilization; and others.110  Maternalism and eugenic practice thus developed 
symbiotically. 
Relatedly, maternalism has been intertwined with racism as well.  Wherever 
maternalist policies have been formulated, they have raised questions about which 
mothers deserve benefits and why.  Unsurprisingly, in many cases, the answer has favored 
mothers of the dominant racial group.  For example, as American states in the early 20th 
century legislated provisions for mothers’ pensions, they also formulated rules for who 
deserved to benefit from them.  The pensions, they decided, were to go to mothers “of 
good character suffering from temporary misfortune” who could provide “proper care to 
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their children in ‘suitable’ homes.”111  The criteria turned out to be code for “white”: in 
practice, it was largely white widowed mothers who were deemed to be mothers of “good 
character” with “suitable” homes and thus came to benefit from the pensions.  In 1931, 
for instance, at a time when nearly 10% of the country’s population was black, 96% of 
nearly 50,000 women receiving mothers’ pensions were white and only three percent 
were black.112  Even in states and cities with heavier concentrations of black populations, 
black women formed a much smaller proportion of the recipients of mothers’ pensions – 
that is, if they received the benefit at all.113  Supporters of mothers’ pensions also 
presented pensions as a way to reform ostensibly uncultured immigrant mothers and 
children, raising them “up to ‘American’ standards.”114  In this way, by equating 
deservingness with whiteness and framing mothers’ benefits as a way to civilize 
immigrants, maternalism gave expression to racial bias. 
However, it is not only racial bias that found expression in maternalism.  
Maternalist motivations often stemmed from class prejudice toward the poor.  Recent 
research has discovered hints of condescension in the rhetoric of American maternalists, 
usually middle-class women, working for the benefit of poor mothers.115  In some cases, 
maternalists were driven not only by sympathy for single mothers and poor children but 
also by the fear that “the child-raising practices of the poor might produce adults lacking 
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in discipline, independence, and impulse control.”116  Worried that the poorly-raised 
children of the poor represented threats to the social order, middle-class maternalists 
imposed their own standards of care, calling the mothering practices of poor women into 
question.  They also misinterpreted what poor women needed most: while poor women 
themselves identified financial support as their primary need, middle-class women 
determined that what they needed most was education.117  Middle-class female social 
workers, asked to make sure that recipients of mothers’ benefits were maintaining 
“suitable homes” for children, inevitably drew from their own class-shaped 
understandings of a fitting home.  When the caregiving skills of poor mothers were found 
wanting, they pressured the women to take classes in English, infant care, nutrition, and 
others.  Like racial prejudice, then, class prejudice too animated maternalism. 
Maternalism is thus neither invariably “good” nor always “bad” in social policy.  
Much depends on the design of maternalist programs, the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, and the extent to which maternalist policy serves as a vehicle for reactionary 
ideologies.  Whether Indian maternalism, the topic of this project, works in favor of 
women is a more specific question that we address in the concluding chapter.  Here, a 
different question is in order: why study maternalism in the first place?   
D. Why study social policy for women? 
Beyond the direct impact of social policy on the women (and children) who are its 
direct beneficiaries, women’s social policy has two important implications: it tells us about 
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the process by which women’s “needs” come to be politically defined, and it is likely to 
have significant impact on the shape of the future welfare systems in the global south. 
The first reason relates to the claim that social policy responds to social “needs.”   
Since needs are rarely “self-evident and beyond dispute”118 however, the existence of 
social policy raises the questions: who decides what social conditions qualify as legitimate 
social needs deserving a social policy response, and how is this decision taken?  As one 
observer of the constructed nature of our perceptions of social needs argues: “the 
interpretation of people’s needs is itself a political stake, indeed sometimes the political 
stake.”119  Applied to our context, the argument suggests that women’s social policy is 
worthy of study because it reveals how women’s “needs” are being understood in Indian 
society and who is doing the defining.  How did India come to decide that pregnant 
women’s needs are the most pressing among adult women’s needs?  How did pregnant 
women’s needs come to be interpreted narrowly as the needs that arise in the days 
surrounding childbirth, rather than the lifelong needs of better nutrition, access to health 
facilities, and reproductive and bodily autonomy?  How did women’s socioeconomic 
needs – functional and legal literacy, higher education, vocational and professional 
training, jobs, access to financial institutions, equitable opportunity for political 
participation and leadership, freedom from domestic and sexual violence, access to 
government services of all types, self-determination in everyday life, better social status 
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overall – come to take a back seat?  A study of women’s social policy promises a window 
into the gendered “politics of need interpretation”120 in India. 
The second reason is that the current, inchoate social policy in developing 
countries is likely to shape future, more comprehensive welfare arrangements of the 
future.  Because many of these countries do not yet have well-developed welfare states, 
the welfare infrastructures they put in place today are likely to provide the foundations for 
the more elaborate welfare states of tomorrow, at least if the European and American 
experiences are any indication.121  Much of what we know now about maternalism in the 
early welfare arrangements of 20th-century European countries was discovered through 
efforts to understand the origins of present-day welfare states – efforts that were 
undertaken precisely because these early arrangements were known to have shaped in 
crucial ways the welfare states that succeeded them.  Women’s social policy in the 
emergent welfare states of the global south is thus worthy of study not only for its current 
effects on millions of women and children but also because, simply put, policies have 
legacies: they foreclose some possibilities for the future and make others more likely. 
One way to think about the impact of maternalist social policy on current and 
future systems of social provisioning is through use of the concept of social citizenship.122  
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T.H. Marshall’s canonical definition of social citizenship distinguishes social citizenship 
from two others forms of citizenship – civil and political – which Marshall argues 
preceded the development of the social element of citizenship.  Although other analysts 
have disputed the chronology theorized by Marshall on the grounds that the sequence he 
posits assumes a male citizen,123 Marshall’s typology of citizenship has been accepted 
widely.  In Marshall’s formulation, civil citizenship refers to “the rights necessary for 
individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right 
to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice,”124 and political 
citizenship is “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a 
body invested with political authority or an elector of the members of such a body.”125  In 
contrast, social citizenship is described as comprising of “the whole range [of rights] from 
the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in 
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society.”126  
If social citizenship is the right to economic security and social well-being, then 
systems of social provisioning are the means through which social citizenship is realized.  
Most components of any system of social provisioning address women as ungendered 
beings, through gender-blind programs meant for both men and women.  However, the 
different social positions of men and women mean that these programs, although 
technically gender-blind, are rarely gender neutral.  Designed to benefit genderless 
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workers or heads of (poor) households, they do not officially preclude women, but the 
predominance of men in the workforce and as heads of households means women’s access 
to benefits is limited.  The result is that the direct benefits from ostensibly gender-blind 
social programs accrue mostly to men.127 
How are women to exercise their social citizenship, then?  Unlike the gender-
blind programs that dominate the social policy landscape, a few programs may take 
gender explicitly into account, for instance by limiting eligibility to women in recognition 
of women’s disadvantaged social position.  It is these programs that this project has called 
“women-specific programs.”  Bereft of equal opportunity to exercise their social 
citizenship rights through gender-blind programs, women do so through programs meant 
only for women.  But, when these programs begin to target women mainly in their roles 
as current or potential mothers – that is, when women’s social policy turns maternalist – 
motherhood becomes the basis for women’s social citizenship.  While this does amount to an 
acknowledgement of women’s care work as useful work that adds value to society, basing 
women’s social citizenship on motherhood carries some risks as well, especially for 
prospects of gender equality and fairer gender relations. 
First, it links women – but not men – with children, implicitly lending support to 
the idea that childcare is primarily a mother’s, not the parents’, responsibility.  In some 
cases, such as during pregnancy, the identification of women with children is inevitable 
given that it is women who bear children.  Yet, as discussed earlier, even maternal health 
programs often codify not only biological aspects of motherhood but also some of its 
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social responsibilities, thus reinforcing the assumption that women are the primary 
caregivers.  A social citizenship model in which women receive benefits based on their 
status as mothers therefore becomes one in which women’s claims to economic security 
and social well-being are based on difference from, not on equality with, men.128  
Historically, it is this very notion of difference that has been used to justify the segregation 
of men and women into different “spheres” of life (the public and the private), which in 
turn has served as rationale for limiting women’s access to education, paid work, and 
public affairs.  Given the role of the sexual division of labor in both constituting and 
perpetuating gender inequality, a social citizenship model built on difference appears 
poised not to reduce but to exacerbate inequality.            
Second, as we saw in the preceding section, maternalism, because of its link to 
children, is especially vulnerable to illiberal ideologies seeking to impose stricter 
patriarchal, eugenic, racist, or classist orders on society.  Unsurprisingly, then, 
familialist/maternalist programs have often been designed in ways that restrict women’s 
sexual and reproductive choices (such as by banning contraceptives and abortions), 
deepen women’s dependency (by encouraging women to leave the labor market), favor 
one social group over others (by making it easier for women and children from the 
favored group to access benefits), and perpetuate the cultural domination of favored social 
groups (by using the childrearing practices of a certain class as the universal standard).  Of 
these, perhaps the greatest danger is to women’s autonomy.  Women’s association with 
children and children’s identification as the future of the family or community (however 
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defined) give society an excuse for policing women’s lives, especially their sexual, 
reproductive, and mothering choices.  After all, if children are the community’s future, 
and mothers hold unique responsibility for the health and well-being of their children, 
then the community can claim to have a direct stake in the choices of current and 
potential mothers – that is, of nearly all women.  An excessive focus on women as 
mothers, backed by a social citizenship model that grants citizenship to women based on 
their current or potential motherhood, is thus especially susceptible to exploitation by a 
patriarchal order seeking to control women on the grounds that the survival of the 
community depends on women’s (sexual, reproductive, and mothering) behavior.     
Finally, in a model in which women’s right to economic security and social well-
being – that is, women’s social citizenship – depends on motherhood, how women who 
do not, cannot, or prefer not to have children might exercise their social citizenship rights 
is unclear.  Also ill-defined are social citizenship rights of women whose children are no 
longer young and dependent, and thus can no longer serve the bases of the claims women 
can make on the state.  How are these women to derive social citizenship rights?  By 
returning to (or entering for the first time) the paid labor market, where they will be at a 
disadvantage in comparison to their male peers for having detached themselves from paid 
work during their childrearing years?  Or on the basis of “need,” which tends to be 
defined at the family level and programs responding to which tend to direct benefits to 
the (likely male) breadwinner or (likely male) head of household?  Neither option promises 
to work to women’s optimal advantage. 
The above discussion suggests that a maternalist model of social citizenship, 
despite its recognition of care work as work, is unlikely to favor women in the long run.  
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To summarize the reason for this in a few words, we might borrow from Sainsbury, who 
argues that “the bases of entitlement are decisive in determining whether welfare state 
policies reinforce women’s dependency or enhance their autonomy.  The criteria for 
evaluating women’s social rights are whether they afford a socially acceptable standard of 
living independently of family relationships.”129  In other words, a crucial test for systems 
of social provisioning available to women is whether they “defamilialise” women.130  
Sainsbury prefers maternalist systems to paternalist systems, arguing that maternal 
benefits may “have a defamilializing capacity in providing a decent standard of living 
independent of family relationships.”131  But, it is worth emphasizing here that maternalist 
systems, while likely superior to paternalist systems, are hardly defamilializing: they simply 
familialize women in another way, making women’s enjoyment of social rights contingent 
on having children rather than husbands.  The emerging maternalist systems of social 
provisioning for women in the global south thus seem unlikely to pass one of the key tests 
assessing the impact of these systems on women: the defamilialization test.  For this 
reason, if for no other, the causes, features, and consequences of maternalism in women’s 
social policy need to be studied systematically.    
IV. Research Design  
Now that we know what maternalism is, how the existing literature seeks to explain it, 
why existing literature is unable adequately to explain maternalism in the global south, 
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and why maternalism is worth studying, let us discuss how this project seeks to study it.  In 
the next few chapters, we examine the determinants of the onset of maternalism in 
women’s social policy in the developing world by close examination of budding 
maternalism in one country: India.  The paragraphs below shed light on the three phases 
of research that comprise this project: (1) case selection, (2) establishing the existence of 
maternalism in India, (3) paired comparison of two women’s social programs in India.   
A. Case selection 
India was chosen as the case study for this project for three broad reasons: its 
consequentiality, its puzzling nature, and its “cruciality.”  The consequentiality of the 
Indian case stems from the fact that India is a developing country home to one-sixth of 
the world’s women.  Thus, the evolution of women’s social policy in India affects a large 
proportion of women in the (developing) world.  To the extent that India is among the 
more powerful or influential of the developing countries active on the international 
stage,132 social policy in India is also likely to enjoy greater visibility across the world, 
multiplying the potential impact of its social policy model.  For reasons of practical 
significance alone, then, India is a suitable case study for examination of maternalism in 
social policy in the global south. 
 Maternalism in India is also puzzling for three reasons: (1) decline in conservative 
attitudes on gender in recent years, (2) low public health expenditures, and (3) concerns 
about the low rate of women’s employment.  Let us examine each in turn.  Social 
attitudes toward gender in India today are less conservative than in decades past.  For 
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instance, compared to their parents and grandparents, young adults in India today 
express greater support for a range of ideas associated with gender equality (egalitarian 
marriages, sharing of childcare responsibilities, women’s equal access to education, 
women’s equal capacity for paid work, uniform treatment of sons and daughters, 
women’s equal claim to inheritance) and greater condemnation of sexism and misogyny 
(as evidenced by falling approval of dowry-giving and violence against women).133  
Although reliable panel surveys are rare, the limited time-series data that are available 
show similar patterns.134  A decline in conservative attitudes and a greater acceptance of 
non-traditional, non-familial roles of women sits uncomfortably with social policy that 
increasingly sees women through a familial lens. 
 Another reason India’s rising maternalism, most of which manifests as rising 
policy effort on maternal health, is puzzling is the country’s otherwise low public health 
expenditure, widely known to be “one of the world’s lowest.”135  In 2014, for instance, 
public health expenditure in India equaled 1.4% of GDP.136  At around the same time 
public health expenditure in the United States was 8.5% of GDP, and that in India’s 
former colonizer, the United Kingdom, was 7.7%.137  The corresponding share for the set 
of countries considered India’s international peers ranged from 3.1% in China, 3.7% in 
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Russia, and 3.8% in Brazil to 4.2% in South Africa.138  India’s public health expenditure 
thus lags behind not only the rich democracies but also the other members of the BRICS 
group.  Yet, despite the overall shortfall in public health expenditure relative to its peers, 
in 2013-14, India spent nearly 66% of the funding earmarked for women-specific 
programs on maternal health, as Figure 2.2 shows (and the following chapter describes in 
further detail).  In other words, India, which otherwise has among the lowest public 
health expenditures in the world, spends most of the funds earmarked for women’s 
programs on women’s health – and especially on maternal health.139  This paradox, too, 
makes India’s maternalism puzzling. 
Figure 2.2: Public expenditure on maternal health programs and other women’s 
programs in India140 
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 A final reason India’s maternalism presents a puzzle is that much concern has 
been expressed both domestically and internationally about the falling female labor force 
participation in the country.  In rural areas, women’s labor force participation rate 
declined from 33% in 1993-94 to 25% in 2011-12.  The corresponding trend in urban 
areas was less pronounced but occurred in the same direction: women’s workforce 
participation declined from 16.5% to 15.5% over the same period.141  Worries about this 
trend abound in scholarly and policy literature.  Scores, if not hundreds, of articles and 
reports have been written to problematize the decline, and books devoted entirely to 
analyzing it are being published as well.142  Yet, despite the belief, expressed almost 
unanimously by those studying the decline of women’s labor market participation in 
India, that women’s labor market activation would do wonders not only for Indian 
women but also for the Indian economy, Indian social policy focuses increasingly on 
women’s maternal role and programs designed especially to encourage women’s higher 
education or enabling their labor market participation are conspicuous only by their 
absence, negligible funding, or limited coverage.  The widespread concern over declining 
labor participation by women, too, makes the relative dearth of effort to increase 
women’s economic participation – that is, the lack of a more individualistic social policy 
for women – puzzling. 
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 Beyond being a consequential and puzzling case, India is also a “crucial” case for 
existing explanations for maternalist social policy.  In his work on the different types of 
case studies, Gerring (2009) argues that there are two types of crucial cases: the most-
likely case and the least-likely case.  The least-likely case is “one that, on all dimensions 
except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, 
and yet does so.”143  For our purposes, the “dimension of theoretical interest” – or, our 
key hypothesis – is the international spotlight on maternal mortality (see introduction and 
theory section below); the “outcome” in question is maternalist social policy; and “all 
[other] dimensions” are the three key predictors of maternalism derived from the 
historical welfare literature, which, as documented earlier in this chapter, are missing 
from the Indian setting.144  The absence of all (three literature-derived hypotheses) but 
one (hypothesis of this project) theorized explanations of maternalism means that, from 
the perspective of existing literature, India is least likely to exhibit maternalism in social 
policy.  For this reason, if social policy maternalism in India is found to predominate, it 
would strengthen the case for the one theorized predictor present in the Indian setting.  
India thus meets the conditions for a least-likely case, making it, once again, a suitable 
case study for examining maternalist social policy. 
B. Establishing the rise of maternalism in social policy in India 
Before proceeding to investigating the reasons behind the maternalist turn in 
Indian social policy, it is first important to establish that social policy for women in India 
is indeed increasingly maternalist.  Although existing research on maternal health in India 
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suggests that this is the case, it does not provide systematic evidence to support the 
suggestion.145  To document the rise of maternalist social policy, budgetary data for 
women’s social programs were gathered for every fifth year between 1988 and 2014 and 
analyzed.  The analysis found strong evidence of rising attention to women as mothers, 
particularly in the form of programs for maternal health and nutrition, in policymaking.  
Chapter 3 describes the methodology and results in detail.   
C. Paired comparison 
The final phase of the research involved comparative analysis of two women-
specific programs – National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS), later renamed Janani 
Suraksha Yojana (JSY), and Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY), later renamed Swayamsiddha 
– that were proposed together, by the same administration, in 1989 and introduced 
together, by the same administration, in 1995.  The key difference in the two programs is 
that while NMBS/JSY is a maternalist program, targeting women as current or future 
mothers, IMY/Swayamsiddha was designed to assist women socioeconomically, which 
makes it an individualist program under our framework.  And while the former has 
grown remarkably since its launch, the latter floundered and was terminated in 2008 (see 
Figure 2.3). 
The programs were chosen for paired comparison because (1) changes in their 
outlays accounted for a large part of the changes in familialist and individualist spending 
that have driven the divergence in these two types of programs since 2003-04, and (2) 
they approximate the most-similar systems design, which allows the cause(s) of divergent 
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outcomes to be traced to antecedent difference(s) in otherwise similar units of study.146  
Following this type of research design, the comparison presented in Chapters 4 and 5 
exploits both the broad similarities in the two programs (i.e. that they are both women-
specific programs that were designed by the same administration and launched together) 
and the difference in their outcomes (i.e. NMBS/JSY expanded while 
IMY/Swayamsiddha was dissolved) to discover why maternalist social policy attracts 
greater support than individualistic social policy for women.  Within each case of the 
paired comparison, process-tracing methodology is used to find causal-process 
observations,147 which are then analyzed to illuminate both causal variables and causal 
pathways.  
	   The divergent trajectories of the two programs, however, are interesting not only 
because of how much they differ from each other, but also because they are surprising 
given the circumstances surrounding the origins of the two programs.  At the time that 
the programs were introduced, IMY promised to be the grander initiative: named after a 
former (late) female prime minister and inaugurated on her birth anniversary by her son, 
the then-prime minister, it was understood to be the most comprehensive and expensive 
program for women ever undertaken in India.  In contrast, NMBS was a marginal, 
neglected campaign promise that failed to attract support from the political establishment 
and attention from the media.  The different paths of NMBS and IMY (see Figure 2.3) 
are therefore doubly surprising.  Because the trajectories are unexpected and because 
they illustrate dramatically the prioritization of maternalist programs over individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Przeworski and Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, 32-35. 
147 Brady, “Causation and Explanation in Social Science,” 237-242. 
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ones, a paired comparison of these programs is used to gain insight into India’s 
maternalism. 
Figure 2.3: Planned and incurred expenditures on JSY and IMY, 1991-2017148 
 
V. Theory 
Section III outlined existing explanations of maternalism in various literatures and 
revealed their limitations, arguing that they do not explain the emergent maternalism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 This is the same figure as Figure 1.2.  NMBS refers to National Maternity Benefit Scheme, a precursor 
to JSY.  For NMBS/JSY, data from 1995 to 2004 pertain to NMBS; the rest pertain to JSY.  IMY’s name 
was changed to “Swayamsiddha” in 2001.  Incurred expenditure data on IMY are not available between 
1995 (when the program was launched) and 1998.  Incurred expenditure data pertain to IMY from 1998 to 
2001 and to its successor, Swayamsiddha, after 2001.  Expected expenditure data pertain to a program 
called Integrated Programme of Development for Women and Children, which was initially formulated in 
1989 and later renamed and launched as IMY in 1995.  IPDWC policy documents did not estimate the 
expenditure on the program beyond 1996-97, but the program was expected to continue after this date.  All 
expenditure figures used in this project are nominal unless indicated otherwise.  For sources, see Figures 4.1 
and 5.1. 
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women’s social policy in the developing world.  Section IV then discussed how this 
project has sought to understand the rise of maternalist social policy in India.  What 
findings did this research yield?  Below I present a theory of emerging maternalism in 
India that ties together the various findings of this project.  The project finds that the 
increasingly maternalist orientation of women-specific social programs in India has 
occurred for two reasons: the agenda-setting effect of international development 
conferences and agreements, and the conflation of gender and poverty in policymaking in 
India. 
A. Setting the agenda 
The agenda-setting, or spotlight, effect operated in the following manner.  High-
profile global conferences such as the International Conference on Population and 
Development (Cairo, 1994) and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) 
drew attention to women’s sexual and reproductive health (SRH), linking them to 
population growth, public health, and economic development, among others.  The 
acknowledgement by the global policy elites of the importance of women’s SRH, of which 
maternal health is a part, attracted opposition from groups, such as the Vatican, that saw 
SRH as a fig leaf for enabling easy access to abortions, widespread use of contraceptives, 
and women’s sexual promiscuity.  To avoid controversy and ensure unanimity, the 
Millennium Summit, a prominent event held in New York in 2000 and attended by heads 
of state and other high-ranking leaders from around the world, steered clear of language 
on SRH while formulating its commitments document.  Instead, this document, called 
the Millennium Declaration, struck a compromise: in exchange for omitting references to 
SRH, it incorporated a less contentious commitment to “maternal health.” 
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The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of global development goals 
that derived from this outcome document, thus reflected the same compromise.  The fifth 
goal on the list was to improve maternal health.149  The goal was further specified through 
a target, and the target then operationalized through two indicators.  The target aimed to 
“[r]educe by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.”150  
The indicators used to measure progress on this target were (1) maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR), and (2) the proportion of births attended by skilled personnel.151  MDG 5 thus 
narrowed the meaning of maternal health: it now stood for reduction in maternal 
mortality (which is only one aspect of broader maternal health) and skilled personnel-
facilitated birth.152  
 The MDGs were not just any list of development goals, however.  Formulated 
based on preceding lists of goals, deriving from the Millennium Declaration (which was 
itself signed by 189 UN member-states), elevated by their association with the historic 
occasion of the turn of the millennium, supported by civil society organizations across the 
world, and receiving extraordinary attention from the global media, they enjoyed 
exceptional legitimacy as a list of goals whose achievement was understood to constitute 
development.  Goal 5 also came to occupy a unique position among the MDGs: as the 
only goal that dealt explicitly with adult women, it became synonymous with women-
focused development.  Since the introduction of the MDGs, MMR has been used to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 United Nations Development Group, “Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals: 
Definitions, Rationale, Concepts, and Sources,” x. 
150 United Nations Development Group, x. 
151 United Nations Development Group, x. 
152 In 2008, a new target aiming to universalize access to reproductive health was added to the MDG 
matrix.  Yet, by this time, the primacy of the maternal mortality target had long been established. 
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signify not only the condition of maternal healthcare in developing countries but also 
women’s general well-being in the context of development.  This created pressure on 
national governments across the (developing) world to take, or to be seen as taking, action 
against maternal mortality.  India, whose MMR was not among the highest in the world 
and was already declining when the MDGs were introduced,153 but which nevertheless 
had the largest number of maternal deaths in the world at the time (due to its large 
population),154 felt especially compelled to improve its record on maternal mortality. 
 There are five pathways through which the influence of the MDGs and other 
international developments worked.  First, development conferences, especially the 
International Conference on Population and Development, forged a discursive link 
between population concerns and reproductive health, catapulting the latter from the 
margins of the global policy agenda to its center, where population concerns dominated.  
Those who worried about the Malthusian scenario of growing populations in poor 
countries ill equipped to feed and accommodate them could no longer dismiss 
reproductive health as irrelevant to their concerns.  This enabled the uptake of a 
peripheral issue, formerly of concern mostly to women’s rights activists, in mainstream 
conversations about development.  Chapter 5 explains in detail how, due to opposition to 
abortion and contraceptives, what began as a campaign for broader reproductive rights 
was whittled down to one for maternal health. 
 Second, the spotlight on maternal health raised the amount of foreign funding 
available for interventions against maternal mortality.  A recent study, for instance, found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 The World Bank, “Maternal Mortality Ratio (Modeled Estimate, per 100,100 Live Births).” 
154 The World Bank, “Number of Maternal Deaths.” 
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that donor assistance for maternal health has grown faster since 2000 than in the years 
before the turn of the millennium.155  Specifically, it grew at an annualized rate of 2.6% in 
1990-99, 4.7% in 2000-09, and 3.1% in 2010-15.156  Between 2006 and 2012, the World 
Bank, the United Nations Population Fund, UK’s Department for International 
Development, and other foreign sources supplied more than a billion USD – that is, more 
than half the funding required – for the Reproductive and Child Health program, one of 
India’s key umbrella programs for maternal and infant health.157  The infusion of such 
large sums of money enabled India’s investment in maternalist programs.    
Third, international commitments, particularly the MDGs, came with reporting 
obligations: countries were asked to submit periodic reports to the UN describing the 
steps they were taking to achieve the MDGs and the progress they were making.  MDGs 
also generated significant media interest in maternal health (see figure 4.3).  These 
developments drew policymakers’ and the public’s attention to the high rate of maternal 
mortality in India and incentivized policy effort for maternal health.  Between 2005, 
when India began to incorporate MDGs into domestic policy goals, and 2017, when 
countries were asked to submit their final MDG reports, India submitted seven MDG 
reports detailing its progress on the goals.  On average, the reports were 183 pages long.  
The pages had to be filled somehow.  Thus, by requiring countries to make detailed 
reports, the MDGs incentivized action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 This does not include funding for child and newborn health, which grew at an even faster pace 
156 Dieleman et al., “Development Assistance for Health: Past Trends, Associations, and the Future of 
International Financial Flows for Health.” 
157 “India: Reproductive & Child Health Second Phase.” 
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Fourth, in addition to this instrumental effect, the international spotlight on 
maternal health created an intrinsic effect: over time policymakers became convinced of 
the inherent value of improving maternal health, seeing India’s high number of yearly 
maternal deaths as an abomination.  Unfavorable comparisons with peer countries that 
outperformed India on lowering MMR became commonplace both in the news media 
and in the government’s own publications.  Observers sensed a feeling of “shame” among 
state actors about having the same MMR numbers as some countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The sense of shame was compounded by the realization that 99% of maternal 
deaths occurred in the developing world, a group of countries that India is at pains to 
distinguish itself from.  Focus on maternal mortality in the Millennium Development Goals 
and the concentration of maternal deaths in developing countries thus tied maternal 
mortality to low levels of development, leading India to redouble its efforts to eradicate 
the problem, lest the country be characterized as a laggard even among developing 
economies. 
Fifth, an international consensus on the importance of lowering maternal 
mortality not only encouraged state actors to advocate for greater resources for maternal 
health but also rendered them able to do so.  As Chapter 4 shows, India’s health ministry 
expanded the coverage and generosity of its key program for maternal health in 
successive steps between 2003 and 2013.  Institutional processes required that it seek 
support from other ministries of the government and/or the Planning Commission for 
significant changes.  Throughout, the ministry faced minimal opposition from these 
entities – an experience very different from that of the women’s ministry, whose requests 
over the same years for resources to continue a women’s socioeconomic program (that 
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was started at the same time as the maternal health program) met with indifference at 
best and antagonism at worst, as documented in Chapter 5. 
Unlike maternal health programs, socioeconomic programs received little boost 
from international agenda-setting efforts, partly because these efforts were deficient 
relative to those for maternal health.  The MDGs embody this imbalance well.  While the 
Goals succeeded in putting maternal mortality on national development agendas, they 
were unable similarly to elevate other women-related goals, such as women’s 
socioeconomic empowerment, because they did not incorporate the latter as central 
objectives.  Besides MDG 5, the only other MDG relating explicitly to women was Goal 
3, which exhorted governments to promote “gender equality and empower women.”158  
The reference to “women” in the text of the goal would seem to make the goal relevant to 
adult women.  However, instead of being operationalized in a manner that promoted 
broad equality measures for adult women, the goal was operationalized through a target that 
promoted educational parity for boys and girls.  In its exact wording, the target sought to 
“[e]liminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and 
in all levels of education no later than 2015.”159  This narrowed the scope of the equality 
goal, limiting it to education and effectively excluding adult women from its purview.160  
Thus, of the two explicitly gendered goals among the MDGs, MDG 3 pertained mostly to 
girls and MDG 5, the only goal to deal with adult women, addressed women as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 United Nations Development Group, “Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals: 
Definitions, Rationale, Concepts, and Sources,” x. 
159 United Nations Development Group, x. 
160 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “E/CN.6/2014/3,” 7; Jenson, “The New Maternalism: 
Children First; Women Second,” 279. Some of the official indicators used to measure progress on this 
target brought adult women back into the picture, but it was the target, not the indicators, that carried 
greater political legitimacy (see McArthur, “The Origins of the Millennium Development Goals”). 
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mothers.161  In this way, the international community gave greater sanction to efforts to 
combat maternal mortality than those to promote women’s socioeconomic well-being. 
B. Folding gender into poverty 
The story is not yet complete, however.  International actors may not have 
succeeded in putting women’s socioeconomic empowerment on national development 
agendas, but why has sufficient support for individualistic programs also not materialized 
in India domestically?  As the story recounted in Chapter 5 tells us, the reason for this is 
not that support for such programs did not exist in civil society or in some quarters of the 
Government of India; it is that state actors have managed to resist demands for women-
specific socioeconomic programs on the grounds that such programs are made superfluous 
by existing sex-unspecific programs that serve both men and women.   
This argument that women-specific individualist programs are a wasteful 
duplication of effort rests on a questionable premise, however.  It assumes that women-
specific socioeconomic programs add no value over sex-unspecific socioeconomic 
programs.  This can be disputed on two counts.  First, the extent to which benefits from 
sex-unspecific programs reach women is often limited.  Due to their disadvantaged 
position in society, women face greater barriers than men in accessing benefits from sex-
unspecific programs and thus tend to form a much smaller proportion of the beneficiary 
population than men.162  Women-specific programs are often better able to ensure that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Razavi, “Addressing/Reforming Care, But on Whose Terms?,” 122; Jenson, “The New Maternalism: 
Children First; Women Second,” 279. 
162 See Mahajan and Ramola, “Financial Services for the Rural Poor and Women in India: Access and 
Sustainability,” 216; Harrison and Melville, Rethinking Social Work in a Global World, 69-70; Roy, 
“Impediments to Women’s Employment in Rural India: Access to Employment, Land and Other 
Resources,” 200; Sudarshan, “Women Workers: Addressing Constraints to Work,” 430.   
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women are not marginalized and that resources are expended on women.163  Second, 
when programs are designed for women alone, they can be made to prioritize women’s 
rights, needs, constraints, and vulnerabilities in a way that integrated programs may not 
be.  Evidence from various countries and policy domains shows that, when designed well, 
such programs tend to generate better outcomes for women.164  In other words, as argued 
toward the end of Section III, there is ample reason to believe that sex-unspecific 
programs create at best a weak form of social citizenship for women.  This is not to say, of 
course, that there is no value in making sex-unspecific programs sensitive to the gendered 
experiences of men and women, a process the international community calls “gender 
mainstreaming.”  The point is simply that there exists at least a theoretical case for 
women-specific programming, even where sex-unspecific programs already exist.165 
This was the initial rationale behind Indira Mahila Yojana.  As Chapter 5 shows, 
IMY was originally designed in the late 1980s as a multi-faceted, women-specific program 
that would address not only women’s economic concerns but also their social 
disempowerment by imparting functional literacy, improving women’s access to health 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Grown et al., “The Financial Requirements of Achieving Gender Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment,” 4; Former Minister, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, 
Interview # 24. 
164 See Prendergast et al., “The Relative Effectiveness of Women-Only and Mixed-Gender Treatment for 
Substance-Abusing Women”; Bloom and Covington, “Gender-Specific Programming for Female 
Offenders: What Is It and Why Is It Important?”; Hemphill, “The Data Reveals the Truth: Women 
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and other services, building women’s grassroots networks, helping women recognize 
gender as a structural force that shapes their lives, and assisting women in mobilizing for 
women-relevant issues in their communities.  Over time, as anti-poverty programs 
became popular, IMY began to be modeled after them.  The radical, bottom-up vision of 
empowerment and emancipation that animated the program at the start began to fade.  
Still, several state actors believed that, even in a reduced form, IMY differed significantly 
from anti-poverty programs because its key objective was not to alleviate (women’s) 
poverty but to address the multiple disadvantages women face in society. 
Others, however, was not convinced.  The Planning Commission advocated 
terminating the program on the grounds that it added no value above and beyond other 
anti-poverty programs.  This line of thought failed to distinguish between programs that 
seek to fight poverty and those designed to fight gender injustice.  It assumed, in other words, 
that the root of women’s disadvantage lies not in gender but in poverty.  Since programs 
seeking to alleviate women’s (and men’s) poverty already exist, the thinking went, there is 
little need for women-specific programs designed to do accomplish the same goal.  In 
defending the termination of IMY on these grounds, the Planning Commission showed 
little appreciation for gender and poverty as distinct, albeit intersecting, dimensions of 
social inequality affecting women.  Collapsing gender into poverty allowed the 
Commission to advocate the dissolution of IMY. 
This lack of recognition of gender as a distinct axis of social stratification and the 
concomitant emphasis on poverty as the central problem of our times can be traced to 
several factors.  First, rapid economic growth in India in recent years has thrown into 
sharp relief the large proportion of the population that continues to live in poverty even as 
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the standards of living of others continue to improve.  Second, research on the 
“feminization of poverty” popularized the idea that poverty is concentrated among 
women, encouraging the incorporation of women into development thinking but 
highlighting their poverty and relegating gender in all its sociological complexity to the 
background.  Third, the backlash against “neoliberal” reforms in the late 1990s forced 
reformers to reorient around, or at least adopt the language of, poverty reduction to stave 
off harsh criticism of market reforms.  And finally, in India in the 1980s and 1990s, social 
mobilization along caste lines and the interpretation in political discourse of caste 
disadvantage as an economic disadvantage focused attention on the worst kind of economic 
disadvantage: poverty. 
As poverty became the master narrative around which social policy in India is 
built, the poverty lens began to dominate social policymaking for women as well, 
undercutting arguments for women-specific socioeconomic programs and strengthening 
the case for sex-unspecific anti-poverty measures.  Paradoxically, then, a focus on poverty 
diverted attention from those, such as women, who stood to benefit most from 
socioeconomic interventions.  This is the reason that, while women-specific individualist 
programs exist in India and in fact outnumber familialist programs by nearly three to 
one, their funding, scope, and coverage remain miniscule compared to those of familialist 
programs.  The resulting combination of high spending on familialist/maternalist 
programs and low spending on individualist programs is what gives the universe of 
women-specific social programs in India its familialist/maternalist orientation.  It is to the 
landscape of women’s social programming in India that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3: Mapping the Terrain of Women’s Social Programs in India 
	  
I. Introduction 
What is the landscape of India’s women-specific social programs like?  What types of 
programs does it comprise, which programs attract the most funding, which women do 
the programs seek to assist, in what ways, and by what means?  How has the landscape 
changed over time, if at all?  This chapter uses an original dataset of government 
spending to provide a bird’s-eye view of the terrain of women’s social programming.  It 
argues that the women’s social programing is increasingly familialist/maternalist: while 
individualist programs outnumber familialist programs, it is the latter – and, within that 
category, maternalist programs – that receive most funds spent on women-specific 
programs.  Depicting these trends sets the stage for the following two chapters, which 
zoom in on two programs to provide further proof of growing maternalism and to 
investigate its source. 
The chapter proceeds in the following manner.  Section II describes how I define 
women-specific programs and why.  Section III recounts how the information presented 
in this chapter was gathered, sorted, and analyzed to estimate spending on maternalist 
and individualist programs.  Next, section IV presents the results of the statistical analysis, 
concluding that programmatic spending on women is indeed increasingly maternalist, at 
least at the level of the federal government.  Finally, section V discusses possible 
limitations of this study while arguing that the study adds value despite these limitations. 
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II. Demarcating the universe of women-specific programs 
As the introductory chapter explains, I define women-specific programs as programs that 
provide targeted cash or in-kind benefits exclusively to women, girls, or women and 
children.  Let us unpack the definition in pieces.  First, this project examines only programs, 
not laws relevant to women or general social service spending – such as that on schools or 
hospitals – from which women might also benefit.  Next, to qualify as women-specific, 
programs must target women directly.  So, for instance, programs funding research or 
conferences on issues relevant to women in the hope that the accumulation of knowledge 
will yield indirect benefits for women in the future are excluded.  Programs providing 
funds to NGOs to assist women in defined ways, such as to build and run shelters for 
widows, are included since the funding is earmarked for specific benefits or services that 
are to be targeted at women alone and the NGO in these cases is simply the 
administrator of the program.  The benefits can be in the form of cash or kind, such as 
vocational training.  The words “exclusively to women, girls, or women and children” 
indicate that programs that assist men or boys in addition to women or girls are 
disqualified (more on this below).  The only exception here are programs for women and 
children.  Since programs designed specially to assist women are often combined with 
child-focused interventions on the grounds that it is easier to operate the two together 
than separately, programs directing benefits to both women and children are included in 
the universe of women-specific programs.  As we will see later in this chapter, however, 
while women-and-child programs are included in the study, only the part of the 
expenditure that targets women is used in the budgetary analysis. 
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Our definition of women-specific programs must be accompanied by two 
additional disclaimers: one about what it excludes, and the other about what it implies 
about the intended beneficiaries of the programs.  First, women-specific social programs 
are not the only programs relevant to women.  The universe of all central government-
funded social programs, of which there are likely hundreds at any given time, can be 
divided into three categories: (1) women-specific programs – that is, those meant 
exclusively for women, girls, or women and children; (2) gender-sensitive programs – 
those which are not specific to women but take gendered experiences into account and 
make special efforts to reach or incorporate women or girls, such as sex-unspecific 
programs with women-specific quotas; and (3) gender-blind programs – those that are 
neither sex-specific nor explicitly designed to encourage women’s or girls’ inclusion in any 
way.166  By excluding the latter two types of programs, this project is unable to account for 
the composition of spending on the full range of programs that serve women, which may 
call into question the chapter’s conclusion about growing maternalism. 
While this is indeed a possible limitation, the decision to focus on women-specific 
programs alone was taken for three reasons.  First, the fundamental goal of this project 
was to understand how governments in the global south are interpreting women’s specific 
needs and vulnerabilities – that is, whether women’s needs are equated with families’ and 
mothers’ needs or if there is a broader conception of the policy issues relevant to women 
qua women.  Because the goal was to uncover and account for the Indian state’s 
conception of the gendered needs of women, it made sense to consider the state’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 It is important to recognize that the programs may be officially gender-blind but, given women’s 
different social positions, cannot be gender-neutral in practice. 
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gendered responses.  Hence, there was little rationale to include gender-blind programs, 
which by default do not provide a gendered response, in the analysis.  The second reason 
for examining women-specific programs alone is that, as chapter 2 recounted, decades of 
experience with social programs in and outside of India has shown that women often face 
difficulty accessing benefits from gender-blind programs (since they are designed with the 
male beneficiary as the default assumed beneficiary) and are marginalized even in gender-
sensitive programs (since these tend to subordinate women’s needs to other goals).  This is 
not to say that gender-blind and gender-sensitive programs do not benefit women: 
programs like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), a gender-
sensitive employment guarantee program with high levels of participation by women, 
clearly do.  The point is that, in reducing women’s barriers to access and addressing 
gender directly rather than through the filter of poverty or class, women-specific 
programs can offer something unique to women.  So, while gender-sensitivity is 
important, it cannot replace women-specificity.  Third, the budgetary data of the Indian 
state are not systematically disaggregated by sex.167  Because of this, there is no feasible 
way to calculate the amount of funding directed to women via the gender-blind and even 
gender-sensitive programs (which, even though they sometimes have women’s quotas, 
often fall short of meeting the quota or surpass it altogether).  The only type of program 
for which relatively reliable conclusions regarding the amount of funding channeled to 
women in cash or kind can be made is thus the women-specific type.  To understand the 
Indian government’s efforts for women qua women, then, it is worth focusing on 
programs designed specifically for women. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 GoI’s Gender Budgets, which began to be presented in 2005-06, are a recent exception. 
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The second disclaimer about our definition of women-specificity is that the 
definition is not meant to imply that women-specific programs are designed exclusively or 
even primarily with women’s welfare in mind.  In fact, as this dissertation shows, in many 
cases the programs appear to be designed as much for the benefit of children or families 
as for the women themselves.  I therefore use the term “women-specific” not to describe 
the intended final beneficiaries of these programs but simply to indicate that official	  
descriptions of these programs identify women as the direct or first-order recipients of the 
cash or other benefits disbursed through the programs. 
III. Methodology 
A. Creating a comprehensive dataset of women-specific programs 
The executive branch of the federal – or “central” – government of India is made up of 
several ministries, each charged with policy in specific domains such as health, 
agriculture, labor affairs, women and child development, and others.  Over the last three 
decades, many of these ministries have launched and run programs meant for women.  
Hence, India’s women-specific programs are spread across various ministries.  In 2005-
06, the Government of India (GoI) began to draw up gender budgets to track spending on 
all women’s programs.  To my knowledge, however, there exists neither a consolidated 
dataset that tracks expenditure on such programs prior to 2005 nor even a central list of 
the names of all women-specific programs. 
The first task for this project, then, was to create a list of all women-specific social 
programs that GoI has run since 1985, a date chosen so that the resulting dataset would 
allow me to capture the landscape of women’s social programs in the decade before 
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India’s economic liberalization of the 1990s, after which both public revenue and 
expenditure rose quickly.  To create this list, I used GoI’s official annual budget 
documents, specifically a part of the expenditure budget known as “Notes on Demands 
for Grants” (NDGs), as well as annual reports of relevant ministries.  The NDGs, broken 
up by ministry, both itemize spending on the ministry’s programs and provide a brief 
description of each program listed.  I used these itemized lists and official program 
descriptions to identify women-specific programs.168  Where sufficient information could 
not be found in the NDGs, or where I perceived a need for triangulation of information 
gathered from this source, I consulted the official Annual Report of the concerned 
ministry in the concerned year and/or other budget documents such as the Detailed 
Demands for Grants and ministry-specific Performance Budgets (or Outcome Budgets).  
NDGs from fiscal year 2000-01 onward are available on government websites and 
are word-searchable.  Women-specific programs from this year on could therefore be 
identified by searching the NDGs for keywords linked to women’s programs.  I generated 
the list of keywords, presented in Appendix 1, based on my prior research on and 
knowledge of women-specific programs, which helped me identify the words likely to be 
used in the names and descriptions of such programs.  The list was fine-tuned and the 
searches re-run as new keywords were periodically identified and added to the list while 
gathering data for this project.   
For the years between 1985 and 2000, Notes on Demands for Grants are 
unavailable online and therefore had to be accessed in physical form at various archives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Programs were identified as women specific through their titles (which tended to include the words such 
as “women,” “girls,” “mothers” in English or Hindi) and through their official descriptions, which indicated 
who the intended beneficiaries of the programs were. 
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and libraries in New Delhi, including the Central Secretariat Library, the Parliament 
Library, and the libraries of the GoI Ministry of Finance, the National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy, and the Indian Institute of Public Administration.  The lack of digital 
copies of these documents meant that women-specific programs could not be identified 
through word searches.  For these years, then, the identification of such programs was 
done manually.  I read each line item and scanned all program descriptions in the NDGs, 
each of which runs 200 to 300 pages, for all years between 1985 and 2000, making note 
of all women-specific programs.  In a large majority of cases, such programs could be 
identified by reading the names of programs itemized and/or their descriptions.  In some 
cases, however, this was not sufficient.  Three such scenarios and my response in each 
case are described below. 
First, in exceptional cases, the programs listed in the line items were sex-unspecific 
umbrella programs that comprised of women-specific sub-programs.169  In such cases, 
where the listed program I knew to be or eventually found to be comprised of distinct 
sub-programs of which one (or more) was specific to women, I included the relevant sub-
program(s) in my list of women-specific programs. 
Second, while the NDGs are comprehensive documents that provide details on 
program-level spending of each ministry, there are some programs that do not get listed 
individually as line items and are instead bundled into the category of “other 
programmes” in the NDGs.  This category is not further disaggregated to help the reader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 For instance, from 1995 to 2001, the National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS), a program for 
unconditional cash transfers to pregnant women, was a part of the umbrella program called the National 
Social Assistance Programme (NSAP).  Under NSAP fell several distinct sub-programs, each with its own 
name, designed to channel social assistance to various groups perceived to need state support.   
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identify which programs comprise the category.  The total spending on “other 
programmes,” however, tends to be a very small percentage – less than 0.5% – of the 
overall spending of the ministry, suggesting that the programs relegated to this category 
are even smaller and, in the ministry’s view, less important than those identified in the 
line items.  So, although it is possible that my practice of identifying women-specific 
programs primarily through line items in NDGs led me to miss some women-specific 
programs that were not distinctly listed, it is nearly certain that these programs 
represented a negligible proportion of overall spending on women’s programs.  In 
addition, for programs that were initially not itemized in the main budget files 
(presumably due to their very small allocations) but later grew and began to be itemized 
in subsequent budget files, I consulted supplementary budgetary documents at 
government offices and libraries in New Delhi to find their specific allocations in the years 
in which the programs existed but were not itemized in the main budgetary files and 
incorporated the resulting information into the dataset.     
Finally, also in exceptional cases, the line items in the NDGs were not individual 
programs but semi-autonomous organizations funded by a ministry of the GoI.170  Some 
of these organizations run programs that are not itemized individually in the ministry’s 
NDG but the details about which can be found in the annual reports of the concerned 
organizations.  In cases where I discovered or suspected, based on descriptions of the 
organizations provided in the budget files, that these organizations ran women-specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 For instance, the NDG of the Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD) lists not only the 
programs of this ministry but also organizations such as the Central Social Welfare Board and the National 
Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, both of which are semi-autonomous organizations 
funded by the MWCD.  Similarly, the NDG of the Ministry of Human Resource Development includes 
grants given to a body called the University Grants Commission, the organization in charge of higher 
education in India.   
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programs, I examined the official annual reports of these organizations.  Two such 
organizations were found and six programs, accounting for about 19% of average yearly 
expenditure on women-specific programs, were identified in this manner.  Of these eight, 
just one – grant spending on women-specific colleges – accounted for 14% of average 
yearly women-specific expenditure. 
The above procedure yielded a list of 84 distinct programs meant exclusively for 
women, girls, or women and children, run by the GoI between 1985 and 2015.  Of these, 
65 targeted adult women.  Since the focus of our analysis is adult (18+) women, the rest of 
this project examines these 65 programs (listed in Appendix 2). 
B. Gathering budgetary data 
Once this comprehensive list of adult women-specific programs was ready, the 
next step was to gather expenditure data.  For this, the same official documents – the 
Notes on Demands for Grants, the Detailed Demands for Grants, and the annual reports 
of various ministries – were consulted.  Where budgetary data could not be found in these 
documents or where there was need for further verification, I consulted additional sources 
such as parliamentary records (debates as well as official answers to questions asked in 
parliament), governmental press releases, and secondary literature.  When all else failed, I 
filed Right to Information (RTI) requests, an official procedure by which the Indian 
public can demand specific information from the state. 
Due to the time-consuming nature of gathering budgetary information and 
because the purpose was to identify general trends, I collected budgetary data for every 
fifth fiscal year, starting with 2013-14 (the last year with most complete data at the time 
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this project began) and moving backward.  As a result, my dataset contains budgetary 
data for six fiscal years between 1988-89 and 2013-14. 
Although national elections in India are also supposed to be held every five years, 
nine national elections were held over the 25-year period of our study due to volatility in 
parliamentary coalitions. Five of the nine were held in the fiscal year succeeding the fiscal 
year for which data were collected.  For instance, 2014 was an election year, and the 
dataset includes numbers for 2013-14.171  This raises the possibility of systematic bias in 
our dataset due to the electoral cycle.172  The impact of any bias created by the electoral 
cycle is minimized by three factors, however.  First, there is no reason to expect that the 
electoral cycle biases individualist spending more or less than, or in a different direction 
from, familialist/maternalist spending.  Because the core comparison in this chapter is 
that between individualist and familialist/maternalist spending at any given time, rather 
than total women’s spending over different time periods, the partial overlap with election 
years matters less.  Second, since five of the six fiscal years for which we have data 
coincided with the year before an election, any electoral-cycle bias that exists should 
affect all five years, which in effect controls for the impact of the electoral cycle.  In other 
words, there is no reason to assume that the extent or direction of the electoral-cycle impact 
would differ systematically from one pre-election year to another.  Finally, the following 
table of women-specific spending in the years for which data were collected shows there is 
no clear relationship between change in expenditures between two periods and whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 The other four elections had no clear relationship with the years for which data were gathered. 
172 State elections are staggered, were held in each year of the period under study, and, in any case, are 
largely irrelevant to our analysis because the analysis focuses on central spending.  Additionally, there is 
wide variation in the intervals at which other relevant factors, such as international grant-making and 
submission of country reports to donors and international organizations, occur, so there is little reason to 
expect that they coincide neatly with the years for which data were gathered. 
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the second of the two periods is a pre-election fiscal year (or an election year).  This, too, 
suggests that there is no systematic impact of the electoral cycle on women-specific 
spending. 
 
Table 3.1: Election years and changes in total spending on women’s programs173 
 
Period Total 
expenditure 
on women-
specific 
programs 
(Rs. billion) 
Growth 
from 
previous 
period for 
which data 
were 
collected 
(%) 
Did the 
current 
period 
immediately 
precede an 
election 
year? 
Was the 
current 
period an 
election 
year? 
1988-89 1.47 n/a Yes No 
1993-94 3.55 141 No No 
1998-99 9.97 181 Yes Yes 
2003-04 8.20 -18 Yes No 
2008-09 35.07 328 Yes No 
2013-14 70.89 102 Yes No 
 
Recent budget documents of the GoI report three types of public expenditures on 
specific programs.  These are the Budget Estimate (BE), the Revised Estimate (RE), and 
the Actual Expenditure (AE).  In each fiscal year, the budget estimates represent financial 
allocation to programs at the start of the fiscal year.  The revised estimates reflect the 
government’s mid-year estimate of how much money was spent or was likely to be spent 
on a given program in the preceding fiscal year.  The actual expenditure refers to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Compiled from various sources.  See sources for Figure 3.2 and “Election Results: Full Statistical 
Reports.” 
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government’s final calculation of how much money was spent on a given program two 
fiscal year prior.174  
The budget figures I gathered and used in the analysis below are revised estimate 
figures.  I chose revised estimates for two reasons.  First, actual expenditure figures began 
to be reported in main budget files only in 2011-12.  Because I needed expenditure 
figures that could be used to make cross-year comparisons from 1985 onward, actual 
expenditure numbers, unavailable in the main budget files before 2011, could not be 
used.  Second, because they are calculated several months into the fiscal year to which 
they refer, revised estimates represent a more accurate picture of that year’s likely 
spending than the budget estimates generated at the start of the fiscal year.  For this 
reason, every effort was made to find revised estimates and almost all data points used for 
analysis below refer to revised estimates.175 
The dataset resulting from the data-gathering methods described above was 
compiled between November 2014 and April 2015, with some Right to Information 
(RTI) responses from the GoI continuing to trickle in afterward, and consists more than 
400 data points.176  
C. Classifying programs 
Once the dataset had been assembled, the next step was to classify programs into 
categories of interest to facilitate subsequent analysis.  The broadest categories relevant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 For instance, the budget documents for 2014-15, published at the start of fiscal year 2014-15, report the 
amount of money being allocated to each line item in 2014-15 (BE), an estimate of spending on each line 
item in 2013-14 (RE), and the government’s final calculation of spending on each line item in 2012-13 (AE). 
175 If revised estimates were not available, I used actual expenditure where possible.  In some cases, 
primary or secondary sources did not clearly identify the type of expenditure being reported.  I used such 
expenditure figures in the analysis below only if they were my only source of information for expenditure on 
a program in a given year. 
176 RTI in India is akin to the Freedom of Information requests in the U.S. 
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this project were familialist and individualist.  Within the category of familialist, the sub-
category of interest was maternalist.  The following steps were taken to code programs as 
familialist or individualist broadly, and as maternalist or non-maternalist within the 
familialist category. 
First, I located a brief description of each program in the NDG documents.  If 
NDGs from more than one year described the program, I used the description provided 
in the earliest NDG (1985 onward) available to me that mentioned the program.  If the 
NDGs did not describe the program at all or described it but not in sufficient detail, I 
consulted annual reports or performance budgets of the ministry in charge of the 
program to find official descriptions of the program. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, preliminary analysis revealed eight distinct “bases of 
entitlement”177 – roles in which the programs targeted women.  Of these, four targeted 
women as members of families (daughter, wife, mother, widow) and four in non-
relational, individualistic terms (student, paid worker, small entrepreneur, and political 
citizen).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Sainsbury, Gender, Equality and Welfare States, 44. 
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Figure 3.1: Ideal types of women-specific programs in India 
 
Because early analysis suggested these eight sub-categories of roles, most programs were 
coded as belonging to one of these categories.  For instance, a program designed to 
provide safe accommodation to women who migrate away from their hometowns to 
pursue employment opportunities was coded as assisting women in their roles as paid 
workers; a program designed to promote better nutrition for pregnant women was coded 
as addressing women in their roles as mothers; a program designed to help female 
members of local governing councils hone their leadership and organizing skills was 
coded as one targeting women in their roles as political citizens, and so forth.  Where the 
program targeted women in more than one role, I coded the program to reflect both 
roles.178  A residual sub-category of “other individualist” was added for programs that 
could not easily be coded as targeting women in any one of the identified individualist 
roles.179   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 For instance, programs designed to assist working mothers by providing free or subsidized daycare for 
their children were coded as addressing women both as “paid worker” and “mother.”   
179 The Awareness Generation Program (AGP), for instance, was coded as “other individualist” because it 
is “aimed at inculcating a spirit of organised activity among the rural women for identifying their 
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Of the 65 programs identified for adult women, the above system of classification 
yielded 16 programs that were coded familialist, 42 that were coded individualist, two 
that were coded both individualist and familialist, and five that were deemed too 
ambiguous to be coded clearly.  Expenditure on the five ambiguous programs together 
represented less than 1% of expenditure on women’s programs on average, and was 
excluded from both familialist and individualist categories.180  Twelve of the 16 familialist 
programs were found to target women in their maternal (including reproductive) 
function, and were therefore further coded as maternalist. 
D. Calculating spending 
The next step was to calculate total spending in each category in each year.  For 
this, spending on all individualist programs was added to reveal total individualist 
spending in each year, spending on all familialist programs was added to reveal total 
familialist spending in each year, and spending on all maternalist (sub-category of 
familialist) programs was added to reveal total maternalist spending in each year.  After 
estimating familialist and maternalist expenditures, it was evident that maternalist 
spending accounted for almost all familialist spending.   
Three further calculation rules were developed to include three special types of 
programs.  First, for programs that were coded as being for women in both familialist and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
needs/problems and for chalking out plans of action to meet the various challenges that come their way” 
(Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2001-2002,” 
105).  Since this description makes clear that the AGP targets women not in a relational or familial role but 
as individual members of society, it was coded as an individualist program.  Yet, none of our sub-categories 
under individualist roles (student, paid worker, small entrepreneur, and political citizen) captured 
meaningfully the way in which the AGP attempts to target women.  It was therefore classified as belonging 
to the residual “other individualist” category. 
180 The miniscule spending on these programs means their exclusion from the calculation does not 
compromise the analysis. 
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individualist roles, I split the expenditure accordingly.  Only two such programs were 
found, comprising 6% of average yearly expenditure on women’s programs.  Both were 
daycare programs that sought to assist employed women with childcare.  In each case, I 
added half of the expenditure on these program to individualist spending and the other 
half to total familialist (specifically maternalist) spending.  The literature on maternalism 
considers such programs, which enable women to reconcile childrearing and paid work, 
fully maternalist.  So, classifying the entire expenditure on the program as “maternalist” 
would have been justified.  Yet, splitting the expenditure evenly into the two categories 
allows me to arrive at a conservative estimate of maternalist spending and a liberal 
estimate of individualist spending.181 
Second, for programs that deliver assistance to both women and children, I 
estimated the amount of assistance directed to women in each year (using beneficiary 
information found in annual reports and outcome budgets of the concerned ministry) and 
included only this amount, rather than the total spending on the program, in my 
calculation.182  It is worth noting here that the literature on maternalism tends to consider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The division rule is reasonable because the programs are equal-parts maternalist (in that they assist 
mothers) and individualist (in that they assist “working” women). 
182 For instance, the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) provides two major types of services to 
two primary groups of beneficiaries: (1) non-formal education to children and (2) meals to children as well 
as pregnant and lactating women.  To estimate how much of the expenditure on ICDS was on women in 
each year, I used annual reports of the Department/Ministry of Women and Child Development to gather 
data on the number of (1) women benefiting from the nutrition component, (2) children benefiting from the 
nutrition component, and (3) children benefiting from the non-formal education component.  Making the 
simplifying assumption that the per-child spending on education, the per-child spending on nutrition, and 
the per-woman spending on nutrition were all equal, I estimated the total spending under ICDS on women 
for each year.  Similarly, India’s Reproductive and Child Health Programme (RCH), designed to reduce 
maternal, infant, and child mortality rates, targets both women and children.  Data disaggregating total 
RCH spending into its maternal and child health components could not be found for most years.  The 
2009-10 Outcome Budget of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), however, indicated 
that the maternal health component of RCH received 57% of RCH funds in 2007-08 and 49% in 2008-09 
(Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, “Outcome Budget 2009-10,” 214).  Aiming 
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programs that assist women and children maternalist in their entirety, so from the 
perspective of this literature it would have been acceptable to include the entire spending 
on such programs and code it as maternalist.  Instead, I estimated and used the women-
only spending to provide the most conservative possible estimate of total maternalist 
spending in India.   
Third, the University Grants Commission (UGC), the autonomous body under 
the Ministry of Human Resource Development in charge of higher education in the 
country, both funds some women-specific programs and gives general grants to 
institutions of higher education (IHEs), including women-specific institutions, in India.  
Gender-disaggregated spending data is not available from the UGC.  Making the 
simplifying assumption that the per-student spending of the UGC in women-specific 
IHEs is the same as per-student spending on other IHEs, I estimated UGC’s total general 
grant spending on women-specific institutions to be 9% of its total general grant spending 
on all IHEs.183  While this grant spending may not be considered strictly programmatic in 
the sense that it functions as general budget support for women-specific IHEs rather than 
route specified benefits to women through the IHEs, it can also be argued that, in 
enabling women to receive higher education, the grants do the work of a women-specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to arrive at a conservative estimate and making the simplifying assumption that proportion of funds spent 
on maternal health in RCH was the same each year, I estimated the maternal-health spending in RCH to 
be about 50% of RCH funding in all years in the dataset.  The spending estimate generated for 2013-14 
through this method was later confirmed via an RTI request to the MoHFW, which provided maternal 
health expenditure figure for this year that was very close to the estimate produced using the above method. 
183 To estimate its spending on grants to women-specific IHEs, I took the following steps.  First, I used 
UGC’s annual reports to gather data on the total amount the organization spent on grants to all IHEs in 
each year.  Next, to avoid counting the same funds twice, I subtracted the amount spent on women-specific 
programs from the total grants disbursed by the UGC to calculate UGC’s total non-programmatic grant 
spending.  Next, I collected from the UGC’s office in Delhi information on (1) total enrollment in women-
specific colleges and universities under the UGC in each year, and (2) total enrollment in all colleges and 
universities under the UGC in each year.  This data showed that on average total enrollment in women-
specific IHEs is 9% of total enrollment in all IHEs. 
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program without the trappings of a program (that is, without an official title and 
specification of precisely what the monies are to be spent on).  Since it is possible to make 
both sides of the argument, I include grant spending on women-specific IHEs in the 
dataset because it raises individualist expenditure on women, rendering my case that 
maternalist spending outpaces individualist spending harder to make.184     
IV. Analysis of public spending on social programs for adult women 
How much has the Government of India spent on women-specific programs over the 
years?  As Figure 3.2 shows, total spending by the central government on adult women-
specific programs rose from 1.5 billion INR (Indian Rupees) in 1988-89 to 71 billion INR 
(equivalent to 1.2 billion USD) in 2013-14, which represents an almost 50-fold increase in 
nominal prices and a 7-fold increase in real terms.185  Growth occurred between each 
period for which we have data, except for 2003-04, when spending declined more than 
30% (nominal value) relative to 1998-99.  The decline was a result of changes in the 
allocation of the more generously funded women’s programs.  For instance, Development 
of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) was merged into a sex-unspecific anti-
poverty initiative186 and thus dropped out of the dataset; the National Programme for 
Women in Secondary and Higher Education lost its funding and was eventually 
terminated on the grounds that it duplicated other existing programs187; and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 For transparency, however, individualist spending without UGC grants is depicted in Figure 3.5 below. 
185 Calculated based on inflation information reported on “Inflation Calculator India: Calculate India’s 
Inflation between Any Two Years from 1971 to 2016.” 
186 Mathura Krishna Foundation for Economic and Social Opportunity and Human Resource 
Management, “An Empirical Study of Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Bihar,” 71. 
187 Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, “Hundred Sixty-Eighth Report on 
Action Taken by Government on the Recommendations/Observations Contained in the Hundred Fifty 
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allocation for Reproductive and Child Health shrank by 27% for unclear reasons before 
growing 7-fold over the next five years (nominal values).  Fiscal year 2003-04 was thus the 
exceptional year that saw a decline in spending on women-specific programs over a 
quarter century otherwise marked by growth.  The total number of distinct women-
specific programs running in any one year also grew over this time, but haltingly and at a 
slower pace.  In 1988-89, GoI ran 29 women-specific programs; in 2013-14, this number 
was 39. 
Figure 3.2: Total spending on women-specific programs in India, 1988-2014188 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ninth Report on Demands for Grants 2005-2006 (Demand No. 58) of the Department of Secondary and 
Higher Education.” 
188 Sources: Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants,” 
various years; Government of India, “Detailed Demands for Grants,” various ministries and years; 
Government of India, “Annual Report,” various ministries and years; Government of India, “Performance 
Budget,” various ministries and years; Government of India, “Outcome Budget,” various ministries and 
years; Lok Sabha archives; Rajya Sabha archives; RTI requests filed by author; and others.  
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 While Figure 3.2 depicts total spending, Figure 3.3 shows average spending per 
program over the same years.  Despite a rough growth in the number of programs 
between 1988 and 2014, per-program spending rose from a low of 330 million INR 
(constant 2014 value) in 1988-89 to 1.8 billion INR in 2013-14, a nearly 6-fold increase.  
Real per-program spending increased in each period (relative to the prior period for 
which we have data), except in 2003-04, when it dipped by 22% compared to 1998-99,189 
only to grow 185% by the next period (2008-09).190 
Figure 3.3: Average spending per adult women-specific program in India, 1988-2014191 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 See reasons in previous paragraph. 
190 Growth since 2003-04 is analyzed at the end of this section. 
191 See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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Next, Figure 3.4 depicts central spending on women-specific programs as percent 
of total central expenditure.  The positive slope of the line suggests that, except for 2003-
04,192 spending on women-specific programs has risen consistently not only in absolute 
terms but also as proportion of total expenditure of the central government.  In 1988-89, 
spending on women-specific programs accounted for a mere 0.18% of total expenditure 
of the central government.  In 2013-14, the corresponding figure was 0.45%, representing 
a 2.5-fold increase.  While 0.45% is still a very small figure, suggesting that GoI’s 
expenditure on women-specific programs remains miniscule, it is perhaps unsurprising 
given India’s overall social sector expenditure is low by international standards.193 
Figure 3.4: Total spending on women-specific programs as share of total spending of 
central government, 1988-2014194 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 The dip in 2003-04 results from a combination of a rapid rise in total public expenditure from 1989-99 
to 2003-04 and a slight decline in spending on women-specific programs over the same period. 
193 “India’s Social Sector Spending ‘Woefully’ below Peers: Study.” 
194 See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.5a and 3.5b decompose total (nominal and real) spending on women-
specific programs into spending on familialist and individualist programs.  In 1988-89, 
real familialist expenditure was a little less than twice as high as real individualist 
expenditure (see Figure 3.5b).  While both types of expenditures rose and declined in 
lockstep from then to 2003, familialist expenditure began to outpace individualist 
spending in 2003-04 and reached a level nearly four times greater than the latter in 2013-
14, the last year of data availability.  In addition, Figure 3.5b shows that, in real terms, 
individualist spending declined slightly between 2008-09 and 2013-14, even as maternalist 
spending continued to grow. 
Figure 3.5a and Figure 3.5b: Decomposition of spending on women-specific programs 
into spending on familialist and individualist programs, 1988-2014195 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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It is worth noting, however, that the above charts include in the individualist 
category the funds given as grants to women-only institutions of higher education by the 
University Grants Commission of the GoI Ministry of Human Resource Development.196  
While these grants capture spending on adult women as students, and may therefore be 
considered part of individualist spending, they do not represent strictly programmatic 
spending.  In other words, there is no distinct social program under which allocation to 
women-specific higher education institutions is made each year.  This spending is simply 
part of grant expenditure of the central government on institutions of higher education 
around the country.  If we remove grants to women-only institutions of higher education 
from individualist spending, spending on familialist programs diverges from that on 
individualist programs even more starkly: as Figure 3.6 shows, familialist spending then 
reaches a level 10 times higher individualist spending in 2013-14, and the decline in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Rationale for this is discussed in section above. 
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individualist spending between 2008-09 and 2013-14 is even steeper than that suggested 
by Figure 3.5b.   
Figure 3.6: Spending on familialist and individualist programs minus UGC’s general 
grants to women-specific institutions of higher education, 1988-2014197 
 
 
Yet, to present the most liberal estimate of individualist spending (and thus subject the 
claim of rising maternalism to the strictest possible test), the rest of this chapter reverts to 
including these grants in individualist spending on women. 
Next, Figure 3.7 decomposes real familialist spending into its component parts: 
maternalist and non-maternalist spending.  It shows that the spending on familialist 
programs is almost entirely comprised of spending on maternalist programs.  Between 
1988 and 2009, maternalist spending accounted for 96 to 99% of familialist spending.  In 
2013-14, this proportion fell to 85%, due mostly to introduction of a widow assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Sources: See sources for Figure 3.2 
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program, called Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme (IGNWPS), that alone 
accounted for 11% of familialist spending.  IGNWPS provides non-contributory social 
assistance to poor widows 40 to 79 years in age.198  The age range suggests that assistance 
is extended to widows based on the “principle of maintenance” (i.e. in recognition of 
widows’ status as dependents of the deceased spouses) rather than on the “principle of 
care” (i.e. to help widows provide care to young children).199  For this reason, spending on 
widows is not considered maternalist spending for our purposes.        
Figure 3.7: Decomposition of familialist spending into maternalist and non-maternalist 
spending, 1988-2014200 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Widows older than 80 are to be covered through a sex-unspecific old age pension scheme. 
199 See Sainsbury, Gender, Equality and Welfare States, 70-72, for a discussion of the principle of maintenance 
v. principle of care. 
200 Sources: See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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Since maternalist spending accounts for much of familialist spending, the 
divergence between familialist and individualist spending shown in Figures 3.5a, 3.5b, 
and 3.6 is driven almost entirely by growth in maternalist spending and stagnation in (or 
slight decline in) individualist spending.  Hence it makes sense to boil our analysis down 
to maternalist v. individualist spending.  Figures 3.8a and 3.8b juxtapose maternalist and 
individualist expenditures in nominal and real terms, respectively.  Both figures show 
maternalist and individualist expenditures rising at nearly the same pace between 1988-
89 and 1998-99 and then declining in tandem till 2003-04, after which maternalist 
spending rises much more quickly than individualist spending.  Like Figure 3.5b, Figure 
3.8b suggests that in real terms individualist spending declined slightly in the period 
between 2008-09 and 2013-14 even as maternalist spending grew quickly.  
Figure 3.8a and 3.8b: Decomposition of spending on women-specific programs into 
spending on maternalist and individualist programs, 1988-2014201 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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The divergence is even starker when we consider per-program spending.  Figures 
3.10a and 3.10b show average spending per maternalist and individualist program in 
nominal and real terms, respectively.  The gap between the two lines is explained not only 
by higher total spending on maternalist programs but also the smaller number of 
maternalist programs at any given time than the number of individualist programs (see 
Figure 3.9).  Between 1988-89 and 2013-14, real per-program individualist spending rose 
less than four-fold.  In comparison, real per-program maternalist spending grew by a 
factor of 10, despite a higher initial level.  Consequently, in 2013-14, spending on a 
maternalist program on average was more than 13 times higher than that on an 
individualist program.  In fact, real per-program individualist spending in 2013-14 was still 
about 22% lower than real per-program maternalist spending a quarter of a century earlier 
in 1988-89.  Thus, maternalist funding not only exceeds individualist funding, it is also 
more concentrated on a few programs than individualist funding, which is spread across 3 
to 5 times as many programs as in the maternalist category in any given year.  So, 
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individualist policy effort is not only smaller but also far more fragmented than the 
maternalist policy effort.   
Figure 3.9: Number of maternalist and individualist programs, 1988-2014202 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10a and 3.10b: Average spending per maternalist and individualist program, 
1988-2014203 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 The two programs that were coded as part-maternalist and part-individualist are considered equal to 
half a program in each category.  Hence, for instance, the figure shows the number of maternalist programs 
in 2013-14 was 5.5 and that of individualist programs was 23.5.  The number of ambiguous programs 
(ranging from 0 to 4, with total funding less than 0.4% of total women-specific spending) is not depicted.  
For sources, see Figure 3.2.      
203 Sources: See sources for Figure 3.2. 
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 Finally, how do maternalist and individualist expenditures fare when considered 
as proportion of total expenditure of the central government?  Figure 3.11 shows growing 
divergence between maternalist and individualist expenditures relative to total central 
expenditure as well.  In 1988-89, maternalist expenditure accounted for 0.12% of total 
central expenditure, while individualist spending was at 0.06%.  In 2013-14, the 
corresponding figures were 0.3% and 0.10% respectively, showing a 150% increase in 
proportion of central expenditure on maternalist spending and a 67% increase on 
individualist programs.  As in other figures above, both percentages dropped in 2003-04, 
after which the maternalist share of expenditure continued to rise till 2013-14 but the 
individualist share rose until 2008-09 and declined thereafter, never recovering its pre-
2003-04 level. 
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Figure 3.11: Spending on maternalist and individualist programs as share of total 
spending of the central government, 1988-2014204 
 
 
This brings us to a key pattern in the charts above that we have left unexplained: 
the inflection point at 2003-04, which marked the acceleration of divergence between 
maternalist and individualist spending.  While the deeper causes of this dynamic are 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the specific programs that have driven the shift since 2003-
04 are worth considering here.  The sharp rise in maternalist spending between 2003-04 
and 2013-14 is due mainly to growth in outlay of two existing maternalist programs and 
introduction of a new maternalist program.  Both existing programs whose outlays 
expanded are mother-and-child programs.  The first, Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS), was launched in 1975, falls under the purview of the Ministry of Women 
and Child Development, and provides meals and health services to pregnant women and 
young children.205  The second, Reproductive and Child Health Programme Phase II 
(RCH-II), began in 2005, is run by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 For sources, see Figure 3.2. 
205 Children also receive non-formal education services. 
 
	  
113 
umbrella program for maternal and infant health services.  Janani Suraksha Yojana, the 
conditional cash transfer scheme for pregnant women that is the focus of chapter 4, is 
part of this program.  Between 2003-04 and 2013-14, both ICDS and RCH-II grew 
almost 5-fold in real terms and their combined funding in 2013-14 accounted for nearly 
93% of all maternalist spending in that year.  A third program that contributed 
significantly to the growth in maternalist spending over this period was Indira Gandhi 
Matritva Sahyog Yojana (Indira Gandhi Motherhood Assistance Scheme, or IGMSY), a 
pilot maternity benefit program that was launched in 2010 by the Ministry of Women 
and Child Development to provide financial incentives to pregnant women and new 
mothers for seeking ante-natal care, immunizing and breastfeeding their newborns, and 
undergoing counseling on child nutrition.206  Even though IGMSY was a pilot program 
operating in select districts in the country, in 2013-14 it accounted for 6% of spending on 
maternalist programs.207 
The slight decline in real individualist spending between 2008-09 and 2013-14, as 
depicted by Figure 3.8b, is due to the termination of (1) Swayamsidha, a socio-economic 
empowerment program for women, on the grounds that it duplicated the work of sex-
unspecific antipoverty programs (see Chapter 5) and of (2) the Special Scheme for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog 
Yojana - A Conditional Maternity Benefit Scheme: Implementation Guidelines for State Governmens/UT 
Administrations,” 7-8. 
207 In 2013, after the Indian Parliament passed the National Food Security Act, which required GoI to 
provide maternity benefit of Rs. 6000 (USD 98 in 2013)207 each month for six months to the majority of the 
country’s pregnant women who are not employed in national or state governments (which have their own, 
more generous maternity policy) and not receiving maternity benefits under another law (such as that 
governing the formal private sector),207 GoI adopted IGMSY as the vehicle through which it would meet its 
obligation under the new law.  In 2017, the government renamed the program Pradhan Mantri Matritva 
Sahyog Yojana (Prime Minister Motherhood Assistance Scheme, or PMMVY) and pledged to expand it 
from a pilot program to one operational across the country. 
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Construction of Women’s Hostels, the funding for which was routed to the sex-unspecific 
grant fund of the University Grants Commission.208  Funding from these two programs 
accounted for 28% of total real individualist spending in 2008-09.  Hence, the loss of this 
funding, which some rise in funding for other individualist programs could not entirely 
offset, caused the slight decline in individualist spending by 2013-14. 
V. Limitations 
There are five major limitations of the analysis presented in this chapter.  
First, social spending data used without “appropriate controls for social needs”209 
may be faulted for not taking the eligible beneficiary population into account.  The 
critique is warranted in some cases but does not apply here.  There are two reasons.  
First, the principal comparison this project makes is between familialism and 
individualism in women’s social policy in India.  The largest possible universe of all adult 
women who can be targeted with familialist policy is the same as the largest possible 
universe of all women who can be targeted with individualist policy – both comprise of all 
adult women.  Hence, normalization of social spending data is not required: it would 
make little sense to normalize familialist and individualist spending by the same number 
in any case.  In addition, since the number of women in India who are in the workforce 
(around 122 million),210 far exceeds the number of women who are pregnant in any given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Government of India, University Grants Commission, “Annual Report 2010-11,” 68.  The dataset I use 
in this project captures the (estimated) part of the general grants of the UGC that are given to women-
specific institutions of higher education, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
209 Jensen, “Less Bad than Its Reputation: Social Spending as a Proxy for Welfare Effort in Cross-National 
Studies,” 328. 
210 The World Bank, “Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of Female Population Ages 15+) 
(modeled ILO Estimate);” “The World Factbook.” 
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year (around 27 million),211 the largest possible sub-category of beneficiaries of 
individualist programs is 5 times largest than the largest possible sub-category of 
beneficiaries of maternalist programs.  Normalizing by extent of “social need” would thus 
only make our case – that maternalist spending outpaces individualist spending – easier to 
make.  
The other reason the critique does not apply is that it takes “social need” as 
exogenously given rather than as interpreted in society.  The universe of population that 
is considered needy of or eligible for almost any benefits can expand or shrink 
dramatically based on looser or tighter definitions of need, which in turn are socially and 
politically determined.212  This is not to imply that needs are not “real” or deeply felt by 
those experiencing any form of deprivation.  Instead, the point is that our conceptions of 
social need are malleable.  Accordingly, as Chapter 4 will show, available funding for 
National Maternity Benefit Scheme in India informed the conception of the social need 
to which that program was a response, instead of the other way around.  Hence, 
normalization by social need is only likely to raise further questions about the appropriate 
measures of need without adding much to the analysis. 
The second limitation is that this chapter examines only central-level spending on 
women-specific programs, not state-level expenditure.  India’s federal structure of 
government allows both central and state governments significant scope in social 
spending decisions.  By not capturing spending on social programs for women at the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Annual Number of Births.” 
212 Fraser, “Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation”; Langan, “The Contested Concept of 
Need”; Saugeres, “The Social Construction of Housing Management Discourse: Objectivity, Rationality 
and Everyday Practice,” 97; Beveridge, Special Educational Needs in Schools, 1; Molyneux, “Mothers at the 
Service of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s Conditional Transfer 
Programme,” 438. 
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level, the chapter can be said to be missing a sizeable part of the social policy landscape.  
While this is again a reasonable critique, there are four reasons why central spending on 
social programs is still worthy of attention.  First, because (1) states have greater control 
over some areas of social policy (including health) than others (such as education and 
employment, for which responsibility is constitutionally shared between the states and the 
central government), and (2) maternalist spending in India tends to be in the health 
sector), it is likely that excluding social expenditure by states in our analysis excludes more 
maternalist spending than individualist spending.  Hence, if the exclusion of state 
expenditure does create bias in the analysis presented here, it is bias that would render 
the argument of this chapter harder, not easier, to make.  This direction of the bias 
(against the argument of this chapter) makes the bias problematic for our purposes.  
Second, although states do retain significant control over social spending, the central 
government looms large in the formulation of social policy across the country for four 
reasons – (1) while the Indian Constitution empowers states to make social policy in many 
respects, it does not bar the central government from enacting social policy; (2) the central 
government launches and funds many of the most important, well-resourced, and high-
profile social policy initiatives in the country; (3) the central government provides 
financial assistance to states to help state governments meet their social-sector 
responsibilities; and (4) the central government influences the policy priorities of states.213  
Third, like information on central spending, that on state spending on women’s programs 
is not systematically available through any one source.  The original dataset on spending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Tulasidhar, “Expenditure Compression and Health Sector Outlays.”; Kapur and Nangia, “Social 
Protection in India: A Welfare State Sans Public Goods?”; Mooij and Dev, “Social Sector Priorities: An 
Analysis of Budgets and Expendiures in India in the 1990s,” 98. 
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across all ministries of the central government used for the analysis presented in this 
chapter was compiled over six months; collecting similar data for all 29 states and 7 union 
territories in India would be beyond the scope of this project.  And finally, as it became 
clear through the process of this research that much of India’s maternalism was a 
response to incentives produced by the agenda-setting efforts of international 
organizations, the rationale for including state-level spending weakened further because 
international organizations such as the United Nations work directly with central, not 
state, government structures in India.  For these reasons, I choose to focus on the 
expenditure trends of the central government in this project.   
Third, women-related state policy action that does not take the form of 
government-run social programs itemized in government budgets is excluded from the 
purview of this analysis.  For instance, the above analysis does not take into account 
women-related changes to the legal code – such as the 73rd and 74th constitutional 
amendments, which require female representation on local governing councils – and any 
microloans that are granted to women by public-sector banks but that are not already 
enumerated as social programs in the budget files of the central government.  While both 
may be important instruments for promoting women’s well-being and gender equality, 
neither qualifies as a social program with a defined budget outlay.  Laws, for instance, 
generally serve to define women’s rights in abstract rather than require the state 
machinery proactively to provide cash or another in-kind benefit to women as social 
programs do.  In addition, they do not have budget allocations attached to them.  Public-
sector microloans are very different from state social programs as well: first, they are 
controlled by largely autonomous banks rather than by the central government itself; and 
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second, they are given usually on a non-programmatic and episodic basis that runs 
counter to the spirit of planning and (intended, if not always achieved) regularity that 
defines the social programs run by the various ministries of the GoI.  They are also loans 
to be paid back rather than grants from the state to women and therefore cannot be 
considered state expenditure on women.  For these reasons, laws and microloans by public-
sector banks did not merit inclusion in this study of state expenditure on women’s social 
programs. 
Fourth, the foregoing analysis examines spending on programs for adult women, 
not that on programs for girls.  Limiting the scope to adult women-specific programs 
allowed me to compare like with like, keeping the analysis clear and consistent.  Is it 
possible, however, that the exclusion of girl-specific programs introduced systematic bias 
in the spending trends depicted in this chapter?  Preliminary analysis of spending on girl-
specific programs shows that incorporating this spending, much of which is on programs 
for girls’ education, in our study reduces to a small extent, but does not close, the gap 
between maternalist and individualist spending.  This suggests that the ratio of 
individualist to maternalist spending is higher for girls than for women – a pattern that, it 
is interesting to note, parallels the Millennium Development Goals, which include 
individualist goals for girls (gender parity in education) and maternalist goals for women 
(improved maternal health) – but that the small downward bias in individualist spending 
introduced by the exclusion of girl-specific programs does not negate the key findings of 
this chapter. 
A final critique might be that individualist and maternalist programs are not 
nearly as different from each other as this chapter suggests: maternalist programs might 
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address women as individuals in some ways and individualist programs might sometimes 
assist women as mothers.  This coexistence of maternalist and individualist elements in 
the same program is indeed possible, and I recognize fully that programs/policies are 
multifaceted and likely to fall at different points along a continuum between 
maternalism/familialism and individualism rather than entirely in one camp or another.  
Nonetheless, I present familialism/maternalism and individualism as ideal types in the 
hope that exaggerating the differences between these concepts helps clarify these 
differences. 
While the five points highlighted above present reasonable limitations, this section 
has argued that they do not defeat the purpose of the analysis undertaken here.  
VI. Conclusion 
Original spending data for women-specific programs were gathered for this chapter from 
various government archives in New Delhi, India.  The chapter analyzed the resulting 
dataset – to my knowledge the only one systematically to identify 65 of GoI’s adult 
women-specific programs since 1985 and to include public expenditure data on each until 
2015 – to show the large and growing difference between expenditure on familialist 
(specifically maternalist) programs and individualist programs.  It argued that a stark 
difference in maternalist and individualist spending (1) is robust to various measures -- 
nominal, real, total, per-program average, with and without UGC grants, and proportion 
of public expenditure – of both types of spending, and (2) exists despite use of coding and 
calculation rules that, as the chapter documents at each step, were designed to yield a 
very conservative estimate of maternalist spending and a liberal estimate of individualist 
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spending.  The next chapter zooms in to reveal the story of one of the programs 
responsible for India’s growing maternalist spending: Janani Suraksha Yojana. 
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CHAPTER 4: Political and Policy History of Janani Suraksha Yojana, 1989-
2013 
 
I. Introduction 
National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) was first announced in 1989 and eventually 
introduced in 1995.  A cash assistance program for poor pregnant women, it failed to 
garner much attention in its early years: the administrations that produced it spent little 
time promoting it, and the media reported on it cursorily at best.  Yet, by 2010, NMBS – 
now called Janani Suraksha Yojana (Mother Protection Scheme, or JSY) – had become 
known as the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world.214  In 2013-14, 
public expenditure on the program was almost 18 billion rupees,215 accounting for about 
a quarter of India’s total federal spending on women-specific programs.  In its first decade 
of existence (2005-2015), JSY assisted 83 million pregnant women in India216 – a million 
more than the entire population of Germany, Europe’s most populous country. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Lim et al., “India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a Conditional Cash Transfer Programme to Increase 
Births in Health Facilities: An Impact Evaluation,” 2010; Randive, Diwan, and Costa, “India’s Conditional 
Cash Transfer Programme (the JSY) to Promote Institutional Birth: Is There an Association between 
Institutional Birth Proportion and Maternal Mortality?” 
215 close to 300 million USD. 
216 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “Assistance to Beneficiaries Registered under Janani 
Suraksha Yojana (JSY).” 
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Figure 4.1: Rising expenditure on and coverage of NMBS/JSY, 1995-2017217 
 
It is this extraordinary trajectory of NMBS/JSY – from a small, unknown 
initiative to one of India’s most generously funded schemes for women and the world’s 
largest conditional cash transfer program – that this chapter seeks to record and explain 
in order to illuminate the possible determinants of the recent wave of maternalist 
policymaking in the global south.218  It argues that three key factors rooted in India’s 
political economy and the politics of international development drove JSY’s remarkable 
evolution: (1) the electoral compulsions accompanying rapid economic liberalization in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Data from 1995 to 2004 pertain to NMBS; the rest pertain to JSY.  All expenditure figures used in this 
project are nominal unless indicated otherwise.  Source: Source: Annual reports of Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MoHFW) and Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD); Internal records of MoRD; 
Online records of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; Five-year plans; Saxena, 
“Sixth Report of the Commissioners to the Supreme Court: Writ Petition (Civil) 196 of 2001 (PUCL v. 
Union of India & Others)”; Government of India, Press Information Bureau, yPress Releases”; Gupta, 
Poverty in India, 178; HAQ Centre for Child Rights, “Rising But Not Shining: Children’s Share in the Union 
Budget,” 75. 
218 The phrase “generously funded” is used to indicate that the program has higher funding than most 
other women-specific programs, not that its outlay is greater than what is required or even sufficient to meet 
the goals of the program. 
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poor democracy, (2) a budding social movement for food security that managed to tap 
into the power of an activist judiciary, and, most importantly, (3) the spotlight cast on 
maternal mortality by the Millennium Development Goals and other high-profile 
international commitments to improve maternal health.  The impact of this spotlight, the 
chapter shows, is visible in JSY’s (1) framing, (2) content, and (3) timing. 
The chapter argues further that there are five pathways through which 
developments occurring at the international level exerted causal influence over JSY: by (1) 
forging a tight link between maternal health and population growth, which brought 
maternal health into the mainstream of conversations on global challenges, (2) generating 
international funding for maternal health interventions, (3) creating incentives for 
policymakers to be seen as taking steps to achieve national and international targets on 
maternal mortality, (4) inculcating among policymakers and other state officials a sense of 
shame over India’s maternal mortality, and (5) legitimizing the devotion of significant 
financial resources to maternal health. 
In making the above arguments, and in emphasizing especially the influence of 
the politics of international development on the course of JSY, this chapter seeks to 
underscore the pivotal role of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in reshaping 
the landscape of women’s public policy.  While international relations and comparative 
politics literature has recognized that the MDGs have had some impact on domestic 
policymaking in developing countries,219 it has often underestimated the extent to which 
they have fundamentally reoriented national policy landscapes and resource allocations in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 See Fukuda-Parr, “Global Development Goal Setting as a Policy Tool for Global Governance: 
Intended and Unintended Consequences”; “MDG Progress of Arab States in 2015”; Hafner and Shiffman, 
“The Emergence of Global Attention to Health Systems Strengthening.” 
 
	  
124 
the global south,220 rarely traced their impact on evolution of specific national policies and 
programs, and not always teased out the overlapping pathways through which the causal 
influence has worked.221  This chapter adds value on these three dimensions. 
We proceed in the following manner.  Section II draws on original sources to 
weave a narrative of the history of NMBS/JSY.  Section III discusses the foregoing 
narrative to draw attention to the three key factors, summarized above, that shaped the 
evolution of JSY.  Section IV considers alternative explanations.  Section V suggests what 
general tendencies the story of JSY might reflect, and Section VI concludes with an 
overview of the argument. 
The chapter relies primarily on an inductive, process-tracing methodology: it 
draws information from more than 2500 pages of internal documents of the Government 
of India (GoI) – not available publicly and, to my knowledge, never before consulted for 
research – and probes this information to uncover the proximate and distal causal forces 
at play.222  In-depth interviews with government officials and other subject matter experts 
as well as secondary sources provide additional details. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Kenny and Sumner, “More Money or More Development: What Have the MDGs Achieved?,” 24; 
Singh, “Emphasize Capacity Building, Inputs and Processes to Achieve Greater Impact of MDGs,” 11; 
Shiffman and Ved, “The State of Political Priority for Safe Motherhood in India.” 
221 Cha, “The Impact of the Worldwide Millennium Development Goals Campaign on Maternal and 
under-Five Child Mortality Reduction: ‘Where Did the Worldwide Campaign Work Most Effectively?’”; 
Christian, Alicea, and West, Jr., “The Impact of the Millennium Development Goals in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile”; Barimah and Diko, “The Impact of United Nations Millennium Development Goals on Sub-
Saharan Africa.” 
222 Methodology and original sources are described in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
	  
125 
II. Evolution of Janani Suraksha Yojana, 1989-2013223 
NMBS/JSY evolved in many phases between 1989, when it first made appearance as an 
overlooked idea in an election manifesto, and 2013, when it channeled benefits to almost 
11 million pregnant women.  Table 4.1 below summarizes the major phases in the 
evolution of the program, and the following sub-sections recount its story in more detail. 
Table 4.1: Milestones in the evolution of NMBS/JSY224 
 
Year Month Milestone 
1989 Nov. -The Congress party’s election manifesto promises to 
introduce a maternity assistance program 
1995 Aug. -National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) is launched to 
enable pre-natal and post-natal care 
-Mothers’ benefit level: Rs. 300 per pregnancy 
-Eligibility criteria: 
•   Age: 19 and above 
•   Poverty status: Below poverty level (BPL) 
•   Parity: No more than two live births in the past 
1997 [Unclear] -Mothers’ benefit is raised to Rs. 500 per pregnancy 
2000 Jul. -NMBS begins to be presented as a maternal nutrition initiative 
2001 Apr. -NMBS is transferred from Ministry of Rural Development to 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
2003 Feb. -NMBS begins to be presented as an anti-maternal mortality 
initiative 
2005 Apr. -NMBS is re-launched as Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) 
-Cash benefit, formerly unconditional, is made conditional on 
institutional delivery 
-NMBS’s eligibility criteria are retained in JSY 
-States are classified as high-performing (HPS) and low-
performing (LPS), and further subdivided into urban and rural 
areas 
-Mothers’ benefit level is enhanced and staggered by type of 
state and area: 
•   LPS-Rural: Rs. 700 per institutional delivery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 The analysis presented in this chapter ends in 2013, both because 2013-14 was the last year of data 
availability when this project began and because no records from beyond 2013 could be accessed at 
MoHFW.  
224 Source: Compiled by author through review of relevant policy documents from GoI. 
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•   LPS-Urban: Rs. 600 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Rural: Rs. 700 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Urban: None 
-Mothers’ benefit is extended to women in LPS on their third 
delivery if women agree to undergo sterilization after delivery 
-Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) are incorporated 
as front-line female health workers to encourage institutional 
delivery 
-ASHAs are given staggered monetary incentives as well: 
•   LPS-Rural: Rs. 600 per institutional delivery 
•   LPS-Urban: Rs. 200 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Rural: None 
•   HPS-Urban: None 
2006 Jun. -Eligibility criteria for mothers’ institutional delivery benefit 
are loosened: 
•   Age restriction removed for LPS 
•   Parity restriction removed for LPS 
•   Poverty status restriction removed for LPS in case of 
deliveries in public (not private) facilities 
-Home delivery benefit of Rs. 500 is added for women meeting 
the following criteria: 
•   19 or above in age, 
•   BPL status, 
•   No more than two live births in the past 
Sept. -Mothers’ benefit is raised in LPS: 
•   LPS-Rural: Rs. 1400 per institutional delivery 
•   LPS-Urban: Rs. 1000 per institutional delivery 
2009 Apr. -ASHA incentive is extended to HPS: 
•   HPS-Rural: Rs. 200 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Urban: Rs. 200 per institutional delivery 
2010 Jul. -ASHA incentive is raised in tribal districts of HPS: 
•   HPS-Tribal: Rs. 600 per institutional delivery 
2013 Apr. -ASHA incentive is raised to make the amount consistent 
across all rural areas and across all urban areas: 
•   LPS-Urban: Rs. 400 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Urban: Rs. 400 per institutional delivery 
•   HPS-Rural: Rs. 600 per institutional delivery 
May -Eligibility criteria for mothers’ benefits are further loosened: 
•   Age restriction removed for institutional delivery 
benefit in HPS 
•   Parity restriction removed for institutional delivery 
benefit in HPS 
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•   Age restriction removed for home delivery benefit in 
HPS and LPS 
•   Parity restriction removed for home delivery benefit in 
HPS and LPS  
 
A. Backdrop 
Maternity and child health (MCH) services had an early, albeit a slow, start in 
independent India.  The country’s very first five-year economic plan (1951-56) outlined a 
strategy to deploy doctors and midwives in rural health centers and urban MCH centers 
to safeguard the health of pregnant women and their newborn babies.225  The goal was to 
produce a stronger nation: the plan document proclaimed that the “protection of the 
health of the expectant mother and her child is of the utmost importance for building a 
sound and healthy nation.”226 
By the 1960s, once India had established itself as an independent state, nation-
building concerns receded and a more pressing problem appeared on the horizon: India’s 
fast-growing population, which hit 500 million that decade.227  The idea that population 
growth caused poverty took hold, and policymakers began to look for ways to increase the 
uptake of India’s family planning programs.  To this end, they merged India’s MCH 
programs with its family planning initiatives, hoping that a link with the former would 
incentivize acceptance of the latter, leading to lower fertility.228  By the time the Fourth 
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Five-year Plan was released in 1969, “[m]aternal health had become commensurate with 
fertility reduction.”229 
During the Emergency years of the mid-1970s, with civil liberties suspended, state 
officials forcibly sterilized around 11 million people, mostly men.230  In the aftermath of 
this abuse of state power, for which GoI was excoriated internationally and at home, 
“family planning” and “vasectomies” became politically toxic words.  In response, 
policymakers replaced “family planning” with “family welfare”231 and began to target 
sterilization efforts at women rather than at men, which brought maternal health back 
into focus.   
Within four years, in 1987, the United Nations Population Fund, the World Bank, 
and the World Health Organization had come together to sponsor the Safe Motherhood 
conference in Nairobi, drawing global attention to the problem of maternal mortality. 
According to WHO estimates, half a million women were dying each year, mostly in 
developing countries, due to pregnancy-related causes.232  Taking note of the scale of the 
problem, the participants at Nairobi launched a global campaign to promote maternal 
health.233  As discussed below, the campaign set in motion a process that eventually 
shaped India’s maternal health policy. 
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B. Origins 
On 7 November 1989, the Indian National Congress, India’s foremost political 
party at the time, released its election manifesto for the national elections that were to be 
held later that month.  In it, the party promised to “work towards introducing social 
security schemes for workers in the unorganised sector to provide for medical treatment, 
maternity benefit as well as old age pension.”234  The exact impetus behind the inclusion 
of maternity benefits in this set of social security measures for workers in the informal 
sector is unclear, but it is likely that the inspiration came from a popular state-level 
maternity benefit scheme introduced in the state of Tamil Nadu in 1987.235  
Whatever its provenance, the maternity benefit was mentioned in the manifesto 
only once and only in passing.  The document revealed neither what the program was 
likely to be called, nor what its features might be.  A marginal promise in a 64-page 
document littered with other pledges, the maternity benefit failed also to attract any 
serious attention from the press.  The Congress party lost the following election, and, 
although the party returned to power in 1991, there was little mention of the maternity 
benefit for another four years as the government turned its attention to the foreign-
exchange crisis that induced India to initiate pro-market economic policy reforms. 
While in power, however, the Congress party took two other steps that paved the 
way for a maternity benefits program in the future.  First, following the Safe Motherhood 
conference of 1987, and in partnership with the World Bank and the United Nations 
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Children’s Fund (UNICEF), it launched the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood 
(CSSM) project in 1992.236  A four-year, country-wide project costing $330 million, 
CSSM sought to increase child survival and improve maternal health, in part by 
establishing more hospitals and community health centers equipped to provide 
emergency obstetric care, protecting pregnant women from anemia and tetanus, and 
encouraging women to deliver in clinics and hospitals rather than at home.237  Over the 
long term, one of the objectives of the initiative was to “shift India’s family welfare 
program from its near-exclusive concern with fertility regulation to mother and child 
health.”238  The high profile of CSSM drew domestic attention to the poor state of child 
and maternal health in India.   
Second, in response to a macroeconomic crisis triggered by India’s dwindling 
foreign exchange reserves in 1991, the Congress party began a series of pro-market 
economic policy changes aiming to free the private sector from state control and open the 
Indian economy to foreign trade and investment.239  These changes, now known as 
India’s “economic reforms” or “economic liberalization,” were not without their critics.  
Opposition came from within the “stodgy Congress party, a divided Parliament, nervous 
industrialists and shrill intellectuals.”240  Yet, the reforms continued. 
In 1994, the states of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Karnataka – both usually 
considered strongholds of the Congress party, which had won seven out of nine state 
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elections in each since independence – went to the polls in routine state-level elections.  
Coming soon after the onset of economic liberalization of 1991 and just two years before 
the next national election of 1996, the 1994 state polls carried special significance for the 
party.  And, even though it was the incumbent party in both states, it was trounced in 
both elections: it lost 86% of its seats in the AP legislative assembly and 81% in the 
Karnataka assembly.241  This “put the fear of God” into the Congress leadership, which, 
interpreting the losses as a sign of widespread discontent with its economic policies, 
sought now to “bring about a degree of social ‘adjustment with a human face’” into its 
economic liberalization efforts.242 
The Congress party’s desire to soften the image of liberalization and spread the 
fruits of growth more evenly across the population led, among other things, to the 
creation of a social security initiative called the National Social Assistance Scheme 
(NSAS), one component of which was the maternity benefit program initially proposed in 
the 1989 Congress party manifesto.  The story of how NSAS came to be involves two key 
figures: Dr. Manmohan Singh, an economist and India’s finance minister under the 
Congress government in the early 1990s, and S. Guhan, a retired senior civil servant and 
social policy expert. 
“Very concerned that reforms were being given a bad name,” Singh turned to 
Guhan for help.243  Guhan – an observer of the Tamil Nadu social security programs 
(which included a cash assistance program for pregnant women) and author of several 
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published analyses of social security – had for long been a proponent of social security 
arrangements for those working in the unorganized/informal sector.244  The informal 
sector employed around 80% of India’s non-agricultural workforce at this time,245 and 
workers in this sector had little recourse to systematic social security arrangements, most 
of which served only formal-sector workers – a setup that Guhan found “skewed, 
regressive, and limited.”246  For Guhan, then, “social security [for the informal sector] was 
the key.”247  Singh, for his part, “instinctively and intellectually related more to the social 
security” idea than to other social policy proposals being discussed at the time.248   
Between Singh and Guhan, the high-level support needed to steer a nascent social 
security program through political and bureaucratic channels was thus in place.     
Presented with the opportunity created by Singh’s request and the rare availability 
of state revenues, which had expanded owing to the rapid growth of the Indian economy 
in the years following liberalization, Guhan helped design a system of social security for 
the vast majority of Indian labor working in the informal sector.249  What resulted was the 
National Social Assistance Scheme, which Finance Minister Singh announced in his 
budget speech on 15 March 1995, calling it an effort to ease the “greatest hardships” 
suffered by the most vulnerable of the poor.  The proposed program, Singh said, would 
have three components: an old age pension scheme for the elderly poor above 65 years of 
age, a survivors’ benefit program to help a poor family in case of the death of the 
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breadwinner, and a maternity benefit program to enable “pre-natal and post-natal 
maternity care to women belonging to poor households.”250  He added that he was 
appointing a governmental committee to design the program. 
C. Launch 
By June of that year, Singh’s committee, chaired by the top civil servant in the 
Department of Rural Development and comprising of representatives of relevant federal 
ministries and officials from some state governments, had worked out the details of the 
program.  According to the NSAS Cabinet note – a synopsis of the objectives and design 
of the program presented to the prime minister’s Cabinet for approval – the NSAS 
started “for the first time a national all-India policy for the unorganised sector.”  Using 
the language of social protection, the note said that the purpose of the program was to 
help protect the poor from “contingencies” such as “old age, death of bread earner, and 
maternity.”251 
The note called the maternity benefit component of NSAS the National 
Maternity Benefit Scheme and conceptualized it as a two-part cash transfer, to be funded 
jointly by federal and state governments.  Eligible pregnant women were to receive the 
first installment once they registered their pregnancies with a local clinic for ante-natal 
care.  The second installment was to be disbursed 45 days after delivery, once the child 
had received relevant immunizations.  The Cabinet note suggested that the maternity 
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benefit “can be linked to maternal care and family welfare measures,”252 but did not 
provide additional details about the concrete objectives of the program.   
The authors of the note expected that benefits from NMBS would reach around 
4.5 million women each year at an annual cost of 1.4 billion rupees in the years 
immediately following its launch.  The Department of Rural Development, in the 
Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, was to oversee the implementation of the 
program.  The Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC), an inter-ministerial committee in 
charge of approving new programs, approved NSAS on June 14.253  The Cabinet 
followed suit on July 18.254  National Maternity Benefit Scheme was now ready to be 
launched. 
On 15 August 1995, Prime Minister Rao used his Independence Day address to 
the country to launch the umbrella social assistance scheme, now known as the National 
Social Assistance Program (NSAP).255  By this time, the designers of NSAP had also 
changed some of the program’s features.  Instead of a two-part cash transfer envisioned in 
the Cabinet note, NMBS would now disburse Rs. 300 to a pregnant woman eight to 12 
weeks prior to expected delivery.  The eligibility criteria for NMBS had also been further 
specified.  To be eligible for a cash transfer under the program, a pregnant woman would 
have to be below the poverty line, aged 19 years or more, and have given birth to no 
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more than one live child in the past.256  Rao announced that the maternity benefit was 
designed to help poor pregnant women who “do not have anybody to look after them 
during delivery or are too poor to depend on medicines,”257 but did not clarify what 
precisely he expected the cash to be used for – as wage replacement, subsidy for 
medication, assistance for purchasing medical care, or something else.  The Department 
of Rural Development, in the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, was to oversee 
the implementation of the program. 258   
Policymakers expected that benefits from NMBS would reach around 4.5 million 
women each year at an annual cost of 1.4 billion rupees in the years immediately 
following its launch.  Soon, the benefit was increased from Rs. 300 to Rs. 500 per 
beneficiary, due to concerns that the original “quantum of benefit was too low.”259  Yet, 
spending on and coverage of NMBS remained much lower than expected.260  The 
fledgling program had yet to take off. 
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D. Growth 
1. Renewed interest in population control 
The first boost came in 1999, as newspapers began to report that India’s 
population would hit one billion within months in less than a year.261  In June 1999, a 
group of government ministers appointed by the Cabinet gathered to formulate India’s 
population policy for the following decade.  Convened as an official Group of Ministers 
(GoM), they recommended that NMBS be transferred from the Ministry of Rural 
Development (MoRD) to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) to 
function as a component of the latter’s population stabilization program, a set of 
initiatives MoHFW had undertaken to arrest the rapid growth of India’s population.262 
What exact concern or hope prompted the GoM to recommend the transfer is 
unclear, but it is likely that the apparent thematic affinity between NMBS (which was 
designed to promote maternal well-being) and the health ministry’s population 
stabilization program (which sought to control population growth through family 
planning efforts, including women’s reproductive behavior) played a role.263 
Unhappy with the prospect of losing control over NMBS, MoRD resisted the 
GoM’s recommendation for months.264  In what was likely an effort to distinguish NMBS 
from the population control-focused programs of the MoHFW, at this time MoRD began 
suddenly to present NMBS as a nutrition initiative. “NMBS is a programme under which a 
lumpsum grant of Rs. 500 is made for maternal nutrition so as to ensure that a pregnant 
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woman gets nutrition even during the period of pregnancy when she is unable to go to the 
field and work so as to ensure healthy self and healthy child,” it argued.265 
Although MoRD’s resistance failed to stop the transfer of NMBS, its framing of 
NMBS as a nutrition program had lasting consequences.  No prior description of NMBS, 
public or internal, had linked the program with maternal and child nutrition – in fact, the 
word “nutrition” was being used in the description of the initiative for the first time.  
Before this, NMBS was identified simply as a program providing “lumpsum cash 
assistance” to poor pregnant women,266 or as a scheme of assistance for “pre-natal and 
post-natal maternity care.”267  Now, however, MoRD was reframing NMBS as a nutrition 
initiative.  Other official statements soon confirmed this reconceptualization.268  The 
notion of NMBS as a program for maternal nutrition – a consequential idea, as we will 
see below – had crystallized by the latter half of the year 2000.  The transfer of NMBS to 
the health ministry took effect on 1 April 2001.269 
2. Domestic social movement for food security 
Also in April 2001, an advocacy organization called People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties, Rajasthan, filed public interest litigation (PIL) – cases filed for the protection of 
public interest – in the Supreme Court against the Government of India, alleging that the 
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government was failing to use the country’s food stocks to prevent hunger and starvation.  
To supplement its effort to promote food security through the legal channel, the 
organization partnered with other civil society groups to begin a public campaign to build 
support for a “right to food” that, affiliated activists argued, was implied in the right to life 
enshrined in the Indian Constitution.270  The Right to Food (RTF) campaign, as the effort 
came to be known, advocated proper implementation of all existing nutrition programs.271  
The campaign drew on the notion of NMBS as a nutrition scheme – promoted, as we saw 
above, by MoRD since July 2000 – to bring maternity benefits under the umbrella of 
food security rights as well, giving NMBS a second impetus through its powerful 
advocacy. 
In an order issued in September 2001 in response to the campaign’s allegations, 
the Supreme Court directed federal and state governments properly to implement various 
existing nutrition programs including NMBS.272  Two months later, the court passed a 
second order on NMBS, giving the benefits under this scheme the status of legal 
entitlements.273   
Because of the interest of the RTF campaign and the intervention of the Supreme 
Court, in 2001 NMBS was already on its path to greater prominence.  But, it was yet to 
meet the targets laid out for it in 1995: the number of women who received benefits 
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under the program in 2000-01 had reached around 1 million, only a quarter of the 
annual number the NMBS policy documents had predicted more than six years earlier.274 
3. From maternal nutrition to maternal mortality 
Starting February 2003, fewer than two years after the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare took charge of the NMBS, the ministry began to propose some financial 
and procedural modifications to the program.  It justified these changes by invoking 
India’s high maternal mortality: “Maternal mortality in India is one of the higher in the 
world,” it said in a memo, adding that “[a]nemia is often considered to be particularly 
problematic for pregnant women and it is one of the major causes (19%) of Maternal 
Mortality…Thus, the scheme aims at reducing Maternal Mortality by providing 
nutritional support to the expectant mothers.”275 
Maternal death has usually been defined as the “death of a woman while pregnant 
or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the 
pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, 
but not from accidental or incidental causes.”276  According GoI reports published in 
2002, India’s maternal mortality ratio (MMR) stood at 407 maternal deaths per 100,000 
live births in 1998, down from 437 in 1993 and 468 in 1980 (see Figure 4.2).277  In the late 
1990s, South Asia had the second-highest maternal mortality ratios in the world (behind 
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those of sub-Saharan Africa).278  Although India was far from the worst offender within 
South Asia – that distinction went to Afghanistan, with an estimated MMR of 1900 per 
100,000 live births in the year 2000 – India’s large population meant that even with a 
lower MMR, the country accounted for the highest number of maternal deaths in the 
world.279  Of the 529,000 maternal deaths that occurred worldwide in 2000, more than a 
quarter – around 136,000 – occurred in India.280 
Yet, despite India’s status as the world’s leader in the number of maternal deaths, 
in the 14 years since NMBS was first proposed in 1989, and in the eight years since it was 
introduced in 1995, MoHFW’s February 2003 memo was the first to link NMBS with the 
problem of maternal mortality.  Before this, as we saw above, NMBS was presented 
initially as a program of cash assistance designed to help poor pregnant women in a 
mostly unspecified way and later as a nutrition program for pregnant women.  None of 
these descriptions invoked India’s high maternal mortality rate as a rationale for the 
program, let alone present high MMR as the reason for the existence of NMBS. 
As we will see below, MoHFW would soon invoke the maternal mortality 
numbers to propose sweeping changes in the program that, under the guise of slight 
improvements, would transform entirely the character of NMBS.281  First, however, a 
different question demands our attention: how did maternal mortality come suddenly to 
be a key concern of policymakers in 2003?  Answering this requires a brief detour into the 
politics of international development, to which we turn below. 
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4. Maternal mortality in international development 
The story begins in 1994, when, following the attention that the Safe Motherhood 
conference of 1987 brought to maternal mortality, the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo “transformed the population 
paradigm”282 by linking population goals closely with issues of development, gender 
equality, and reproductive health for women.283  The Fourth World Conference on 
Women, held in 1995 in Beijing, reinforced the centrality of gender equality and women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights to a wide array of public policy concerns: public health, 
education, environmental protection, and economic development.284  Connected to 
reproductive rights is maternal health, linked to which is maternal mortality, a problem 
that agreements emerging from both conferences emphasized and committed to 
fighting.285 
 Not everyone supported the outcomes of the conferences, however.  The Vatican, 
along with some Islamic countries and conservative Christian groups in the United States, 
feared that language promoting better reproductive and maternal health served to 
smuggle abortion rights into the consequential international documents resulting from 
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these conferences, especially the ICPD.286  In the years that followed, opposition to the 
Cairo agreement coalesced, and dissenters lobbied to keep reproductive health rights out 
of any agreements reached at the upcoming 2000 UN Millennium Summit287 – a 
gathering so significant that it has been described by observers as “the mother of all 
summits.”288  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan hoped that all UN Member States 
would sign the declaration produced at the end of the Millennium Summit, signaling 
unprecedented, unanimous, and global support for the development agenda formulated 
at the conference.  The declaration thus had to steer clear of controversy.   
The Millennium Declaration, signed in September of that year, represented a 
compromise: it retained a reference to maternal mortality, but, to appease the critics, it 
dropped reproductive health from the agenda.289  Subsequently, an effort to codify the 
goals identified in the text of the Millennium Declaration culminated in the formulation 
of the Millennium Development Goals in 2001.290  The MDGs, like the Millennium 
Declaration from which they derived, made no mention of reproductive health.291  
Instead, reduction in maternal mortality was included as one of the goals (MDG 5).292  
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The specific target under this goal sought to reduce maternal mortality ratio (MMR) by 
75%, using 1990 figures as the baseline.293  Progress on this target was to be measured 
through two indicators: (1) MMR, and (2) the proportion of births attended by skilled 
personnel.294  In this way, maternal mortality was elevated from one of the hundreds of 
measures of development to one of the chosen few – and, among those few, it was the 
only indicator pertaining to adult women.295  No surprise, then, that MMR – and, to 
some extent, deliveries assisted by trained personnel – became the key metrics by which 
women’s well-being in developing countries would be assessed worldwide.296 
Drafted based on many preceding documents, the MDGs had consolidated, 
prioritized, and codified hundreds of development objectives into a neat list of eight.  
Because of the complexity of this exercise, the Goals’ long and distinguished pedigree, 
and the nominal link of the MDGs to the “momentous”297 occasion of the turn of the 
millennium, the MDGs enjoyed extraordinary levels of support from the international 
community and attention from the global media.298  No country could afford to ignore 
them entirely, and, as one observer said about the thrall of the MDGs in the mid-2000s, 
“[i]f you’re not an MDG, you’re not on the agenda.”299   
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5. From National Maternity Benefit Scheme to Janani Suraksha Yojana 
By 2003, once UN officials had further popularized the MDGs and urged 
governments around the world to commit resources to the MDGs, the Goals were ready 
to be implemented.  At this time, data on MMR in India were patchy and conflicting.  
While most of the data available in 2003 showed declines in India’s MMR (see Figure 
4.2), GoI officials noted that at least one of the government surveys showed an increase in 
MMR between 1993 and 1998, from 424 to 540 per 100,000 live births.300  Policymakers 
recognized that the confidence intervals for these estimates were too wide for the 
difference between the two estimates to be statistically significant, but they worried that 
the lack of statistically discernible reduction in MMR suggested that the rate of reduction 
of maternal mortality was slowing down.301  If India were to reach its MDG 5 target of 
109 by 2015,302 the pace of MMR reduction would have to accelerate.   
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Figure 4.2: Declining maternal mortality ratio in India, 1960-2003303 
 
Accordingly, as mentioned above, in February 2003 MoHFW began to discuss changes to 
NMBS on the grounds that the program had not had “the desired impact on MMR.”304  
That lowering maternal mortality had never been an objective of NMBS was of no 
import. 
A March 2003 note followed up with details.  It made four key suggestions.  First, 
it proposed changing the name of the program from National Maternity Benefit Scheme 
to Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY).  The words “National Maternity Benefit Scheme,” the 
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note said, meant nothing to the program’s intended beneficiaries, who spoke little 
English, and restricted the uptake of the scheme.305  Second, it recommended removing 
the condition that barred women who had already given births to two children (born 
alive) from being eligible for benefits in subsequent pregnancies.  It reasoned that the two-
child ceiling precluded some of the neediest and poorest women from receiving the 
maternity benefit.306  Third, it suggested making the receipt of benefits contingent on 
ante-natal checkups and institutional deliveries – that is, on deliveries in hospitals or 
clinics, where childbirth was far likelier to be attended by trained personnel than it would 
be at home, and which accounted for only about 40% of all deliveries at this time.307  
Finally, it proposed to give dais, traditional birth attendants normally untrained in 
Western medicine, financial incentives for encouraging pregnant women to deliver in 
clinics or hospitals.308 
Unlike NMBS, under which the cash benefit was to be disbursed 8 to 12 weeks 
prior to delivery, JSY could disburse benefits only after delivery, once administrators had 
verified that the delivery did indeed occur in a medical facility.309  Coming after the birth, 
the funds could no longer be said to enable a woman’s intake of nutritious food during 
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pregnancy. The transformation of the program from a nutrition scheme to a scheme for 
institutional delivery intended to reduce MMR was now well underway.   
This ministry’s JSY proposal – called the “EFC note” in reference to the 
Expenditure Finance Committee, a bureaucratic body whose approval it was written to 
obtain, – estimated that the changes proposed would cause the expenditure on JSY in the 
remaining years of the 10th Plan period (2002-2007) to grow to almost 7.5 billion rupees 
(around $115 million).310  In annual terms, this was about 40% higher than that expected 
on NMBS in its early years.  There was one problem, however.  The Planning 
Commission had already allocated 5 billion rupees to NMBS for the 10th Plan period.  As 
per the rules of the finance ministry, a note proposing changes to an existing scheme was 
not to be sent to the EFC until arrangements had already been made to obtain all 
necessary funding.311  This condition, and other suggestions by various ministries and 
other government bodies to whom the draft proposal was sent for comments, led to a 
series of revisions to the EFC note. 
One of the major revisions was the introduction of a classification scheme to sort 
Indian states into two different categories that would make women in these states eligible 
for different levels of benefits.  The 10 states where the institutional delivery rate of below-
poverty-line (BPL) populations was lower than 25% would be classified as Low 
Performing States (LPS), and women in these states would be eligible for higher financial 
incentives for institutional delivery.  The remaining states would be considered High 
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Performing States (HPS), and women there would be given a lower incentive.312  Each 
state, low or high performing, would further be divided into rural and urban areas, with 
women in the former receiving a higher incentive than those in the latter, on the grounds 
that rates of institutional delivery were lower in rural areas.313  Receipt of cash would be 
conditional on institutional delivery.  Although ante-natal checkups, post-natal care, and 
neo-natal care would be encouraged, these would not be required for availing the cash 
benefit.314  The cash benefit itself would increase from Rs. 500 under NMBS to Rs. 600 
or 700, depending on whether the beneficiary was in LPS or HPS and in a rural or urban 
area (see Table 1).315  Despite this increase in the incentive amount, the staggering of 
benefits across two dimensions (LPS/HPS and urban/rural) allowed planned expenditure 
on JSY to fall below the ceiling of Rs. 5 billion in the 10th Plan period. 
 A second change was the incorporation of the Accredited Social Health Activist 
(ASHA), a female community health worker, as a front-line health agent for women.316  
The original proposal for JSY, written in 2003, envisaged the local dais as the front-line 
workers, responsible for encouraging pregnant women to undergo ante-natal checkups 
and to deliver in hospitals or clinics.  Now, MoHFW introduced the possibility that 
ASHAs, instead of or in addition to dais, could help women navigate the process of 
checkups and institutional delivery under JSY and receive a monetary incentive to do 
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so.317  (In time, ASHAs would go on to become pivotal figures in the implementation of 
JSY.)  Additionally, unlike the first EFC draft, which proposed a 25-rupee incentive to the 
dai per case,318 the final note advocated an incentive of Rs. 600 in rural areas of LPS and 
Rs. 200 in urban areas of LPS per case to the dai/ASHA.319  No dai/ASHA incentive was 
planned for HPS.  
 Third, after receiving criticism for the effort to extend benefits to pregnant women 
who had already had two live births in the past – including the charge that such a 
provision would give “the unintended impression of rewarding ‘births’ in a 
country…which wants to limit births and stabilize population”320 – the ministry modified 
this provision.  Instead of removing the two-birth ceiling entirely, it now proposed that 
JSY benefits be extended in LPS to pregnant women on their third delivery, “provided 
the woman on her own accord, chooses to undergo sterilization, after the delivery.”321  In 
a note to the Planning Commission in early 2005, the ministry attributed this decision to 
retain the two-child ceiling to a “paucity of resources,” adding that “if government 
support is available the scheme may be extended to all women.”322  
 Fourth, a statement addressing the recent actions of the Supreme Court was 
added to the note.  Based on a complaint by the Right to Food activists in the ongoing 
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public interest litigation on food security, the Supreme Court had ruled that NMBS 
should not be “discontinued or restricted in any way without the prior approval of this 
Court.”323  Acknowledging the order, MoHFW said that, in its view, the “introduction of 
Janani Suraksha Yojana in modification of NMBS does not result in reducing benefits 
under NMBS as the new integrated Scheme will enhance overall maternal health care 
and benefits in a focused manner.”324  Still, it said, if the court “makes any 
observation/issues any direction to the contrary,” MoHFW would make the required 
changes “within the overall frame work of Janani Suraksha Yojana” (emphasis added).325  
In other words, no matter the grievances of the Right to Food campaign and the future 
directions of the Supreme Court, JSY as a scheme to promote institutional delivery was to 
continue. 
 On 14 March 2005, the final policy note with all above revisions was sent to the 
Cabinet.326  This Cabinet Note justified the proposal to convert NMBS to JSY by, once 
again, invoking India’s maternal mortality.  One “of the accepted strategies for reducing 
maternal mortality,” it argued, “is to promote deliveries at health institutions, conducted 
by the skilled personnel like doctors and nurses.”327  It gave the responsibility to 
implement JSY to state governments.328  Once the cabinet approved the proposal, JSY 
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was launched on April 12,  with more than 3.5 billion rupees remaining out of its 
approved allocation of 5 billion for the remaining two years of the 10th Plan period.329 
On the same day, MoHFW also launched the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM), a significant “architectural correction”330 to the Indian public health system 
and one that subsumed the existing programs of MoHFW.331  The objective of NRHM 
was to make public healthcare more accessible and affordable.  The program sought to 
do so by introducing an army of trained female community health workers (ASHAs) 
across the country, strengthening local health infrastructure, and enabling decentralized 
health planning at the district level.332  The impetus behind NRHM was the return to 
power in 2004 of the Congress party, which had campaigned on a pro-poor platform that 
criticized the “India Shining” rhetoric of the previous government and highlighted the 
continued deprivation experienced by many despite unprecedented economic growth.333  
In its National Common Minimum Programme, a document outlining the common 
objectives of the coalition of parties in power, the Congress party-led coalition had 
promised to focus on primary healthcare and to raise public spending on healthcare from 
less than 1% to at least 2 to 3% of GDP by 2009.334  Many saw NRHM as an attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Government of India, Planning Commission, “Report of the Working Group on Health of Women and 
Children for the Eleventh Five Year Plan, 2007-2012,” 19; Secretary (HFW) to AS&FA, June 23, 2006, 62. 
330 “Speeches: PM Launches ‘National Rural Health Mission.’” 
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333 Dasgupta and Qadeer, “The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM): A Critical Overview,” 138. 
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make good on this promise.335  Along with other programs, JSY was subsumed under the 
NRHM umbrella.  
6. Expanding coverage, enhancing benefits, and raising expenditure 
Within a month of the introduction of JSY and NRHM, the Supreme Court 
intervened again.  In the food security case, it ruled that NMBS should not be “modified 
by reducing, abridging or qualifying in any way the social assistance entitlements under 
the original scheme for expecting BPL mothers, including cash entitlement of Rs. 500/- 
provided therein.”336  In addition, it asked the government to provide further information 
about how exactly JSY will preserve benefits provided under the original NMBS, and 
ordered the Supreme Court Commissioners, two prominent former bureaucrats 
appointed to monitor the implementation of orders relating to the food security case, to 
conduct a detailed study of NMBS and file a report.   
 Responding to the court order in October, the commissioners submitted a report 
describing what they saw as the many shortcomings of NMBS/JSY.  First, they alleged 
that despite agreeing not to reduce benefits under NMBS, the government had, for all 
practical purposes, ended the program by converting it into JSY, which promoted not 
maternal nutrition but institutional delivery.337  Second, the imposition of many eligibility 
criteria in JSY undermined the maternity entitlement by making about 70% of the 
women who would be eligible for assistance under NMBS ineligible for any assistance 
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under JSY.338  Third, the government continued “to make inadequate provision in the 
budget to cover all pregnant women giving first two births.”339  Fourth, awareness of the 
program among eligible women was low, in part because the 500-rupee benefit per 
delivery was too low an amount to encourage high participation.340 
A few months later, in April 2006, a state-level official wrote to MoHFW, echoing 
some of the same concerns about JSY.  More money needed to be spent to raise 
awareness about the scheme, the official said.  Even more importantly, all women 
delivering in government facilities should be able to receive benefits under JSY without 
having to produce BPL certification.  Not all below-poverty-line families were able to 
obtain such certification, and in any case only the poor used public health facilities, the 
official said.  The BPL certification requirement should therefore be removed, the official 
suggested.341 
In response to the Supreme Court’s intervention and feedback from state 
governments and NGOs, in June 2006 the Secretary of Health and Family Welfare 
proposed further changes to JSY that would dramatically expand coverage and pave the 
way for JSY to become the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world.342  Just 
like NMBS, the Secretary’s proposal argued, JSY in its first year of implementation (2005-
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06) did not incur sufficient expenditure.  At Rs. 550 million over the year, this low 
expenditure showed “that some barriers prevent access to the scheme’s benefits.”343  It 
then identified three barriers and outlined steps to remove them. 
 First, it said, the eligibility criterion that required beneficiaries to be 19 years of 
age or above created a key barrier because age certificates were hard to obtain, especially 
in rural areas.344  JSY’s age certification requirement should therefore be removed and 
JSY benefits be extended to all BPL women, regardless of age, in low-performing states.345  
Second, the proposal sought once again to remove the two-child ceiling that MoHFW 
had been unable to eliminate in the Cabinet Note due to objections that doing so would 
amount to incentivizing more births.  Women with many children, it argued, had higher 
risks of mortality and morbidity and thus a greater need for the medical attention 
available through institutional delivery.346  Third, not every poor woman had a BPL card 
to certify her poverty status, and it was usually only the poor who accessed healthcare 
through public institutions.  Keeping this in mind, JSY benefits should be extended to all 
women who, no matter their ability to produce BPL certification, delivered in public 
facilities in LPS.347  And finally, without identifying it as an addition or presenting a 
rationale for it, the proposal extended (a smaller) cash benefit of Rs. 500 to women 
delivering at home, provided they were 19 or above, could produce BPL certification, and 
had not given more than two live births in the past.348 
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Later internal documents of MoHFW and government publications indicated that 
this quiet extension of benefits to women delivering at home – the exact opposite of the 
institutional delivery norm that JSY was designed to promote – occurred due to the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that NMBS should continue.349  Giving poor pregnant 
women Rs. 500 in cash benefit for delivery at home and a larger sum for delivery in 
medical institutions allowed MoHFW both to retain NMBS’s unconditional benefit in 
some form and to incentivize institutional delivery, reflecting a compromise between the 
demands of the right to food campaign/Supreme Court orders and the ministry’s effort to 
lower MMR by urging women to deliver in medical facilities under supervision of trained 
personnel. 
 The Secretary’s proposal estimated that the above modifications would raise the 
expected expenditure on JSY in 2006-07 to 2.4 billion rupees350 (more than 60% higher 
than the amount calculated by the 2005 Cabinet Note for the same financial year).351  
The proposed modifications went into effect in July 2006, and JSY’s coverage more than 
quadrupled from 0.7 million women in 2005-06 to 3 million women in 2006-07.352 
 More changes were soon to follow.  On 26 September 2006, the Mission Steering 
Group (MSG), the highest decision-making body of NRHM, made several important 
changes to JSY.353  Among others, it doubled the cash benefit to pregnant women in the 
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10 LPS from Rs. 700 to Rs. 1400 per delivery in rural areas, and almost doubled it from 
Rs. 600 to Rs. 1000 per delivery in urban areas.  In addition, MSG decided to make 
women from Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) – historically 
disadvantaged social groups in India – eligible for JSY’s institutional delivery benefits, 
regardless of these women’s ability to produce BPL certification.354  While documents 
from the MSG meeting did not illuminate the reasons behind these changes that more 
than doubled the expenditure under JSY, a later letter from MoHFW to state 
governments attributed them to inputs from field functionaries who complained that the 
cash assistance given to pregnant women was “not enough to meet even the cost of a 
normal delivery completely and also that the differential between cash assistance for 
home and institutional delivery” was not enough to incentivize the latter.355  
 In late September 2006, the ministry calculated that, once the changes approved 
by the MSG went fully into effect, annual expenditure on JSY would soon rise to almost 4 
billion rupees,356 which amounted to a 63% increase over the 2.4 billion anticipated for 
2006-07 in the Secretary’s June 2006 proposal, and an almost 170% increase over the 
expenditure calculated for 2006-07 in the 2005 Cabinet note.  JSY expenditure over the 
11th Plan period (2007-2012), the ministry estimated, would rise to 17.5 billion rupees,357 
exactly 10 billion more than the 7.5 billion estimated by the first draft of the EFC note for 
the 10th Plan period in June 2003 – an estimate that, because it exceeded that period’s 
allocation to the JSY, had necessitated a series of consequential revisions that transformed 
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JSY between 2003 and 2005 (see sub-section above).  Now, only three years later, 
MoHFW appeared confident that its request for 17.5 billion rupees in allocation for JSY 
would be approved. 
 In August 2007, however, MoHFW revised its estimation of expenditure on JSY 
again.  This time, the ministry calculated that 11th Plan funding requirements for JSY 
would reach almost Rs. 60 billion (more than $900 million) – an amount more than 3 
times greater than that estimated less than a year earlier in September 2006.  The reason, 
according to internal correspondence of the ministry, was the popularity of the program: 
in 2007-08, demand for JSY funds from state governments had reached 9 billion rupees, 
almost 4 times higher than that year’s allocation, and the number of beneficiaries was also 
climbing steadily, more than quadrupling (as discussed before) between 2005-06 and 
2006-07.358 
 Even 60 billion turned out to be too low an estimate, however.  Between 2007 and 
2012, MoHFW spent 68 billion rupees on JSY,359 and expenditure over the next five 
years (2012-2017) grew another 25% to 85 billion.360  These increases were due in part to 
further changes in the features of JSY (see Table 4.1).  The most significant of these 
changes took effect on 7 May 2013, when women of any age and with any number of 
children were made eligible to receive the institutional delivery incentive in high-
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performing states and the home delivery benefit in all states.361  Before this, as discussed 
earlier, women under 19 and women with two or more children were not eligible for 
institutional delivery incentive in HPS and home delivery benefit anywhere, due to fears 
that providing benefits to women under 19 would legitimize child marriage and 
extending them to multiparous women would encourage higher fertility.  In early 2012, 
the ministry had estimated that the removal of age and parity conditions for institutional 
delivery in HPS and home delivery everywhere would immediately raise annual 
expenditure on JSY by 7.6 billion – that is, by almost 45% – in 2012-13.362 
 The decision in 2013 to remove age and parity requirements can be traced to a 
series of influences.  First, in April 2010 and again in September 2011, the Supreme 
Court Commissioners in charge of monitoring implementation of food security programs 
as part of the food security litigation wrote to the Supreme Court to share again their 
concerns about JSY.  Subsuming NMBS under JSY had not yielded the desired results, 
they said, and JSY’s strict eligibility restrictions continued to exclude large numbers of 
poor pregnant women.  To enable more women to benefit from the program, they 
recommended that age and parity restrictions be removed from the home-delivery 
component of JSY, allowing women and girls of any age and with any number of 
previous deliveries to receive the basic (NMBS-equivalent) benefit under JSY that was not 
conditional on institutional delivery.363 
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 Second, in June 2010, a comprehensive study of JSY published in the renowned 
medical journal The Lancet found that the poorest and the least educated women had low 
odds of receiving benefits under JSY and stressed “the need for improved targeting of the 
poorest women.”364  An internal file of MoHFW that dealt with the removal of age and 
parity conditions included a copy of this article, with the above quote highlighted in 
bright pink, suggesting that the findings of the study did not go unnoticed at the 
ministry.365 
 Third, the file also included a marked-up copy of another report on maternity 
protection that was commissioned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
India’s Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE).  Published in April 2011, the report 
had noted that Indian women working in the formal sector had recourse only to a 
patchwork of government programs such as JSY, but coverage gaps in such programs 
were large and poor women slipped through them routinely.366  The authors suggested 
that JSY be made applicable to all self-employed women workers, regardless of their 
income, age, and number of children367 – a recommendation that was highlighted in neon 
in the ministry’s copy of the report, indicating again that officials at the ministry had read 
and considered the idea. 
 Following this, in early 2012, MoHFW drafted a series of notes, to be circulated 
internally and sent to key external actors, proposing removal of age and parity criteria for 
institutional births in HPS and home births in all states.  The notes justified the proposed 
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changes by referring to the findings of the ILO/MLE and other reports as well as to the 
“courts” – likely, the Supreme Court – that, the notes said, had “been taking an adverse 
view of conditionalities of parity and age under JSY.” 368  Effective 7 May 2013, the 
ministry removed the age and parity restrictions for the institutional delivery incentive in 
HPS and the home delivery assistance in all states. 369  The criteria that limited eligibility 
for the institutional delivery incentive in HPS to BPL, SC, and ST women and for the 
home delivery assistance in all states to women from BPL households, however, were 
retained.370  Table 4.2, taken verbatim from MoHFW’s correspondence with state 
governments, summarizes the eligibility conditions that came into effect in May 2013, 
and which remain in place, more or less intact, at the time of this writing in 2017. 
Table 4.2: JSY eligibility conditions and benefit amounts, May 2013371 
 
Category 
of States 
Rural Area Urban Area Eligibility Criteria 
Mother ASHA* Total Mother ASHA** Total  
Financial Assistance for Institutional Delivery  
Low 
Performing 
States 
(LPS) 
Rs. 
1400 
Rs. 600 Rs. 
2000 
Rs. 1000 Rs. 400 Rs. 
1400 
Available to all 
women regardless 
of age and number 
of children for 
delivery in 
government/private 
accredited health 
facilities 
High Rs. 700 Rs. 600 Rs. Rs. 600 Rs. 400 Rs. Available only to 
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Performing 
States 
(HPS) 
1300 1000 BPL/SC/ST 
women regardless 
of age and number 
of children for 
delivery in 
government/private 
accredited health 
facilities 
 Financial Assistance for Home Delivery  
LPS Rs. 500 Nil Rs. 
500 
Rs. 500 Nil Rs. 
500 
Available only to 
BPL women who 
prefer to deliver at 
home regardless of 
age and number of 
children 
HPS Rs. 500 Nil Rs. 
500 
Rs. 500 Nil Rs. 
500 
*Rs. 600/ per delivery in rural area includes Rs. 300 for antenatal component and Rs. 300 for 
facilitating institutional delivery 
**Rs. 400/ per delivery in urban area includes Rs. 200 for antenatal component and Rs. 200 for 
facilitating institutional delivery 
 
With this, JSY’s period of rapid expansion came to a close.  State attention to 
women as mothers, however, has not waned, as several other major programs for 
maternal health and maternity benefit have since been launched (see Chapter 6). 
III. Discussion 
The question we asked at the start of this chapter was: how and why did the maternity 
benefit program, introduced with little enthusiasm, grow to be among the better-funded 
programs for women in India and the largest conditional cash transfer program in the 
world?  The narrative of its evolution alluded to a plethora of factors that shaped the 
course of NMBS/JSY.  Of these, three, discussed below, stand out for their explanatory 
power. 
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A. The need for “adjustment with a human face”372 
There are two ways in which the need for “adjustment with a human face” drove the 
evolution of NMBS/JSY: in 1995, it spurred the Congress party to introduce a system of 
social security (which included NMBS) for the informal sector, and from 2005 onward, it 
fomented higher expenditure on public health, which supplied funding for JSY. 
First, as the previous section shows, while the precise impetus behind the initial 
incorporation of the maternity benefit proposal in the Congress party election manifesto 
of 1989 is unclear, the revival of this proposal in Finance Minister Manmohan Singh’s 
1995 budget speech can be traced to (1) the perceived need to give India’s structural 
adjustment “a human face” – that is, combine economic restructuring with a focus on 
human needs373 – in the aftermath of Congress party’s devastating electoral loss in two 
important state elections in 1994, and (2) the presence in Congress’s high-level political 
and policy circles of Manmohan Singh and S. Guhan, – an economist-turned-politician 
and a civil servant-turned-social policy expert – both of whom saw value in establishing a 
system social security for the millions working in India’s informal sector. 
Why include maternity benefits in the proposed social security program, however?  
After all, social security is generally associated not with maternity benefits but with 
pension arrangements, health insurance, disability benefits, unemployment assistance, 
and others.  It is likely that the inclusion of maternity benefits resulted from political 
leaders wanting to do – and wanting to be seen doing – something specifically for women, 
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who had cast 43% of all votes in the previous national election.374  Neither of the other 
elements of the proposed NSAS at the time – old age pension and survivors’ benefits – 
targeted women specifically.  Maternity benefit, then, was a fitting complement to the 
other two components of the program. 
Even so, why did the desire to do something “for women” translate specifically 
into maternity benefits, rather than into any number of possible women-related 
interventions, such as assistance for widows (which came later, in 2009), tuition 
reimbursement for women, and others?  The answer, according to one longtime member 
of the Congress party with knowledge of the matter, is that maternity benefits were “very 
much part of the Indian discourse.”375  That India had a long history of legislated 
maternity benefits (the first of which was introduced in the Bombay presidency in 1929) 
for the formal sector and that maternity benefits were included in the Tamil Nadu social 
security system, which Guhan knew well and had written extensively about, likely also 
made a difference. 
Second, as we learned before, in 2005 NMBS was re-launched as JSY, along with 
NRHM, the “flagship” health program of the Congress government.376  As the historical 
narrative recounts, the Congress party-led coalition government came to power in 2004 
after campaigning against massive inequality despite rapid economic growth.  Countering 
the rosy “India Shining” claims of the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, 
the Congress party pledged to raise public health spending from less than 1% of GDP to 
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Volume I.” 
375 Member of Parliament, Congress Party, Interview # 33. 
376 Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, “Janani Suraksha Yojana: Background.” 
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2 to 3% by 2009.  NRHM, the key health intervention that followed, received large 
amounts of money in budgetary allocation.377  The program’s outlay rose from 
approximately 70 billion rupees in 2005-06 to about 200 billion in 2016-17,378 an increase 
enabled by the expansion of state revenues due to market-led economic growth.379  
Although insufficient for raising total public health spending to the level promised,380 the 
large NRHM outlays are what financed JSY, making possible the steep rise in spending 
on JSY after 2005. 
Therefore, in a rough illustration of international political economy’s 
“compensation thesis”381 – the idea that economic liberalization and market integration 
heighten economic risk, necessitating expansion of state support to compensate (and 
coopt) those made insecure by the new economy or left behind by it entirely – National 
Maternity Benefit Scheme emerged in part from the electoral compulsions created by 
India’s economic liberalization of the early 1990s, and grew in part due to availability of 
funds under the National Rural Health Mission, which itself emerged from the Congress 
party’s effort to spread the benefits of growth more widely.  
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B. Civil society activism and Supreme Court intervention for food security 
While the efforts of the Right to Food campaign and directions of the Supreme 
Court failed to preserve NMBS in its original form, they affected the course of JSY in two 
crucial ways.  First, they compelled MoHFW to, in effect, incorporate the basic NMBS 
benefit – unconditional cash transfer to poor pregnant women – into JSY.  This benefit, 
known as the home delivery benefit under JSY, continues to be an important part of the 
program. 
Second, they urged MoHFW to roll back the exclusionary eligibility criteria of 
JSY and enhance the amount of cash benefit it provided.  As we saw earlier, the Supreme 
Court Commissioners, at the direction of the Supreme Court, conducted studies of JSY 
and identified various shortcomings that they shared in public reports.  Based on their 
findings, they asked MoHFW to loosen eligibility criteria (in particular, by removing age 
and parity restrictions) and raise spending on JSY to allow benefits to reach a greater 
number of eligible beneficiaries.  Over time, MoHFW adopted both suggestions.  It is 
clear, then, that the Right to Food campaign and the Supreme Court influenced the 
trajectory of JSY by keeping an unconditional cash benefit on the agenda, monitoring the 
implementation of JSY, publicly holding MoHFW accountable for poor performance, 
and urging MoHFW to make changes designed to ensure that JSY could reach those who 
needed its benefits most. 
Two questions remain, however – what motivated these two actors, the RTF 
campaign and the Supreme Court, to attempt to make changes to JSY, and what enabled 
them to influence the course of the program even though neither of them had any 
authority over it?  The answer lies in the confluence of three factors: the interest of the 
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RTF campaign in NMBS, the possibility of filing litigation against the state on behalf on 
the public interest in India, and the willingness of Indian courts to direct government 
action on questions of social policy and social justice. 
The Right to Food campaign, as the historical section shows, became interested in 
maternity benefits, which would normally be considered outside the purview of food 
security, because of NMBS’s framing as a nutritional initiative in late 2000, only a few 
months before the food security litigation against GoI began.  As a nutritional program, 
NMBS was swept up in the food security-related public interest litigation along with other 
food security programs.  This PIL was, in turn, made possible by the right third parties in 
India have had since the late 1970s to sue the state on behalf of public interest when those 
directly aggrieved by state action (or non-action) are unable themselves to move the 
courts.382  The PIL gave the Supreme Court the occasion to direct the government to 
continue NMBS.  Finally, the court’s willingness to issue such a policy instruction to the 
government – wading, as critics have said, into traditionally executive territory – is in line 
with other instances of “judicial activism” exercised by Indian courts in recent years.383  
The Supreme Court intervened to promote food security on the grounds that although 
the Indian Constitution does not provide an explicit right to food, it guarantees a right to 
life, which can be interpreted to mean a right to life with dignity, which in turn can be 
interpreted to suggest a right to food.384 
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This trifecta of the Right to Food campaign’s interest in NMBS, the possibility of 
PILs, and a pattern of judicial intervention in policy matters traditionally under the scope 
of the executive enabled the food security movement and the Supreme Court to shape the 
evolution of JSY.                 
C. International spotlight on maternal mortality 
This brings us to what is perhaps the most important explanation for why 
NMBS/JSY grew to become one of the largest and most generously funded programs for 
women in India: the changes occurring in the world of international development in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  To understand how these changes exerted causal influence 
on NMBS/JSY, the paragraphs below describe the causal process. 
1. Causal factors 
The previous section shows two overlapping ways in which the spotlight cast on 
the issue of maternal mortality by international actors affected NMBS/JSY.  First, the 
International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994, 
transformed the discourse on population control by bringing development, reproductive 
health, and women’s rights from the margins of the population control conversation to its 
center.  In time, political expediency required the notions of “reproductive health” and 
“women’s rights” to be whittled down to “maternal health” in mainstream international 
agreements.  Second, the inclusion of a maternal mortality target in the Millennium 
Development Goals, along with the exclusion of any other adult women-focused goals, 
made MMR the key indicator of women’s well-being in the context of development 
around the world.     
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 These trends, especially the pledges of the Cairo Programme of Action (a 
document that India signed), are reflected in the evolution of India’s official population 
policies, of which there have been two.385  The first, called the National Population Policy 
of 1976 (NPP 1976), argued that addressing India’s “population problem” was crucial if 
the future of the country was “to be secured, and the goal of removing poverty to be 
attained.”386  The policy aimed to reduce India’s birth rate from 35 per thousand in 1974 
to 25 per thousand in 1984, but referred to maternal health only once and only in 
passing.387  The only other woman-friendly measure the policy mentioned was to raise 
female literacy, which it noted strongly predicts lower fertility.388  The notions of 
“reproductive rights” and “sexual health” did not make an appearance in this policy. 
 In 1996, however, India began to incorporate some elements of the Cairo 
document into its domestic policy agenda: it rolled back its target-driven approach to 
family planning (under which the federal government set sterilization and other 
contraceptive-acceptance targets for health workers) and sought to take broader 
reproductive health seriously.389  In 1997, after the World Bank-funded Child Survival 
and Safe Motherhood project ended, GoI started the Reproductive and Child Health 
(RCH) program to continue the work of CSSM and supplement it with other 
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reproductive health services.390  The National Population Policy of 2000 (NPP 2000) took 
the shift a step further: maternal mortality, it said, 
…is not merely a health disadvantage, it is a matter of social injustice.  Low social 
and economic status of girls and women limits their access to education, good 
nutrition, as well as money to pay for health care and family planning services.  
The extent of maternal mortality is an indicator of disparity and inequity in access 
to appropriate health care and nutrition services throughout a lifetime, and 
particularly during pregnancy and child-birth....391  
 
In addition to placing maternal mortality in its social and gender context, the policy also 
made 11 references to issues of maternal health, incorporating the reduction of MMR as 
one of its key goals.392 
 In addition to showing how Indian policy rhetoric evolved in tandem with 
international discourse, this incorporation of maternal health concerns in NPP 2000 
matters for our purposes because it set the stage for the reworking of NMBS, a maternity 
assistance scheme, into JSY, an anti-maternal mortality program.  And, indeed, it is while 
drafting NPP 2000 that policymakers noted the relevance of NMBS (which promoted 
maternal health) to MoHFW’s population stabilization initiatives (of which reproductive 
health was a key part) and recommended transferring the program from Ministry of 
Rural Development to MoHFW.393  In time, this transfer would give MoHFW the 
opportunity to expand and transform JSY beyond recognition. 
 Beyond affecting NBMS/JSY via the population policy, the international spotlight 
on maternal health shaped the program directly as well.  There are three key observable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Kesterton et al., “Institutional Delivery in Rural India: The Relative Importance of Accessibility and 
Economic Status,” 2. 
391 Government of India, “National Population Policy 2000,” paragraph 8. 
392 Government of India, paragraph 2. 
393 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, “New Proposed Guidelines on National Social 
Assistance Programme (NSAP) and Annapurna,” 1. 
 
	  
170 
implications of the causal influence of this spotlight, especially of the MDGs, on 
NMBS/JSY.  These can be seen in: (1) the program’s (re)framing, (2) its content, and (3) 
the timing of its major milestones.  Let us address each in turn. 
 First, in 2003 MoHFW began suddenly to present NMBS, the nutrition program 
with no explicit prior link to maternal mortality, as a program whose very objective was 
to reduce the country’s maternal mortality ratio.  This newfound concern about maternal 
mortality, pressing enough to lead to the sudden reframing of an existing program, in a 
country where maternal mortality rates had not only been high but also been 
acknowledged to be high all along (see Figure 4.2),394 suggests a powerful trigger was at 
work.  That there is little in the domestic political economy of India that changed in a 
way that would predict greater attention to maternal health in particular – the same 
party, Bharatiya Janata Party, under the same prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had 
led the federal government since 1998; women’s share in the total number of votes cast 
had held steady at around 43% in all nine national elections since gender-disaggregated 
voting data became available in 1971395; and no notable “focusing event”396 occurred in 
India to precipitate attention to maternal mortality – suggests that the trigger was of 
international, rather than domestic, origin.397  And finally, that the program was reframed 
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as one addressing the problem of maternal mortality specifically – as opposed to one 
enhancing women’s overall health (or even overall maternal health), or compensating 
women for lost wages during pregnancies, or assisting poor pregnant women’s families 
with health expenditure relating to childbirth – leaves little doubt that the international 
spotlight cast on maternal mortality in recent years was that trigger. 
 Second, MoHFW changed not only the framing of NMBS/JSY from a nutritional 
to anti-maternal mortality initiative but also the substantive content of the program.  
Formerly, NMBS made a small cash transfer to poor pregnant women in the weeks 
before childbirth to enable consumption of more nutritious food.  With the launch of JSY 
in 2005, cash transfers were no longer unconditional in nature: poor pregnant women 
would now receive the cash upon delivery, provided that the delivery occurred in a 
certified medical institution.  MoHFW put this requirement in place because, it argued, 
the presence of “Skilled Birth Attendants (SBAs) at every birth” could be ensured only 
when women delivered in institutions.398  In addition, early versions of JSY sought also to 
incorporate a provision to train the dai, the traditional birth attendant, in some aspects of 
modern midwifery to ensure that pregnant women had access to skilled care even when 
not delivering in a medical institution.399  This emphasis on the presence of skilled or 
trained attendants at birth and the exact correspondence between the terminology of the 
second indicator under MDG 5 – “proportions of births attended by skilled health 
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personnel”400 – and the language of JSY indicate that MoHFW changed not only the 
framing but the substance of NMBS in response to the MDGs.  As a high-ranking 
bureaucrat working at MoHFW in the early years of JSY recalled: “when we designed the 
JSY, we had to bear in mind our commitments” under MDGs.401 
 Third and finally, further clues can be found in not only the changes made to the 
framing and the substantive content of NMBS/JSY, but also in the timing of these 
changes.  Both these changes occurred in the first five years of the new millennium, soon 
after the commitments in Millennium Declaration were distilled into a set of eight 
Millennium Development Goals in 2001 and the UN had completed a serious effort to 
persuade governments around the world to mobilize resources for the implementation of 
these goals in 2003.  That NMBS transformed into a maternal mortality-targeting and 
institutional delivery-promoting program neither in the1990s (when the MDGs were not 
yet in sight) nor in the late 2000s or 2010s (long after maternal mortality had burst onto 
the global scene as the key measure of women’s well-being around the world), but very 
much in the immediate aftermath of the formulation of the MDGs in 2001 suggests, 
again, that the rising importance of maternal mortality in the global development agenda 
at this time made all the difference. 
2. Causal pathways 
It is clear, then, that rising international attention to reproductive rights and 
maternal health, reflected in the Cairo documents and the Millennium Development 
Goals, shaped the evolution of NMBS/JSY.  How these macro developments occurring 
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on a remote, global stage exerted influence on a specific national program in India 
remains to be seen, however.  Below I identify five pathways through which the causal 
influences worked: by (1) creating a linkage between a fringe (maternal health) and a 
central (population growth) concern already widely acknowledged to be an urgent global 
problem, (2) making a large amount of international funding available for maternal health 
interventions; (3) generating rational incentives for policymakers to take steps against 
maternal mortality, (4) provoking a sense of shame among policymakers about India’s 
high maternal mortality, and (5) providing a ready and legitimate argument for why anti-
maternal mortality work was of utmost importance.  While less thoroughly documented 
with the use of original sources than the foregoing observations of this chapter, the 
theorized pathways below find support in existing literature.  
First, while maternal mortality was still considered a peripheral issue in the 1980s 
and 1990s, of concern primarily to health activists and women’s organizations, the 
international community had long considered population growth a core global 
problem.402  As discussed above, one of the many contributions of the Cairo conference 
that year was to create a linkage between these two policy issues.  The resulting association 
with the high-profile problem of population growth catapulted maternal health from the 
margins of international advocacy to its mainstream, making it a key part of the 
population agenda.  This, in turn, put maternal health on the radars of actors and 
institutions not otherwise known for their special concern for women.  The interest in 
maternal health displayed by the MoHFW, the drafters of NPP 2000, and even India’s 
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state governments403 in the late 1990s and early 2000s is a case in point.  The linkage with 
population objectives thus generated unprecedented attention for maternal health, paving 
the way for a grander, bigger JSY.404 
Second, the spotlight on maternal health as a key development concern generated 
international funding for maternal health interventions.  For the second phase of the 
Reproductive and Child Health program (RCH-II), of which JSY is part, the World 
Bank’s International Development Association granted India a loan of USD 360 million 
between 2006 and 2012.405  The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the British 
Department for International Development (DFID), and other foreign sources supplied 
another $800 million.406  International financing thus comprised about 53% of total 
expected cost of $2232 million (around 144 billion rupees, as per 2005-06 exchange rate) 
of RCH-II over six years.  Although it is unclear exactly what proportion of international 
funds was directed specifically to JSY, there is evidence that at least some World Bank 
funding was used to support it,407 and, given the sizeable share of international funding in 
RCH-II’s budget, it is unlikely that without infusion of international capital into RCH-II, 
JSY could have received the large outlays it did throughout the period under study.  The 
placement of maternal mortality on the international development agenda thus boosted 
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the availability of international funding for maternal health interventions, enabling their 
expansion.   
Third, the MDGs came with a set of reporting requirements to which UN 
Member-States were subject, and which supplied a pressing incentive to act.  Countries 
were asked, for instance, to submit MDG progress reports “at least once every 2-3 years,” 
describing in 20 to 25 pages the progress made on MDG indicators, challenges faced in 
working toward the goals, domestic and external resources necessary for meeting them, 
and so forth.408  Starting in 2005 – the same year that JSY was launched – India 
submitted at least seven such progress reports, each of which devoted a chapter to steps 
taken to achieve MDG 5, with a special focus on MMR and proportion of births assisted 
by skilled birth attendants.  JSY featured prominently in all but one of these reports409 and 
even NPP 2000, with its MMR targets, appeared in a few.410 
Simultaneously, the MDGs piqued popular media’s interest in maternal health: 
periodicals around the world began to report on maternal mortality with rising frequency 
after the mid-1990s, and even more often in the aftermath of the MDGs.  For example, a 
search for “maternal mortality” between 1971 and 2017 on the Factiva database yielded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 United Nations Development Group, “Reporting on the Millennium Development Goals at the 
Country Level: Guidance Note,” 4-7. 
409 Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium 
Development Goals India Country Report 2005,” 63; Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, “Millennium Development Goals India Country Report 2007,”  66; 
Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium Development 
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410 Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium 
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almost 60,000 articles from 100 periodicals worldwide (see Figure 4.3).  More than 99% 
of these articles were published after 1994, and Indian sources alone accounted for about 
13% of the total.411  This suggests that public scrutiny of state action to lower maternal 
mortality tightened in the years after Cairo and the MDGs. 
Figure 4.3: Sharp rise in the number of articles referring to “maternal mortality” 
worldwide412 
 
 
It is likely that the periodic reporting requirements and rising media coverage of 
India’s performance on MDG indicators served to make the MDGs, whose final deadline 
of 2015 must otherwise have felt quite distant in the early 2000s, more salient to 
policymakers.  That such reporting requirements incentivize reportable action is well 
established in the literature and was confirmed by a former minister in charge of women-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 To be sure, since Factiva has added more periodicals to its database over the years, the trend depicted 
in this figure may result partly from the availability of a greater number of indexed sources in the later 
years.  Yet, 38 of the 100 publications that yielded articles with references to maternal mortality had been 
indexed by 1990 and all 100 had been indexed by 2000.  This suggests that the upward slope of the line is 
only partly attributable to variation in the number of publications available to search over time.  The other 
explanation can only be the one identified in the text above: a rising interest in maternal mortality 
worldwide. 
412 Source: Drawn based on information gathered from the Factiva database, accessed 26 Jan 2018. 
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related policymaking in India.413  As research in psychology and sociology has shown, 
people prefer to meet expectations, changing priorities and adjusting behavior in response 
to monitoring and evaluation.414  One observable indication of the seriousness with which 
the MDG indicators were taken in India is the extent to which these indicators came to 
be prioritized in domestic health monitoring systems,415 suggesting that the responsibility 
to report progress triggered change.   
Fourth, there are many more subtle ways in which monitoring via numerical 
indicators exerts causal influence.416  A conscious desire to have something favorable to 
report aside, policymakers and bureaucrats appear also to have been persuaded of the 
intrinsic importance of lowering maternal mortality.  In other words, international 
spotlight on maternal mortality socialized policymakers into both (1) problematizing the 
existing and long-familiar condition of high maternal mortality, and (2) wanting to do 
something about it.  This “socialization” mechanism is different from the “rational 
incentive” mechanism outlined above because, while the latter posits a “logic of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Andrews, “Downward Accountability in Unequal Alliances: Explaining NGO Responses to Zapatista 
Demands,” 99-113; Taylor, “Strengthening the Link Between Performance Measurement and Decision 
Making.” 859; Former Minister, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, 
Interview # 24. 
414 Espeland and Sauder, “Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds;” 
Adair, “The Hawthorne Effect: A Reconsideration of the Methodological Artifact.” 
415 Mishra and Roalkvam, “The Reproductive Body and the State: Engaging with the National Rural 
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416 Yamin and Boulanger, “Why Global Goals and Indicators Matter: The Experience of Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Rights in the Millennium Development Goals,” 6-8; Kelley and Simmons, 
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consequences” (do X to achieve or avoid Y), the former invokes a “logic of 
appropriateness” (do X because it is natural or appropriate).417 
One observable indication that the logic of appropriateness was at work is the 
frequency with which the word “shame” began to appear in discussions of MMR in 
India.  Many at MoHFW continue to talk of India’s high maternal mortality as a 
shameful tragedy.418  For instance, recounting the story of the making of JSY, a high-
ranking official involved with the program in its early years, recalled a speech by then-
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that invoked a feeling of national shame at India’s high 
MMR.419  In this 2005 speech urging state governments to act on what was “surely a 
matter of national shame,” Singh had asked: “Do we care so little for our women and 
children that we allow preventable deaths to occur even when we know the nature of the 
interventions required?”420  Three months later, Singh had addressed the Planning 
Commission, yet again calling India’s performance on health in general, and on MMR in 
particular, “no less than a national shame.”421  Following suit, the then-Minister for 
Health and Family Welfare had then publicly called maternal mortality a “big shame” for 
the country.422  Along similar lines, according to one expert on sexual and reproductive 
rights in India, the introduction of JSY had to do with the extent to which India’s high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 For more on the two logics, see March and Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness” and Finnemore, 
National Interests in International Society.  For more on international socialization, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” and Bearce and Bondanella, “Intergovernmental 
Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence.” 
418 Personal conversations.  
419 Former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Interview # 19. 
420 “Implement MTA Recommendations in Collective Spirit of Federalism: PM.”  Surprisingly, in this 
speech Singh also lamented that that India’s MMR had “shown virtually no improvement in the past 
decade or more.”  The government’s own publications, however, reported declining MMR. 
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MMR had come to be regarded as a national embarrassment.  This observer, from civil 
society, believed that the thought process behind JSY ran in the following way: 
…India has this kind of thing about a certain national pride about many things, 
and one of the [reasons for] national shame was the maternal mortality rates, 
because we could be compared to Sub-Saharan Africa, and that was a big slap on 
our face.  But how did we deal with it?  So this JSY I think was a huge push to 
rectify that.423     
 
The frequent reference to “shame” suggests that efforts to combat maternal mortality 
were at least partly a result of the idea – now more widely shared than before – that 
maternal deaths represented a humanitarian tragedy and a moral failing.  In other words, 
steps to address maternal mortality had to be taken not only because the UN required 
reports detailing such steps and the media had begun to pay greater attention to MMR 
(logic of consequences) but also because a high MMR was in itself a serious problem and 
attempts to lower it were the right response (logic of appropriateness). 
What induced this deep sense of shame about high MMR at a time when 
maternal mortality in the country was, ironically, the lowest it had been (at least since 
maternal deaths began to be recorded) in India?  As the quote above from the civil society 
expert above suggests, unfavorable comparisons with other middle- and low-income 
countries had a role to play.  By the time JSY was launched, it was well known that India 
had the highest number of maternal deaths in the world, accounting for about a quarter 
of global maternal mortality.424  An important GoI report from 2005 compared India to 
Sri Lanka and China, discussing in detail the progress of the latter two in lowering MMR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423  Program Officer, international foundation, India office, Interview # 21. 
424 Krishnakumar, “Unsafe Motherhood;” AbouZahr, “Global Burden of Maternal Death and Disability.” 
3; Ramarao et al., “Safer Maternal Health in Rural Uttar Pradesh: Do Primary Health Services 
Contribute?” 256. 
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while India’s own figures remained “unacceptably high.”425  The comparisons, in turn, 
were likely triggered by MDG-directed spotlight on maternal health and enabled by 
MDG-driven availability of comparative data.426  Moreover, the very process of collecting 
and analyzing data on MMR likely focused policymakers’ attention on the scale of the 
problem, compounding their embarrassment.427 
In addition, by the time MDGs were introduced, it was clear that 99% of 
maternal deaths occurred in developing countries.428  That high MMR was now widely 
associated with being less-developed, a label that contradicted India’s self-image as an 
aspiring global power,429 appears to have deepened the sense of shame.  As one observer 
puts it: “Brand India is about India not being Third World.”430  How, then, could high 
maternal mortality, a quintessentially Third-World phenomenon by 2005, go 
unproblematized in India? 
 Finally, while the above four mechanisms explain how the MDGs led to the 
introduction of JSY, we have yet to determine whether and how they account for the 
program’s expansion after 2005.  For this we turn to the way in which the MDGs 
accorded the efforts to reduce maternal mortality a ready legitimacy that could be invoked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Government of India, Planning Commission, “Mid-Term Appraisal of the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-
2007),” 83-85. 
426 Prior to the formulation of MDGs, reliable data on maternal mortality in the developing world were 
rare. 
427 For further discussion of the role of reporting requirements, see Bogdandy and Goldmann, “The 
Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessment: The OECD’s PISA Policy 
as a Paradigm for a New International Standard Instrument.” 
428 Ray, “Safe Motherhood: Initiatives to Make It Safer.” 
429 For more on India’s international aspirations, see: Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for 
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each time JSY had to be expanded, enhanced, or defended from critics.  Without the 
internationally sanctioned focus on eliminating maternal mortality, it appears unlikely 
that MoHFW would have succeeded in expanding NMBS/JSY by removing nearly all 
eligibility conditions between 2005 and 2013 (see Table 4.1).431  Each round of benefit 
enhancement and coverage expansion attracted some criticism from various ministries 
and the Planning Commission, but MoHFW overcame this opposition easily, deploying 
the same arguments each time: MMR was still too high, rate of institutional delivery 
attended by skilled personnel still too low, and barriers to accessing JSY benefits still too 
strong, the ministry said repeatedly. 
It is telling that during this process the ministry never felt compelled to justify why 
maternal mortality – which is, after all, only one among the many severe deprivations 
experienced by the people of India – deserved the significant efforts and resources 
proposed by MoHFW.  That maternal mortality was a problem worthy of this level 
attention was an idea that all parties took for granted in a way that would have been 
entirely unfamiliar just a decade earlier, even though MMR was higher then (see Figure 
4.2).  While the Millennium Declaration was not the first to raise concerns about MMR, 
then, the MDGs legitimized anti-MMR efforts to an unprecedented degree.   
 Of course, MDG 5 did not give MoHFW carte blanche on JSY: as the historical 
section shows, the ministry still needed approvals from the Planning Commission, the 
Cabinet, and the decisionmaking bodies of NRHM for many of the changes it sought to 
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implement.  In addition, MoHFW often initiated changes in JSY not proactively but in 
response to feedback from state governments, pressure from the Supreme Court, and 
lobbying from civil society.  Yet, once the ministry decided that a policy change was in 
order, the broad consensus on maternal mortality as a key indicator of women’s well-
being gave the ministry recourse to an ever-ready justification for why JSY needed to be 
bigger and better. 
This suggests that the final mechanism through which the international spotlight 
on maternal mortality wielded causal influence was the way in which this spotlight forged 
a consensus around the importance of tackling high maternal mortality, which provided 
MoHFW an automatic rationale for JSY – a rationale that, as this article shows, even 
India’s Supreme Court had ultimately to accept.   
IV. Alternative explanations 
What could be some alternative explanations for the current size and scale of JSY, 
however?  Three possible explanations are discussed below. 
First, it may be argued that one reason for the rapid expansion of JSY is that 
many poor women were dying in childbirth, presenting a true humanitarian tragedy to 
which any government would feel compelled to respond.  This need-based explanation is 
inadequate on many counts: (1) it cannot account for the timing of JSY’s introduction and 
expansion (2005-2013), because maternal mortality over this time was already lower that 
it had previously been; (2) it does not explain why maternal mortality, as opposed to 
countless other conditions, came to be considered a humanitarian problem meriting a 
state response; and (3) it does not consider why poor pregnant women in particular came 
 
	  
183 
to be considered especially vulnerable and deserving of direct state assistance.  In short, 
the need-based explanation is insufficient because it fails to recognize that notions of 
need, vulnerability, and deservingness are constructed in society rather than given 
exogenously.432 
Another possible explanation is that efforts to combat maternal mortality began to 
be emphasized once the public health and medical communities appeared to come to the 
agreement that one of the major reasons behind maternal death was that, throughout 
their pregnancies and especially during childbirth, women did not have access to 
necessary medical services and trained personnel who could anticipate and address 
obstetric complications.433  While there is reason to believe that the convergence of some 
“epistemic communities”434 on the importance of medical assistance during childbirth 
played a role,435 it is unlikely that findings published in academic journals spurred action 
by themselves.  For these findings to matter, technical information had systematically to 
be studied and translated into viable policy strategies, a time-consuming and costly 
exercise unlikely to be undertaken unless some policy space existed already for the issue of 
maternal mortality.  For this reason, while an incipient scientific consensus might have 
been a proximate cause or facilitator of rising spending on maternal health, a search for 
the distal cause would bring us back to broader developments, such as the formulation of 
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433 McCarthy and Maine, “A Framework for Analyzing the Determinants of Maternal Mortality,” 25-27; 
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the MDGs, that put maternal health on the global political agenda in the first place.  
Therefore, the arguments of this chapter still stand. 
A third possibility is that what drove spending on JSY was not the high rate of 
maternal mortality but a high rate of infant mortality in the country.  India’s infant 
mortality rate was 68 per 1000 births in 2000 and 58 in 2005, compared to the world 
average of 49 over this five-year period.436  Indeed, reduction in infant mortality was an 
explicit objective of JSY.437  Yet, a thorough review of 2500 pages of MoHFW’s policy 
documents and correspondence on JSY leaves no doubt that worries about high MMR 
were what motivated JSY: the program had many goals, but, as documented in the 
historical section above, averting maternal death dominated the conversation on JSY 
throughout the period of this study.  
A third alternative argument might be that JSY was less a program to combat 
maternal mortality and more one to advance, under the guise of improving maternal 
health, the population control agenda of the Indian state.  The idea that JSY is designed 
to control population growth does not withstand scrutiny, however, because, as the 
historical section shows, MoHFW sought to remove the two-child eligibility criteria that 
JSY inherited from NMBS even before JSY was officially launched.  The ministry failed 
in this effort at the time.  Noting the limited resources available to JSY in its early years 
and yielding to the objections of other governmental actors who feared that, without the 
two-child ceiling, JSY would inadvertently promote higher fertility, MoHFW backed 
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down temporarily.  Yet, in response to pressure from the Supreme Court, the insistence 
of the food security movement and other civil society actors, and feedback from state 
governments, it returned to this eligibility criterion repeatedly in the years after, removing 
it in increments: for LPS beneficiaries willing to undergo sterilization in 2005, for all LPS 
beneficiaries in 2006, and for all HPS recipients in 2013 (see Table 4.1).438  This tells us 
that, although population-control concerns wielded some influence in the making of JSY, 
they did not provide the overriding motivation for the program.  Had the key objective of 
JSY been to promote population control, parity restrictions would have been made 
tighter rather than relaxed, and sterilization conditions made stricter rather than 
removed. 
Finally, two secular trends preceded JSY: (1) economic growth augmented 
incomes, and (2) India’s maternal mortality nearly halved between 1990 and 2005, 
declining from more than 550 per 100,000 live births to fewer than 300.439  This raises the 
possibility that these correlates of JSY had causal links to the program.  Let us consider 
each in turn. 
There is little doubt that economic growth allowed for greater absolute social 
spending (including on programs such as JSY) via higher state revenues, but perhaps the 
relationship between economic performance and attention to maternal mortality is even 
more specific – could it be that countries begin to problematize maternal mortality once 
they pass a certain level of development, possibly due to a rising threshold of what 
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439 World Health Organization, “Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2015. Estimates by WHO, 
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constitutes an acceptable standard of living?  There is some suggestive support for this 
hypothesis.  The emergence of maternalist politics/policy in the US, UK, Germany and 
France can be traced back to the late 19th century,440 when income per capita in these 
countries ranged between $2000 and $4500 (in 1990 international prices), as shown in 
table 4.3 below.441  Income per capita in India between 2005 and 2008 – the years that 
marked the onset of JSY – was very similar: $2400 to $3000 per capita (in 1990 
international prices).442  It is possible, then, that there exists a threshold level of 
development – perhaps around $2000 to $2500 in income per capita – beyond which 
high maternal mortality becomes harder to ignore.  This is a possibility, but not one that 
can be assessed here.  More systematic, cross-country research is needed to establish 
whether, why, and how this threshold effect might occur. 
Table 4.3: GDP per capita (PPP, 1990 international prices, $)443  
 
Year/Country France Germany UK US 
1880 2120 1991 3477 3184 
1890 2376 2428 4009 3392 
1900 2876 2985 4492 4091 
 
Similarly, a significant and long-term decline in maternal mortality preceded the 
emergence of maternalist politics and policy in several European countries in the late 19th 
century.  In Germany, for instance, MMR declined by a quarter between 1740 and 1860 
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– from 1761 to 1292 per 100,000 live births.444  In England and Wales, it fell by more 
than half, from 1300 to around 500 per 100,000 live births, between 1750 and 1890.445  
As discussed earlier, the introduction of JSY followed years of decline in MMR in India as 
well.  It is possible that this pattern of the onset maternalist politics/policy following long-
term decline in MMR suggests a causal link: perhaps falling maternal mortality 
demonstrates that it is indeed possible to make childbirth safer, which makes continued 
maternal deaths unconscionable and galvanizes support for policy efforts to address them.  
This hypothesis, too, could supplement the arguments of this chapter and will have to be 
tested through future research. 
V. Generalizing from the experience of JSY 
What lessons can we derive from the analysis presented in this chapter?   
 One takeaway from the tale of JSY is that while spotlight in the form of a narrow 
set of international goals and indicators can convert formerly peripheral “conditions” into 
serious “problems” and place them on the political agenda,446 the spotlight effect carries 
the risk of stripping problems of their complexity and reducing them to easy-to-measure, 
technical inputs.  For instance, the grand political vision behind the Cairo documents, 
which emphasized the centrality of reproductive health and women’s rights to 
development, was reduced to the idea of strong maternal health by the time it got 
funneled to MDG 5.  The first target under MDG 5 then whittled maternal health down 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Klasen, “Marriage, Bargaining, and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation: Excess Female Mortality 
among Adults during Early German Development, 1740-1860,” 451. 
445 De Brouwere, “The Comparative Study of Maternal Mortality over Time: The Role of the 
Professionalisation of Childbirth,” 547-549. 
446 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 109-115. 
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to maternal mortality, which in turn was distilled by JSY to rate of institutional delivery.  
Unsurprisingly, then, much conversation around the success or failure of JSY has focused 
on whether the program has managed to bring pregnant women to medical facilities 
rather than on whether it has strengthened women’s overall health, improved their 
reproductive autonomy, or even actually lowered maternal mortality.  For instance, 
India’s 2015 country report on the MDGs summarized JSY’s contribution in the 
following way: the program, it said, “has been lauded as a successful scheme bringing 
about a surge in institutional deliveries since its launch.”447  Hence, while the MDGs have 
focused our attention on women’s health, it is on a very narrow, technical aspect of 
women’s health that our lenses are trained. 
Second, the story of JSY reveals just how consequential the frames used to 
describe policy interventions can be.  NMBS had little traction as a program of basic 
financial assistance for pregnant women.  Its trajectory changed when it began to be 
framed as a nutritional program: it became linked to a larger set of food security 
interventions, which triggered the interest of the Right to Food campaign, which 
advocated its continuation and even moved the Supreme Court in its favor.  Once the 
nutrition frame was discarded in favor of a maternal mortality frame, the course of JSY 
changed once again: it was now India’s premier program for achievement of MDG 5 and 
had to be accorded attention and resources commensurate with its new status.  What the 
ICPD in Cairo accomplished was also, arguably, a reframing of the population problem – 
from population growth as an isolated issue to population growth as intimately connected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium 
Development Goals India Country Report 2015,” 91. 
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with women’s reproductive rights and development.  This reframing at Cairo, the chapter 
shows, set into motion forces that eventually put maternal health at the center of 
international development agenda through the MDGs, reorienting national policy 
landscapes and remaking gender budgets in countries such as India.  JSY’s story tells us, 
then, that policy and problem frames are far from the trivial and ornamental things that 
the word “frames” suggests – they are often pivotal to the course of what they frame. 
A final tendency suggested by the story of JSY concerns the role of civil society in 
shaping women-specific policy in the context of development.  In contrast to Europe and 
the US, where maternalist programs were introduced thanks directly and in large part to 
the efforts of women’s civil society groups, India’s JSY benefited more from advocacy of 
civil society groups working on non-women-specific issues.  For instance, although 
women’s rights activists are part of the Right to Food campaign, the overarching goal of 
the campaign is not to further gender equality or enhance women’s well-being but to 
ensure food security for the poor.  Not only did the RTF campaign shape JSY in many 
ways, it also played a part – and an even greater one at that – in the introduction of a 
subsequent maternity entitlement program that promises to triple the amount of cash 
assistance available to pregnant women under JSY.448  The efforts of women-focused civil 
society associations, on the other hand, appear to have mattered much less in JSY’s 
evolution.449  While the reasons for this are unclear, the muted role of women’s groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Discussed in the concluding chapter 
449 It is possible that this conclusion is an artefact of the methodology adopted to gather information for this 
chapter: analysis of the internal policy documents of MoRD and MoHFW on NMBS and JSY.  A different 
methodology – one relying primarily on interviews with civil society actors, for instance – might have 
yielded a different perspective on the role of women-focused civil society groups, perhaps revealing the 
effect of civil society efforts on the broader contours of the maternal health debate in India.  Yet, such a 
contribution would still be considered an indirect determinant of maternalist policy in India, which 
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and the prominent role of non-women’s groups in fomenting maternalist policy in India 
might reflect the marginalization of women’s and feminist groups even within civil 
society.  In addition, it might suggest that women-focused policy fares better when 
advocated by organizations not primarily identified as feminist or even women focused. 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to understand what accounts for the size, in terms of number of 
beneficiaries and expenditure, of Janani Suraksha Yojana, given the program’s humble 
beginnings as the National Maternity Benefit Scheme.  Through presentation of a 
historical narrative and its subsequent analysis, the chapter argued that three factors 
relating to India’s own political economy and the politics of international development 
shaped the trajectory of JSY. 
First, India’s rapid economic liberalization of the 1990s necessitated and, through 
expansion of state revenues, enabled pro-poor interventions (such as cash assistance for 
poor pregnant women) that were designed to give structural adjustment “a human face.”  
Second, a civil society movement for food security filed public interest litigation at a time 
of high judicial activism, leveraging the power of the courts to urge the state to expand 
nutritional programs, one of which was the maternal nutrition program NMBS.  Finally, 
the emergence of the Millennium Development Goals as a focal point for international 
development cast a sharp spotlight on maternal health, giving India’s health ministry both 
a reason and the ability to augment its existing efforts for maternal health.  Of these three 
factors, the chapter argues, the last had the greatest impact on the course of JSY.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reinforces the point made here: unlike in Europe and the US, where women’s groups were directly involved 
in the onset of maternalist policymaking, the role of women’s organizations in India appears to have been 
more distant.     
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The chapter argued further that this international spotlight exerted causal 
influence in five ways: by linking maternal health with other high-profile issues, 
generating funding for maternal health interventions, creating incentives for domestic 
policymakers, socializing domestic actors, and legitimizing major interventions for better 
maternal health.  The findings of the chapter suggest that emergence of maternalist social 
policy in the global south has roots in the policy trends unfolding in the world of 
international development. 
One question remains to be addressed, however: has JSY succeeded in attaining 
its objectives?  Is institutional delivery rate now higher and maternal mortality lower due 
to JSY?  I draw on existing evaluations of the program to answer this question in the 
concluding chapter.  First, however, the story of another women-specific program that 
took shape alongside NMBS/JSY is in order.  Chapter 5 presents this story. 
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CHAPTER 5: Political and Policy History of Indira Mahila Yojana, 1989-
2012 
 
I. Introduction 
Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY), a program for women’s socioeconomic empowerment, 
shares its origins with National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS), discussed in Chapter 
4.450  Like NMBS, it was first proposed in 1989 and launched in 1995.  Unlike NMBS, 
however, it raised high expectations in its early years, only to foil them during its lifetime.  
Although planned as a grand program designed to overhaul women’s social policy and 
challenge gender-based injustices in India, IMY – in the form that it came to be 
introduced and implemented – could not realize the vision around which it was built, 
remained small in terms both of coverage and expenditure (see Figure 5.1), and was 
terminated within 13 years of its launch.  This chapter seeks to understand why these 
three developments – the loss of the original vision, the failure to take off, and an early 
death – occurred in the life of IMY and its successor, called Swayamsiddha.451  Put 
another way, the chapter asks why policymakers and political leaders in charge did not 
feel compelled to make IMY the watershed program it was intended to be when it was 
designed in the late 1980s. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Indira Mahila Yojana translates as Indira Woman Scheme or Indira Scheme for Women.  The name 
was later changed to Swayamsiddha, denoting self-reliance and self-dependence. 
451 Also spelled “Swayamsidha” in some official documents 
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Figure 5.1: GoI expenditure on IMY/Swayamsiddha452 
 
The chapter finds that IMY’s underwhelming trajectory can be attributed to three 
factors: (1) the transformation of the program from a “holistic” empowerment program 
into a narrower microcredit scheme, (2) the effort to make IMY a financially self-
sustaining program, and (3) the prioritization of non-sex-specific, anti-poverty measures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Incurred expenditure data on IMY are not available between 1995 (when the program was launched) 
and 1998.  Incurred expenditure data pertain to IMY from 1998 to 2001 and to its successor, 
Swayamsiddha, after 2001.  Expected expenditure data pertain to a program called Integrated Programme 
of Development for Women and Children (IPDWC), which was initially proposed in 1989 and later 
renamed and launched as IMY in 1995.  IPDWC policy documents did not estimate the expenditure on the 
program beyond 1996-97, but the program was expected to continue after this date.  Expenditure figures 
are nominal.  Sources: Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual 
Report 1993-94”; Chakraborty, “Macroscan of Union Budget 2003 in India: A Glimpse through the 
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over women-specific, gender-justice programs such as IMY.  The chapter argues that, in 
the final analysis, these factors can be traced to the tendency among policymakers in 
India to view the problems of women through the lens of poverty rather than that of 
gender.  The course of IMY reflects the assumption that what ails women is poverty: if 
women’s poverty is eliminated, gender will automatically become inconsequential.  There 
is little appreciation of the idea that gender might exist independently of poverty/class as 
a dimension of social stratification.453  The result is an effort to solve gender by solving 
poverty.  The course of IMY reflects policymaking resulting from collapsing the 
distinction between these two axes of inequality.  
The chapter also identifies pathways through which these factors exerted causal 
influence.  The reframing and transformation of IMY into a microcredit program served 
to weaken the unique social interventions that accompanied economic ones in the 
original vision of the program, likening IMY to other (non-sex-specific) anti-poverty 
initiatives.  An emphasis on self-sustainability kept IMY small in coverage and scope.  
Finally, preference for anti-poverty measures led state actors to dismiss further the 
usefulness of interventions that did not target poverty directly.  These three pathways 
came together in the story of IMY in 2008, when the Government of India (GoI) 
dissolved IMY on the grounds that the program duplicated on a smaller scale the efforts 
of larger, non-sex-specific, anti-poverty programs that were already assisting India’s poor, 
including women.  The implication was that poor women are to be targeted as poor first 
and as women later, if at all.  Because general anti-poverty initiatives were already in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 The words “poverty status” and “class” are used interchangeably here. 
 
	  
195 
place, state actors envisioned little need for women-specific initiatives that combined anti-
poverty measures with those promoting broader social empowerment of women. 
While social science research has often recognized the subordination of gender to 
class or the folding of gender into poverty454 and literature focused on India has also noted 
the domestic tendency to “address gender through poverty,”455 work establishing this 
tendency empirically and tracing its impact on policymaking is rare.  This chapter adds 
value by tracing the policy impact of folding gender into poverty status as a single 
dimension of disadvantage in India.  It illustrates one downstream effect of privileging 
poverty in this way: the creation of a social policy landscape that interprets gender 
injustice as economic injustice and seeks to address it accordingly. 
We proceed in the following way.  First, I describe the historical evolution of IMY.  
Next, I complement the chronological approach with an analytical one, discussing (1) 
features that set IMY apart from existing social programs for women in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, (2) reasons for the program’s initial rise and anemic growth, (3) the 
possible reasons behind the Indian polity’s tendency to privilege poverty status/class over 
gender, and (4) the merits of the arguments offered by GoI to advocate the termination of 
IMY.  Next, I discuss the general implications of the foregoing analysis and assess possible 
alternative explanations for IMY’s trajectory.  I then conclude with a succinct overview of 
the findings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Howard, “Our Own Worst Enemies: Women Opposed to Woman Suffrage,” 463; Williams, “What so 
Many People Don’t Get about the U.S. Working Class?”; Gedalof, “Sameness and Difference in 
Government Equality Talk,” 130; Fleschenberg, “South and Southeast Asia,” 36; Jackson, “Rescuing 
Gender from the Poverty Trap,” 489-504; Jackson and Palmer-Jones, “Rethinking Gendered Poverty and 
Work,” 557-558.  
455 Swaminathan, “Intervening for Empowerment,” 3598.  See also: Rustagi, “Women and Poverty: Rural-
Urban Dimensions”; Razavi, “Gendered Poverty and Well-Being: Introduction,” 409. 
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II. Evolution of Indira Mahila Yojana, 1989-2012 
This section weaves together the early history of the launch of the program; describes the 
ways in which IMY was elaborated and thereby modified in the years after its initial 
launch; demonstrates how the Planning Commission, the body formerly responsible for 
formulating India’s economic plans, resisted the early efforts to expand IMY into a bigger 
program with a broader reach, anticipating its own stronger objections to the program in 
subsequent years; and recounts the debate between the Planning Commission and the 
Ministry of Women and Child Development that ultimately led to the program’s 
dissolution. 
A. Backdrop 
In response to a UN mandate asking governments to conduct comprehensive 
studies of the condition of women in their societies, the Government of India constituted 
the Committee on the Status of Women in India in 1971.  The committee comprised 
renowned feminists, elected representatives, activists, social workers, academics, and 
others.  In 1974, it released the results of its extensive study of women in India in a report 
called Towards Equality.  The 480-page report described in great empirical detail the many 
manifestations of women’s inferior social position in Indian society.  It painted a dire 
picture, drawing attention to and discussing in detail the increasingly skewed child sex 
ratio, the institutionalization of gender inequality in the major religions of the country, 
high rates of child marriage, low rate of women’s participation in the paid economy, 
significant gaps between the earnings of men and women, low rates of educational 
attainment among women, and low representation of women among elected 
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officeholders.456  Three pioneers of women’s studies in India describe the impact of the 
report in the following way: “The appalling findings of the Report reopened the women’s 
question for the government, academia and women’s organizations.”457  The report is 
now considered a foundational text of the women’s movement and women-focused 
policymaking in the country.458 
The following decade witnessed the production of another key policy document 
on women.  In 1988, under the direction of then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, GoI set 
up a group to formulate a ten-year plan for the country’s women.  The purpose was to 
establish a decadal vision for improvement in women’s status that could help GoI’s 
various ministries overcome the myopia resulting from the annual planning incentivized 
by yearly budgetary cycles.  The group steering the effort to draft this plan identified eight 
areas for interventions favorable to women: rural development and agriculture, 
employment and training, supportive services, education, health and family welfare, 
legislation, political participation and decisionmaking, and media and communication.459  
The resulting document, called the National Perspective Plan for Women, identified steps 
to be taken in each area for lasting improvements in women’s condition.  At nearly 400 
pages long, it presented another comprehensive analysis of women’s situation in India 
and represented another watershed moment in women-focused policymaking in India.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Government of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, “Towards Equality: Report of the 
Committee on the Status of Women in India.” 
457 Desai, Mazumdar, and Bhansali, “From Women’s Education to Women’s Studies: The Long Struggle 
for Legitimacy,” 52, as quoted in Khullar, Writing the Women’s Movement: A Reader, 11. 
458 “Report: The Making of a ‘Founding Text,’” 87. 
459 Alva, Courage and Commitment: An Autobiography, Chapter 19, 3625. 
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While there are many commonalities between the findings and recommendations 
of Towards Equality and the National Perspective Plan, one in particular set the stage for 
the formulation of IMY.  This was the finding that women’s participation in formal 
political institutions was low across the country and had to be raised to amplify women’s 
voices in the polity and make governance friendlier to women.  To achieve this objective, 
both reports recommended instituting quotas for women in local government.  The 
Towards Equality report, for instance, called for provision to women of “special 
opportunities for participation in the representative structures of local Government.”460  
The perspective plan followed suit in recommending a 30% reservation for women of 
seats in local bodies.461 
Following these recommendations, and in search for issues to politicize for the 
upcoming 1989 national election, the Congress administration under Gandhi sought to 
use constitutional amendments to mandate women’s quotas in local governments.  The 
64th and 65th Constitutional Amendment Bills, which gave local elected governance 
bodies such as panchayats (village councils) and nagarpalikas (municipalities) a constitutional 
standing and set 30% of the seats aside in both bodies for women, were drafted.462  The 
effort was top-down in nature rather than a response to demands from women’s 
groups.463 Although the bills lapsed due to insufficient support in the upper house of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Government of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, “Towards Equality: Report of the 
Committee on the Status of Women in India,” 304. 
461 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “National Perspective Plan for 
Women, 1988-2000 A.D.,” 164. 
462 Chandrashekar, “Panchayati Raj Bill: The Real Flaw,” 1433. 
463 Deo, Mobilizing Religion and Gender in India: The Role of Activism, 129. 
 
	  
199 
Parliament in 1989,464 the prospect of women occupying 30% of elected seats in local 
bodies, as we will see below, had lasting consequences for IMY. 
B. Origins 
On 24 February 1989, V.A. Pai Panandiker, director of a top think tank in New 
Delhi, wrote an opinion piece in a popular Indian news daily.  Discussing possible 
strategies available to Rajiv Gandhi, the incumbent prime minister, in the national 
election that November, Panandiker argued that while Gandhi enjoyed the support of 
India’s middle class, this support would not be sufficient to keep him in office.  Given 
electoral considerations, Gandhi had no choice but to use the following year’s state 
budget, which his administration was designing as Panandiker was writing the article, to 
attract votes.  But whose votes would Gandhi seek?  Panandiker answered his own 
question: “Recent pronouncements indicate that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi wants to woo women, 
the youth and the poor,” who would comprise “a formidable coalition which would be a 
winning one,” he said.  Gandhi “will have to present a series of credible schemes to win 
the support of these groups,” he concluded.465  
As if on cue, Finance Minister S.B. Chavan promised several interventions for 
women in a speech delivered to introduce the 1989-90 national budget the following 
week.  These included an income-generating program for women, an initiative to raise 
women’s awareness of their own rights and social issues, and even a plan to distribute free 
saris to poor women. 466  Chavan offered no additional information about the possible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Singh, “The Sabotage of the Women’s Reservation Bill.”  The bills were later passed in the form of 74th 
and 75th Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992. 
465 Panandiker, “Prime Minister’s Dilemma.” 
466 “Speech of Shri S.B. Chavan Minister of Finance Introducing the Budget for the Year 1989-90,” 6-13. 
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design or reach of these programs at the time, so the promises remained short on details.  
The stage for a timelier and more conspicuous announcement, however, was now set. 
Newspapers began to fill in some of the blanks in subsequent months.  Times of 
India reported that the Gandhi administration planned to launch a program that would 
not only consolidate existing disparate interventions for women under one umbrella but 
would also add other components.  While women’s programs were generally 
implemented by the Department of Women and Child Development (DWCD) under the 
Ministry of Human Resource Development, talks were underway to put this program 
under the charge of the Ministry of Rural Development, a more powerful entity.467  The 
possibility of employing a woman worker per village to coordinate the program and of 
consulting other government agencies and NGOs for suggestions on the design of the 
program was also being discussed.468 
Official details came on 6 November 1989, two weeks before the national polls.  
In its election manifesto, Gandhi’s party, the Indian National Congress, described its 
plans for a new program it called the Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY), or Indira Scheme for 
Women.  “The basic philosophy of the IMY,” the manifesto said, “is that the problems of 
women, especially of poor women in rural areas, should be approached holistically 
instead of being split into several separate and disparate components.”  IMY exemplified 
this holistic approach, it said, and aimed to (1) make women aware of and empowered to 
exercise their rights; (2) strengthen women economically by helping them acquire skills 
and access to resources such as credit and inputs; (3) promote women’s health; and (4) 
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educate young girls as well as adult women.  The program “will bring together, 
rationalize and further augment all that has been done, is being done and will be done to 
ensure respect, recognition and reward for women commensurate with their great and 
indispensable contribution to building our nation,” the manifesto announced.469   
What the 1989 manifesto called IMY was a program designed earlier that year by 
four senior civil servants in charge of four social sector departments or ministries of the 
government of India: S.P. Shukla of Department of Women and Child Development, 
Anil Bordia of Department of Education, Vinod Pande of Ministry of Rural 
Development, and (to a lesser extent) Mira Seth of Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare.  Pande led the group.470  The exact origins of the group are unclear, but it is 
likely that it was convened by Roma Mazumdar, who preceded Shukla as Secretary of 
Women and Child Development.471  One of the driving factors behind the creation of this 
program, called the Integrated Program of Development for Women and Children 
(IPDWC), was the perceived need to prepare women for work as elected representatives 
in local (village and municipal) governments.472  As the previous sub-section recounts, the 
Rajiv Gandhi government was trying to obtain constitutional standing for local 
governments through the 64th and 65th Constitution Amendment Bills of 1989, which also 
provided for a 30% quota for women in village and municipal councils.  If the 
amendment passed, several hundred thousand women would have to be elected to local 
governments in the near future, and the number would rise to more than a million in a 
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few years.473  Where were the women who could step up to do the job well?  As a senior 
official from the prime minister’s officer at the time recalls: 
By 1989 Rajiv was most interested in panchayati raj [local self-government].  
That was his top priority.  And he was told by a lot of people that we were not 
sociologically at a level of development where there would be effective 
participation of women in [sic] even in the elections, let alone in the running of 
the panchayats.  I recall a minister in charge at the time…saying “Mujhko koi aitraz 
nahi hai, lekin…mujhe batayiye main kahan dhoondoonga itni mahilayein? (I have no 
objection, but…tell me: where am I going to find so many women?)…And these 
were not people who were objecting to women per se.  One was saying that given 
social conditions in Haryana, where every Hindu woman walks with a ghoongat 
[veil] down to her knee, and every Muslim woman is dressed in black from head 
to toe, where are they going to find the women?  It was a genuine question to 
ask.474 
 
To have an effective system of local self-governance with female representatives, 
then, women had first to be empowered socially.  Without some level of social 
development enabling women to function in the public sphere, there could be little, if 
any, meaningful participation and representation of women in the panchayats.  The 
program designed by the group of four was partly an answer to this conundrum produced 
by the efforts to mandate 30% female representation in local government in a country 
where, according to the previous census, three-quarters of women (compared to a little 
more than half the men) could not yet read and write.475 
After months of meetings, deliberations, research tours, and consultations with 
civil society, the group of Secretaries prepared a proposal for a women-specific program 
that it called the Integration Programme of Development for Women and Children 
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(IPDWC).476  The program proposal critiqued the “sectoral” approach to social 
policymaking for women in India: the lack of a “holistic” approach in existing policy, it 
argued, “has brought about a certain amount of directionlessness [sic] in different 
programmes beamed at rural women and children” and created “overlap and inefficient 
utilisation of resources.”477  Various shortcomings undermined “conception, design, 
process and personnel management” of existing programs for women.478 
To fix these problems, the integrated program sought to combine interventions 
aiming to accomplish three goals: (1) build women’s awareness of the manner in which 
their social position as women systematically shapes their lives; (2) provide economic 
opportunities to women, including “wage employment, self-employment, individual and 
group production, access to credit and subsidy, acquisition of new skills and upgradation 
of traditional skills and encouragement of thrift groups”479; and (3) merge women-focused 
health, nutrition, family welfare, and non-formal education services under the same 
umbrella.480  The proposal recommended creating a new government agency to 
implement the program.481  Inspiration was drawn from, and the goal was to scale up, the 
most successful features of other women-focused interventions already operating on a 
smaller scale in various parts of the country.  One such intervention was Rajasthan’s 
Women’s Development Program, which formed women into groups designed to 
strengthen women’s networks and help women realize that “their deprived condition is 
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not unchangeable, that alternatives exist, that they have the competence to choose 
between alternatives and that they are not alone in the task.”482 
Along the same lines, IPDWC’s ultimate goal, in the words of one of its key 
architects, was to trigger “a social transformation by changing the conceptual framework, 
and changing the design, and changing the approach” to women’s public 
programming.483  The group of four estimated that IPDWC would cost around Rs. 8 
billion (around $320 million) in its first year of operation and that the expenditure would 
slowly rise as additional women were mobilized each year.  The last year for which the 
authors estimated expenditure was 1996-97, when IPDWC was expected to cost around 
Rs. 20 billion (see Figure 5.1).  
It was this program that the Congress party manifesto announced in November 
1989, changing its name to Indira Mahila Yojana.  The manifesto did not have to explain 
the provenance of the name – it was understood that the scheme was named after Indira 
Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi’s late mother and India’s only female prime minister, assassinated 
while in office exactly five years and one week before the scheme bearing her name was 
announced in the manifesto.  To tie the program even more closely to Indira Gandhi, the 
government made plans formally to announce the program three days before the national 
elections, on a day that would mark Indira Gandhi’s 72nd birth anniversary.484  On 19 
November 1989, then, during a commemorative event comprising tributes, rallies, and 
prayer meetings at the headquarters of the Congress party, Rajiv Gandhi declared he 
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intended to launch the scheme during his second administration if he won the upcoming 
election.  Additionally, he pledged to allocate 50 billion rupees, equal to around 3.5 
billion USD at the time and about 5 billion USD in 2015, to it annually.485 
Gandhi’s remarks on IMY during the event made front-page news in several 
major newspapers.  In his speech, Gandhi reiterated the primary objectives of IMY 
presented in the manifesto.  First, it would aim to make women aware of “their rights and 
privileges as equal, honoured and respected members of society.”486  The second goal was 
to provide education, training, credit, improved technology, and other resources to 
women to help them boost their income, which would enable them to “lead a less 
arduous and more fulfilling life.”487  Finally, IMY would seek to “provide supplies and 
services for the administration of all integrated schemes ranging from health and nutrition 
to maternity care and family counseling, from education and skills-formation to assets-
acquisition and income generation, from khadi and village industries to tree pattas [titles] 
and land pattas for women,”488 and to incorporate the women-specific components of 
otherwise non-sex-specific programs.489 
In addition, Gandhi described the specific gaps and problems the program would 
address.490  First, he said, the Indian government sponsored 90 or so programs that were 
meant exclusively for women or had a heavy women-focused component.  The problem 
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was that these were being run by different agencies and departments.  Although the exact 
text of his speech is unavailable, the implication of his remarks is clear from newspaper 
reports: too many cooks were spoiling the broth.  Indira Mahila Yojana, Gandhi said, 
would be designed to consolidate (at least 40 of)491 these programs within a single 
institutional framework.  Second, only about 30% of the funds spent on women’s 
programs reached targeted beneficiaries; the rest leaked out in the form of salaries and 
“unproductive overheads.”492  IMY would stem such leakage.  Most importantly, existing 
programs treated beneficiary women in a fragmented manner instead of seeing them as 
single individuals with multiple needs.  “Therefore,” he said, “much less actually gets 
done than could be achieved through an integration of these numerous programmes” 
into one scheme.  IMY’s “holistic” approach would provide the solution. 
Gandhi offered specific information about the design of the program as well.  
IMY, he said, will be administered by local “Mahila Sabhas,” or groups of women from 
concerned areas, and governed by village councils in rural areas and municipal councils 
in urban ones.  Women in each Mahila Sabha would elect a voluntary female worker 
called a “saathin” (which translates loosely as a female friend or helper), who would be 
responsible for spreading awareness among women of IMY and linked schemes.  In 
addition, under IMY the government would open a women and child development 
center in each village or municipal ward of the country within five years of the launch of 
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the scheme.  Each such center would employ a range of workers to implement the scheme 
and provide services to women and children.493 
Within days of the announcement, opposition parties made clear their objections 
to the Congress party making a detailed announcement of a large scheme immediately 
before the election and asked the Election Commission, the body responsible for ensuring 
free and fair elections in India, to take action against the party.494  In response, the 
commission criticized Gandhi lightly for violating the model code of conduct governing 
behavior in the days before the polls.495 
Had they known the outcome of the election in advance, though, the opposition 
parties and the Election Commission might have chosen not to bother with the 
reprimand.  This is because three days after the announcement of IMY, the country went 
to the polls and voted Gandhi and his party out of office, dealing IMY its first devastating 
blow. 
The Congress party lost more than half of its entire strength in the lower house of 
Parliament that year.496  In the aftermath of the election, analysts pointed to many causes 
ranging from a corruption scandal involving Gandhi497 and his reliance on inexperienced 
advisors498 to the Congress party’s poor governance record and loss of Muslim support for 
the party.499  No one, however, blamed IMY.  Yet, the party’s inability to retain office 
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that year, whatever its actual causes, had the effect of disrupting the momentum IMY had 
gained in prior months. 
There is no indication that the coalition of parties, called the National Front, that 
came to power in 1989 developed IMY further in any way.  The scheme was, after all, 
the brainchild of the leader of a much-despised rival party.  But the National Front could 
not hold together for very long.  Formed by set of parties that had coalesced primarily to 
keep the Congress party at bay, the alliance fell apart in 1990.  The ensuing coalition 
government unraveled a few months later as well, necessitating a second round of 
national elections within two years.  The first of three phases of this election was 
scheduled for May 20, 1991.  Once again, Rajiv Gandhi led the Congress party’s election 
efforts and promoted Indira Mahila Yojana as an important plank of the party platform. 
The Congress manifesto in 1991 stayed true to its 1989 forerunner: it promised 
that IMY will be the “focal point for programmed women’s development.”500  On his 
campaign stops across the country, Gandhi delivered speeches to gather support for his 
party.  A reporter who followed him on the campaign trail in northeastern India filed a 
story on the day of the election: “Two announcements made by Mr. Gandhi drew 
enthusiastic applause at every meeting,” he wrote.  “One was the creation of one crore 
[10 million] jobs for youths.  The other was the setting aside of Rs. 5,000 crores [50 
billion] for the uplift of women and to prevent their exploitation and suppression.  The 
funds would be earmarked for the Indira Mahila Yojana.”501 
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While the extent to which Gandhi was genuinely committed to gender equality 
cannot be known, his persistent emphasis on IMY as a vehicle for women’s 
empowerment suggests that the program might have seen some glory had Gandhi 
managed to become prime minister again.  The Congress party’s strong victory that 
election, in which the party won nearly twice as many seats as the next ranking party in 
the lower house of Parliament, might have predicted a similar outcome.502  Yet, what 
swept the Congress to power in 1991 also delivered a second blow to IMY: the program 
lost its most enthusiastic proponent a day after the first phase of the polls when, while 
campaigning for the remaining phases of the election, Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a 
suicide bomber in reprisal for his intervention in the Sri Lankan civil conflict. 
C. Launch 
A wave of sympathy for the grieving Gandhi family brought the Congress party 
back to power,503 and the party appointed Congressman P.V. Narasimha Rao the prime 
minister of the country after Rajiv Gandhi’s widow, Sonia Gandhi, refused to take the 
reins of the party.  Although elected on what could be interpreted as a mandate to 
implement Rajiv Gandhi’s vision for the country, Rao appears to have done nothing to 
launch IMY, an important election pledge, in the first three years of his administration.  
Between 1991 and 1994, there is almost no meaningful mention of IMY in state 
publications and newspapers.  The references that do exist are cursory at best – quick 
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assurances that the program will be revived, but no effort to offer any details that would 
lend credence to the claim.504 
One notable exception exists, however.  In a parliamentary discussion in 1992, 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, an elected representative in the lower house of the Parliament and a 
member of the Congress party, urged the Rao government to take IMY forward.  At 
nearly 1700 words, Aiyar’s strong defense of IMY is too long to produce here in full.  
Instead, some highlights are presented below.  He said: 
Mr. Chairman, it was back in September 1985 that the then Prime Minister, Shri 
Rajiv Gandhi undertook what I personally regard as the single most constructive 
decision of his Prime Ministership…The perception was that whereas the needs 
and requirements of a human being are diverse and many, the human being 
himself or herself is indivisible. Therefore, if we were to develop one part of a 
human being without developing the totality of that human personality, we might 
end up with a grotesque distortion.… 
 
Thus the essence of the Indira Mahila Yojana is that where at present, there are 
something like 50 or perhaps even more programmes of the Government itself, 
designed to meet the requirements of women and children, they should somehow 
be brought together, if not into a single programme, then, at any rate, into a single 
delivery mechanism, and, on the other side, on the demand side, the women 
should be organized in Mahila Sabhas so that they select from among themselves, 
people who would be representative of them...505  
 
Aiyar presented the program as one of Gandhi’s major unrealized policy visions, making 
an emotive case for the implementation of the scheme.  Despite such an exhortation, the 
Rao government would not be spurred to quick action. 
One possible reason was that much else of import was occurring in the early years 
of Rao’s administration.  In 1991, India’s debt crisis came to a head, necessitating serious 
change in economic policy that resulted in the (partial) liberalization of India’s economy.  
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Rao himself blamed the crisis-driven lack of fiscal capacity for his early inaction on social 
programs.506  Additionally, in 1992, right-wing Hindu groups mobilized and led a drive to 
demolish a 16th-century mosque, provoking religious riots across the country.  Another 
challenge that Rao dealt with in his years in office was the aftermath of highly 
controversial caste-based quota policies implemented in 1990.  Perhaps no other three-
year period of India’s post-independence history witnessed as much political churning in 
as many areas as the early years of the Rao administration.  It is possible, then, that the 
Rao government may simply have been too busy putting out fires elsewhere to pay much 
attention to IMY. 
Rao finally revived the scheme in August 1995 on India’s Independence Day, 
announcing in the customary prime ministerial address to the country that this program, 
brainchild of Rajiv Gandhi, would be officially launched on 20 August 1995 to mark 
Gandhi’s birth anniversary.  Gandhi, he said, “had put a lot of effort in this.”507  The 
scheme Rao launched, however, was a far cry from what Gandhi had pledged.  In 
contrast to the all-India program envisioned originally, Rao’s IMY would be a pilot 
program implemented in 200 of the more than 5000 administrative sub-divisions (called 
“blocks”) across the country.508  Also gone were the ambition, the vision, and the political 
backing that characterized Gandhi’s IMY.  Rao’s speech gave no indication whether his 
version, like the original, would seek to converge 90 or so different programs in place for 
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women or be flushed with the kind of resources – equivalent of 3.5 billion USD a year in 
1989 – that Gandhi pledged repeatedly in public.509  In short, where the original 
architects of IPDWC and Gandhi’s Congress party hoped to make IMY the centerpiece 
of the country’s gender strategy – a one-stop shop for women’s entry into a system 
mandated to meet their multiple needs – Rao’s IMY was little more than yet another 
small scheme, a mere shadow of what was proposed earlier. 
Unsurprisingly, then, after a long overdue birth, the program received a slow 
start.  It began as small scheme mounted on an existing program for young children, 
called the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS).  On 20 August 1995, the day 
IMY was officially launched, a minister in Rao’s cabinet offered some details on the 
institutional architecture that would underpin the program.  This centered on Indira 
Mahila Kendras – or Indira Woman Centers – at the anganwadi level.  Anganwadis are 
village-level centers that were created under ICDS and tasked primarily with providing 
nutrition and non-formal education to children under the age of six.  The implication was 
that anganwadis would double up as women centers, providing space for women to meet, 
identify needs, and create “micro plans” for their villages.510 
To this day, because of this early merger between IMY and ICDS, it is unclear 
what the initial allocation for or spending on IMY alone was.  Since the program used 
much of ICDS infrastructure, official figures report only the sum allocated to ICDS and 
IMY together, rather than to IMY alone.511  For 1995-96, for example, official records 
indicate that the funds allocated to the joint program amounted to 5.67 billion rupees 
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(170 million USD) – one-tenth of the figure that Rajiv Gandhi had pledged for IMY 
alone.512  Combined allocation was 5.16 billion rupees (145 million USD) in 1996-97513 
and 6 billion rupees (161 million USD) in 1997-98.514  Therefore, while we know Rao 
shrank both the coverage and the funding of the scheme, the exact extent to which the 
funding was cut in the early years remains unclear in absence of IMY-specific figures.515 
The only available hint comes from a 1996 article that appeared in a prominent 
news magazine, Outlook.  According to the writers, Rao deliberately “alienated those who 
were identified as Rajiv loyalists,”516 keeping them at arm’s length, even refusing to grant 
government jobs to those seen as close to Rajiv Gandhi.517  “To rub it in,” the article 
continues, Rao “stalled many programmes initiated by the late prime minister.  Thus, 
funds for the Indira Mahila Rozgar Yojana were slashed from Rs. 1,700 crore [17 billion 
rupees or 500 million USD] to Rs. 70 crore [700 million rupees or 21 million USD].”518 
If this claim is true, it means the funds for IMY were first cut from 50 billion 
rupees pledged by Rajiv Gandhi to 17 billion – presumably by the Rao administration in 
the early years of his prime ministership, since Gandhi reportedly maintained the 50-
billion figure throughout the 1991 election campaign519 and was killed before he would 
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have had a chance to revise downward – and then further from 17 billion to 700 million 
rupees. 
The Congress party’s grand program for women therefore received its third 
setback when Rao launched it as a diluted, add-on initiative.  This, despite the fact that it 
was Rao who, as would-be education minister in Rajiv Gandhi’s cabinet in 1985, had 
urged Gandhi to refashion the ministry of education as a human resource ministry 
comprising of various new departments, including one for women and children. 520  This 
department and eventual ministry would be the one to run the Indira Mahila Yojana 
(and its subsequent avatar, Swayamsiddha) through the course of the program’s life.  
Ironically, then, Rao both invented the institution that would administer IMY, and, a 
decade later, dampened the spirit of the very program that could have been this 
institution’s biggest legacy.   
D. Limited Growth 
Even in its shrunken form, however, IMY kindled high hopes.  For instance, a 
1995 Times of India article titled “A year that has been eventful for women,” called the 
launching of IMY a “significant event for the cause of Indian women.”521  India’s Ninth 
Economic Plan too described IMY as “a major initiative undertaken during the Eighth 
Plan”522 – and for good reason.  Even though the program did not yet have the resources 
that would allow it to soar to great heights and attain the original goals of empowering 
women through social mobilization, service convergence, and livelihood building, it is the 
only program that sought to achieve these goals under one grand initiative.  In addition, 
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the Rao administration introduced the program as a “pilot” initiative, hinting at the 
possibility of future expansion.  Such expansion, as it turned out, was indeed on the cards. 
Yet, two of the ways in which the Indian state elaborated, and thereby modified, 
the scheme before attempting to expand it spelled its eventual demise.  These were (1) the 
de facto privileging of microcredit – originally just one among many equally important 
components of the program envisioned by Rajiv Gandhi – over others, making IMY a 
microcredit scheme first and foremost; and (2) the sudden emphasis placed on ensuring 
that the program was self-sustainable rather than dependent on state funds.  The 
paragraphs below trace these developments to illustrate their rising prominence. 
Once Rao announced the IMY in 1995, his administration set to work turning the 
bare-bones Independence Day promise into reality.  The 1995-96 annual report of the 
Department of Women and Child Development began to define some of the contours of 
the program.  It reported that the government had identified the 200 blocks where the 
IMY would be piloted.  Institutionally, it envisaged formation of cells called Indira 
Mahila Kendras (IMKs) – Indira Woman Centers – comprising of 100 to 250 women 
members each.  Around 120 village-level IMKs, the report anticipated, would be 
federated at the block level, forming committees called Indira Mahila Block Samitis 
(IMBSs). 
Financially, the report indicated the GoI would provide 5000 rupees per IMK as 
a one-time grant that would be channeled to the IMKs through state governments, which 
would pass the funds on to block committees to finally disburse to the IMKs.  Because 
GoI would supply only a one-time start-up grant each member of the IMK, the annual 
report said, will pay a five-rupee membership fee and a one-rupee monthly contribution 
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to ensure continuation of group activities.  The funds thus collected will be used “as small 
credit requirements of the individual members, and seed money wherever necessary, and 
for expenditure on holding of awareness generation camps and any other activity 
resulting in furtherance of the cause of IMY.”523  Finally, the report reiterated the three 
principal components of IMY: convergence of services; income generation; and sustained 
awareness generation, mobilization, and education.  While at this time the text did not 
explicitly or implicitly single income generation out as the core component of IMY, it is 
important to note that this was the first time in the history of the IMY that the idea that 
the government’s fiduciary responsibility would be limited to supplying start-up grants 
was mentioned. 
In May 1996, Rao left office after the Congress party lost the national elections 
held that year.  There is no indication that the three unstable governments that followed 
between 1996 and 1998 took any interest in the IMY.  The program now lay squarely in 
the domain of the administrative apparatus of the Indian state, a change that moves the 
focus of our analysis from the political/partisan to the administrative realm. 
By 1997, the program had been elaborated further.  The 1996-97 annual report 
of the DWCD was the first of the official publications to explicitly state that IMY would 
be implemented in urban areas in addition to rural ones.  Each IMK, the report said, 
would comprise of nine or ten economically homogenous women’s groups.524  The groups 
would elect office-bearers.  Each IMK, in turn, would send representatives to the block 
committees, which were tasked with coordinating major schemes across IMKs, assisting 
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IMKs in creating proposals for district-level official plans for women, organizing 
trainings, and supervising implementation of IMY in their blocks.  The report also noted 
some progress on linking IMY to other programs, especially a credit fund by the name of 
Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (National Credit Fund for Women), and on the awareness-
building components of IMY.  “Some of the states like UP,” the report said, “have 
already started monthly workshops at the IMKs where special issues pertaining to child 
marriages…atrocities on women and other social issues are discussed.”525 
Yet, a financial rider was in order here as well: the block committees, the report 
indicated, “will be financially sustained by the member IMKs and the Government does 
not intend to provide any additional financial support to them for this purpose,” the 
report said, adding that “IMY is not aimed to create another funding window.”526  
Instead, IMBSs would be expected to use funding available for other schemes for women 
and children by covering such schemes through IMY.  The funds for IMY operations, in 
other words, will be supplied by women’s own contributions and, to the extent possible, 
obtained through funding allocated to other programs that could be linked operationally 
with IMY.  The program’s own core funding would remain small.  The process of pulling 
funding from the program thus continued. 
In 1998, the IMY underwent another modification by elaboration: the DWCD 
adopted the language of self-help while discussing IMY, calling groups to be formed 
under IMKs “self-help groups” (SHGs) for the first time.527 To be sure, references to 
generating self-employment had been made in earlier remarks about the scheme, 
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including in Gandhi’s own speeches, but the spotlight in these cases was not on self-
employment, which was simply one of the many goals of IMY, such as jobs, services, legal 
awareness, and others.528 
The semantic shift to “self-help groups” in 1998 was important because by this 
time the term had already become synonymous with microfinance: it referred to groups 
of poor people, particularly women, who saved together, extended loans to each other 
when necessary, and used the group’s “social collateral”529 – the social pressure exerted by 
members on one another to use funds appropriately and pay loans and interest back in 
time – to compensate for their lack of physical collateral when applying for external loans 
from financial institutions for small entrepreneurial initiatives and urgent consumption 
needs.530  This linking of IMY to self-help groups and microcredit, as the analytical 
section below will show, served to liken IMY to other antipoverty initiatives, diminishing 
its unique features and setting it up for unfavorable comparisons with such initiatives. 
The same 1997-98 annual report that first embraced the terminology of self-help 
groups also indicated that the DWCD and the Planning Commission – the erstwhile 
government body in charge of formulating India’s economic plans and directing 
development spending – conducted a joint evaluation of IMY’s performance.531  The 
following year’s report summarized the results of that report: while IMY had 
transformative potential, its current manifestation suffered various shortcomings, such as 
inadequate training requirements, deficient resource material, and insufficient personnel, 
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among others.  Based on these findings, the report said, the DWCD planned to revamp 
the scheme.  The “recast” scheme, the report promised, would be implemented the 
following year.532 
The DWCD did not fulfill this promise.  The following year’s annual report failed 
to announce a renewed program.  GoI’s Annual Plan 2000-01 suggested the redesigning 
of the scheme was still in process.  Unlike the annual report, however, the annual plan 
from that year hinted at the design of the new program.  Highlighting the importance of 
the credit and income-generation components of the program, it said that the program 
was being re-conceived to further incorporate the “special provisions of income 
generation, capacity building through training, credit and market linkages, etc.”533  In 
fact, the plan said, the new version of IMY was to be merged with an existing program, 
called the Mahila Samriddhi Yojana (roughly translates as Prosperity Program for 
Women), which began in 1993 and aimed to give women incentives to accumulate 
savings and deposit them into micro-savings accounts.  The standalone Mahila Samriddhi 
Yojana (MSY) was terminated in March 1998 due to prohibitively high operational 
costs.534  Perhaps to salvage what was left of MSY, then, the DWCD decided to merge it 
with IMY,535 furthering the transformation of the IMY into a primarily microfinance 
initiative. 
Yet, the “recast” IMY was still nowhere to be seen in operation.  This lack of 
progress on the redesigned IMY bothered at least one entity: the Lok Sabha Committee 
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on the Empowerment of Women (CEW), a standing committee in the lower house of 
parliament.  Made up of 30 members from the two houses of parliament and headed at 
the time by Margaret Alva,536 then a lower-house representative and a former minister of 
the DWCD, the three-year-old committee was tasked with holding the government to 
account on matters relating to women.537  In one of its reports released in December 
2000, the committee reprimanded the DWCD for slow progress on IMY.  Calling IMY 
and MSY “two schemes for women’s economic empowerment,” the report asked DWCD 
to begin to implement the redesigned IMY by March 2001, thereby accepting and 
perhaps cementing IMY’s new identity as an economic empowerment scheme first and 
foremost. 
Nearly everything else the CEW said about IMY in that report reinforced the idea 
that IMY was primarily a microcredit program.  For instance, the CEW asked the 
government to ensure IMY and Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (RMK), a program that is 
essentially a credit fund for women, were not identical programs that duplicated each 
other’s work.538  The question of duplication would not arise if the CEW did not consider 
microcredit the core of IMY.  The government’s response reflected the same 
understanding.  Instead of challenging the CEW’s interpretation of IMY as a microcredit 
program, DWCD responded by arguing that RMK and IMY were complements rather 
than substitutes because RMK supplied the funds that “intermediate organisations” such 
as Indira Mahila Block Samitis, the block-level entities created by IMY, channeled to 
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women as small loans.539  In other words, the RMK and IMY were different not because 
the IMY’s original remit was much broader than provision of credit but because the two 
occupied different parts of the microcredit chain. 
It was surprising, then, when in the same report the government offered the 
opposite argument as well.  The CEW asked the government to make sure IMY did not 
duplicate the efforts of a program called Support to Training and Employment 
Programme for Women (STEP), which sought to help women build skills that would 
render them employable in agriculture, animal husbandry, handlooms, and other 
“traditional sectors.”540  If they were deemed not to be substitutes, the report said, the 
government should explore possible linkages between the two.  In response, the DWCD 
wrote: “IMY and STEP are not identical since IMY is trying to bring about 
empowerment of women through their mobilization, and providing inputs on awareness 
generation, income generation and conversion of schemes of various sectoral 
departments.”541  In this answer, then, the DWCD offered a very different interpretation 
of IMY, one that reflected the program’s original mission rather than its more recent 
avatar. 
How can we make sense of this uncharacteristic response from DWCD?  The very 
next sentence in the answer gives a clue: “So far Government of India has funded the 
Awareness Generation component [of IMY] only…It is now proposed to expand IMY to 
900 blocks and its will offer an integrated mechanism to simultaneously access schemes 
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like STEP in these blocks.”542  In other words, the department argued, IMY and STEP 
are different because, until now, IMY has focused on awareness generation while STEP 
has provided trainings to raise employability.  Efforts are now underway to expand the 
microcredit and livelihood-building component of IMY, which will likely bring the 
program closer to STEP in its goals.  This similarity, instead of making any of the two 
programs redundant, will provide the rationale and means for integrating the two.  This 
reading suggests that even while DWCD understood the original mandate of IMY was far 
broader than to provide microcredit, it seemed eager to redesign the program to 
accentuate its economic-empowerment dimension. 
Even more telling than DWCD’s response on STEP was the manner in which it 
addressed CEW’s concerns regarding a program called Development of Women and 
Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA).  The CEW asked why this program – which, in the 
government’s words, “aimed to improve the socio-economic status of the poor women in 
the rural areas through creation of groups of women for income-generating activities on a 
self-sustaining basis”543 – had not been transferred from the Ministry of Rural 
Development to DWCD for integration with IMY despite orders given more than four 
years ago.  In response, the DWCD said the program was not transferred because 
DWCRA and IMY were incompatible.  First, unlike the IMY, the DWCRA was a 
country-wide program, a feature that would make the two programs difficult to integrate.  
Second, and more importantly, DWCD said that IMY and DWCRA differed from each 
other in a more fundamental way: while “majority of DWCRA groups are being 
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sustained on subsidy only,” the “IMY advocates a subsidy free” approach.544  In providing 
this answer, the DWCD highlighted again the self-sustainability feature it had added to 
IMY in 1995. 
Although it was not obvious in 2001, these two developments – the foregrounding 
of the microfinance component of IMY and the government’s new emphasis on self-
sustainability of (some) social programs – would eventually be used by the Planning 
Commission to argue against the continuation of the program and so turn out to be the 
fourth and fifth major setbacks for IMY.545    
E. Second launch 
The “recast” IMY was finally ready in 2001.  The government, now led by the 
Congress party’s primary rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made two important 
changes to the program at this time.  First, it changed the name of the program from 
Indira Mahila Yojana to Swayamsiddha, a word meant to suggest self-reliance in Hindi, 
and thus distanced the program from the Gandhis.  Second, on 27 February 2001, it 
decided to expand the program’s operations from 238 to 650 blocks across the country.546  
The BJP government announced the new, expanded program that July547 and launched it 
formally in November.548  The key difference between IMY and Swayamsiddha, 
according to the 2000-01 annual report of the DWCD, was that while the former 
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operated in 238 administrative blocks of the country, the latter would slowly expand to 
650 blocks by 2002.549 
While some state publications continued to refer to the original mandate of IMY 
in their discussions of Swayamsiddha – one, for instance, said that the program aims to 
achieve “more comprehensive and holistic empowerment of women through awareness 
generation, economic empowerment and convergence of various schemes”550 – others 
began to recognize microcredit as central to the program.  For instance, the Press 
Information Bureau of India (PIB), the government’s public relations agency, released an 
article later that year describing the redesigned program.  Swayamsiddha, it said, is a: 
…scheme for empowering the Indian women both socially and economically to 
enable them to live with dignity and self-reliance.  The scheme lays stress on 
access to micro-credit and envisages block and panchayat-level participation 
among women, cutting across all regional, economic and social groups… ‘Self-
help’ is the magic word here.  The programme urges women to help themselves, 
literally.551 
 
The PIB thus identified microcredit as central to IMY. 
What the Bureau failed to mention, however, was that Swayamsiddha came with 
an expiration date and a budget that was extremely small even by the standards of IMY.  
State publications described Swayamsiddha as a six-year program with a total outlay of 
1.16 billion rupees.552  This meant that while IMY was envisioned under Gandhi as a 
long-term program, Swayamsiddha was planned as a short-term project with a 
predetermined termination date.  In addition, the funds set aside for Swayamsiddha – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2000-01.” 
550 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2001-02,” 65. 
551 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “Swayamsiddha.” 
552 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2002-
2003,” 119. 
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1.16 billion for 6 years – were much less not only than the 50 billion yearly that Gandhi 
pledged but less also than the 1.65 billion allocated to IMY (which operated in one-third 
as many blocks as Swayamsiddha was to operate in) for five years as part of India’s 9th 
five-year economic plan, from 1997 to 2002.553  At 1.16 billion for 6 years, then, Rajiv 
Gandhi’s program for women was receiving 0.4% of the yearly financial support he had 
pledged.554  Explanation was offered neither for the built-in expiration date nor the 
diminished funding, both of which amounted to further modification by elaboration. 
By February 2005, only 31% of the funding allocated for Swayamsidha Phase I 
had been utilized.555  Yet, the scheme was set to expire on 31 March 2006.556  As the end 
date neared, state officials began to discuss the possibility of extending the program 
beyond 2006.  One reason was that another program called Swashakti (literally, self-
power) was to end in 2005 when its external funding expired. 
Swashakti was a World Bank- and International Fund for Agricultural 
Development-supported project that, unlike Swayamsiddha, was implemented in only 
nine states, but, like Swayamsiddha, aimed to empower women through provision of 
credit to self-help groups.  Swashakti did not provide subsidies to women’s enterprises, a 
feature that the Ministry of Women and Child Development, DWCD’s ministry-level 
successor, would later come to interpret as key to Swashakti’s success.  GoI wanted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 Government of India, Planning Commission, “Tenth Plan.” 
554 This is without accounting for inflation, which eroded the value of the rupee by more than 50% 
between 1989 and 2001 relative to a representative basket of goods tracked by the Consumer Price Index.  
From: “Inflation Calculator India: Calculate India’s Inflation between Any Two Years from 1971 to 2016.” 
555 Desk Officer to Director (SR), “Continuation of the Scheme of Swayamsida as Swayamsidha Phase-II 
with World Bank Assistance.” 
556 Government of India, Planning Commission, “Report of the Steering Committee on Empowerment of 
Women and Development of Children for the Eleventh Plan,” 8.  Since the program was launched in 2001 
for 6 years, one would expect it was set to expire in 2007.  Instead, at some point GoI decided to end the 
program a year earlier in 2006, and later postponed the date to 2007 and again to 2008. 
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continue Swashakti beyond its planned end in 2005.  In the Annual Plan meeting 
between the DWCD and the Planning Commission in December 2004, state officials 
decided to, in effect, merge Swashakti with Swayamsiddha and extended the tenure of the 
resulting program by another few years.557  This extended program was named 
Swayamsiddha Phase II. 
This re-making of Swayamsiddha along the lines of Swashakti further established 
Swayamsiddha as a program for microcredit, because Swashakti was designed to increase 
“the number of women enlisted in self-help groups, the degree of increase in household 
incomes, and the rates of return to investment activities.”558  The metrics of success, in 
other words, were all economic in nature.  Built around a notion of women’s 
empowerment as better financial outcomes for women, Swashakti furthered the 
microcreditification of Swayamsiddha when merged with the latter. 
The officials also decided to seek funding from the World Bank for the program, 
and the World Bank indicated informally its willingness to consider providing support for 
some components of Swayamsiddha Phase II.559  The formal proposal to the World Bank, 
however, was yet to be made.  This proposal, the DWCD was told, would have to be sent 
to the World Bank through the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA),560 a division of 
the Ministry of Finance charged with overseeing matters relating to foreign aid for 
development.561  While the DEA indicated its willingness to forward the proposal to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 Desk Officer to Director (SR), “Swayamsidha Phase-2.” 
558 Ramachandran, Jandhyala, and Govinda, “Cartographies of Empowerment: An Introduction.” 
559 Desk Officer to Director (SR), “Continuation of the Scheme of Swayamsida as Swayamsidha Phase-II 
with World Bank Assistance.” 
560 Desk Officer to Director (SR). 
561 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, “Allocation of Business: Department of Economic Affairs.” 
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World Bank, it asked the DWCD simultaneously to obtain permission for Swayamsiddha 
Phase II from the Planning Commission.562  Informally, both the Commission and the 
minister of the human resource ministry (of which DWCD was a part) appeared to 
approve of the plan to extend Swayamsiddha into a second phase.563 
Not everyone agreed that seeking World Bank funding was a good idea, however.  
A DWCD official representing the department’s finance division called into question the 
merits of requesting interest-bearing loans from the World Bank.  “The overall cost of the 
proposed Swayamsidha Phase II is Rs. 750.00 crore [7.5 billion] to be spent over a period 
of five years,” he wrote.  Since Swayamsiddha Phase I was funded out of domestic 
resources, it “may not be difficult for the Government of India to meet the proposed cost” 
of Phase II as well.564  The official suggested that the ministry request the Planning 
Commission to fund the entire program from domestic revenues.565  
In a meeting held the following month between senior officials from the DWCD, 
the DEA, the Planning Commission, and the World Bank, the question of funding arose 
again.  The Secretary of DWCD – that is, the official occupying the topmost position 
within the department bureaucracy – favored requesting World Bank funding.  The 
experience with Swashakti, she argued, showed that external funding provided incentives 
to monitor implementation, control expenditure, and institute and follow a system of 
approvals and a defined set of norms.  With World Bank funding also came the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Desk Officer, “Proposal for Swayamsidha Phase-II Starting from 1.10.2005 for Submission to World 
Bank and DFID.” 
563 Joint Secretary to Integrated Finance Division, August 3, 2005. 
564 Prasad to Director (Fin.), August 9, 2005. 
565 Prasad to Director (Fin.). 
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organization’s global development experience.566  The director of DEA concurred, 
pointing to the successful example of Swashakti and another World Bank-funded project.  
He also conveyed the DEA’s readiness to provide funds for Swayamsidha Phase II, since 
the program promised to continue the work of Swashakti, which the DEA regarded as a 
success.567  In contrast, the representative of the Planning Commission now dithered on 
funding.  While he did not disapprove of seeking assistance from the World Bank, he 
cautioned that the Planning Commission will be able to consider funding the project only 
after it receives a project proposal.568  This, then, was the first of many signs of the 
Planning Commission’s reluctance to support the program and foreshadowed its 
consequential objection to the program in 2010. 
State officials present at this meeting also decided to extend Swayamsiddha Phase 
I by a year – that is, to 2007 – in order to keep the program going while Swayamsiddha 
Phase II was being designed.569  In the following months, DWCD officials attempted to 
finalize the design of Phase II so a proposal could be written and sent to the Planning 
Commission for its formal permission to extend the program.  In a note to the 
department Secretary, the Joint Secretary (the official occupying the second-highest 
position in the department bureaucracy) indicated that the plan was to implement Phase 
II in 14 states of the country.  These states, she said, were selected on the basis of three 
criteria: worsening sex ratio, low literacy, and high poverty.  Since these states had the 
greatest need, Swayamsiddha Phase II should focus on them.  The Joint Secretary did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Executive Director, Swashakti to Joint Secretary (LK), “Minutes of the Meeting Held in Secretary’s 
Chamber on 2 September 2005 on Phase-II of Swayamsidha.” 
567 Executive Director, Swashakti to Joint Secretary (LK). 
568 Executive Director, Swashakti to Joint Secretary (LK). 
569 Executive Director, Swashakti to Joint Secretary (LK). 
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clarify whether the latter two indicators were disaggregated by gender – that is, whether 
they referred to women’s literacy and poverty rates or rates for the entire (male and female) 
population of the state570 – hinting already at the low salience of gender even in 
discussions regarding a women-specific program.   
In a response in March 2006, the Minister of Women and Child Development 
suggested that the ministry consider extending the program to the states in southern 
India, which had not featured in the list of 14 states identified by the ministry so far.571  In 
a follow-up note, the minister explained her rationale.  While the southern states had 
better development indicators in general, there could be districts within these states that 
were performing poorly.  In addition, the ministry should not punish better-performing 
states by denying them the benefit of the extended program.  The way to incentivize 
strong performance would be to reward it.  In any case, there was “no denying the fact 
that Empowerment [sic] is needed for women of the entire country.”572  In September, on 
the minister’s insistence, the ministry decided to expand the program across the country.  
It calculated that instead of 7.5 billion estimated earlier, the program would now cost 
about 11 billion rupees.  About half of that sum could be expected from the World Bank.  
GoI and state governments would have to supply the other half.573 
During this time, the Planning Commission continued to exhibit ambivalence 
toward the program, but did not indicate the source of its reservations.  A few months 
before then, in around March 2006, the DEA contacted the Ministry of Women and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Joint Secretary and Secretary, “Integrated Women’s Empowerment Project (Swashakti) With Domestic 
Funding.” 
571 Officer on Special Duty to Minister of State (WCD) to Joint Secretary (PDD), March 6, 2006. 
572 Minister of State (WCD) to Secretary (WCD), July 2006. 
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Child Development (MWCD)574 to assure the ministry that the DEA had begun 
conversations with the World Bank to request funding for Phase II.  The dialogue was 
launched on the presumption that the ministry would obtain approval from the Planning 
Commission.  Had the ministry obtained this approval yet?575  On receiving the DEA’s 
letter, the ministry sent a reminder to the Planning Commission asking for an “in-
principle approval” – permission to bring the proposed project before a cross-ministry 
committee for consideration576 -- for Phase II.577  In response, the Planning Commission 
emphasized again that it would need a formal proposal before granting approval.  
Because the proposal could be drafted only after the intended coverage of the program 
was finalized, ministry officials decided to wait.  It was July before the minister responded 
with her rationale for asking for broader coverage and September before the decision to 
make the program an all-India project was taken. 
By January 2007, a proposal had been prepared.  The ministry now anticipated 
that the project would run for eight years and require almost 15 billion rupees in funding.  
In a meeting early in the month, however, the Planning Commission, while deliberating 
the upcoming year’s annual plan, changed course again.  Instead of offering hesitant 
statements of support, it now decided to allocate to Swayamsiddha Phase II almost twice 
as much money as the ministry had requested for the program.  In an intra-ministry note, 
an MWCD official observed that at more than 28 billion that was offered by the Planning 
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575 James to Deputy Secretary (RP), March 10, 2006. 
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Five Year Plan/Annual Plan Outlay, Major Changes in the Scope and Investment Approval of the Plan 
Schemes, for the Central Ministries/Departments.” 
577 Deputy Secretary (RP) to Joint Secretary (PDD), March 16, 2006. 
 
	  
231 
Commission, the project could cover not only some blocks in all states but all blocks in all 
states of the country.  “Therefore,” he wrote, “a project has to be prepared with revised 
outlay and larger geographical coverage.”578  In the revised concept note written “in 
order to absorb the enhanced allocation,”579 the ministry proposed a longer lifespan for 
the program as well – instead of being implemented for eight years, the program was now 
expected to last ten.  The World Bank, the ministry hoped, would still provide half of the 
total funds.580  The ministry’s finance division approved the concept note in February that 
year581 and the minister followed suit in March.582  In the meantime, Phase I, scheduled to 
expire on 31 March 2007, was now extended for another year.583 
In April 2007, the Planning Commission changed tack again.  This time the 
reversal was not on the issue of funding but on whether Phase II required in-principle 
approval from the Planning Commission before the project proposal could be forwarded 
to the relevant cabinet committee for final consideration.  Backtracking from its earlier 
demand for a concept note for in-principle approval, the commission told the ministry it 
would not be needing such an approval after all.  Since Phase II is an extension of an 
ongoing project, an in-principle approval was not necessary.  The ministry was free to 
present the proposal directly to the Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) for 
approval.584 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Desk Officer to Director (RP), January 17, 2007. 
579 Desk Officer to Director (RP), February 13, 2007. 
580 Desk Officer to Director (RP), January 17, 2007. 
581 Desk Officer to Director (RP), February 8, 2007. 
582 Personal Secretary to Secretary (WCD), March 14, 2007. 
583 Government of India, Planning Commission, “Report of the Steering Committee on Empowerment of 
Women and Development of Children for the Eleventh Plan.” 
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Now, however, it was the DEA’s turn to vacillate.  When the ministry learned it 
did not need an in-principle approval, it informed the DEA of the development and 
sought to schedule a meeting with the department to consider future steps.585  By mid-
August, the DEA had not responded.586  The ministry sent a reminder that month and 
then again in November.587  The DEA responded in January 2008, informing the 
ministry that it had contacted the Planning Commission with some questions and was 
waiting for a response.588  The questions, it turned out, dealt with funding: the DEA 
wanted to see how much of the promised funding the Planning Commission expected to 
provide.  The DEA would request the rest from the World Bank.589  In a March 2008 
meeting between the MWCD and the DEA, attending officials now made the decision to 
seek World Bank funding only if the Planning Commission was unable to cover what was 
originally supposed to be the World Bank’s share of allocation.  In addition, officials asked 
the MWCD to demonstrate that it had institutional capacity to absorb the funds it was 
requesting for Swayamsiddha Phase II.590  The Joint Secretary agreed, noting that since 
the Planning Commission had already allocated 28 billion rupees for the program, it 
made sense to proceed with domestic funding alone.591  If domestic funding was to cover 
the entire cost of Swayamsiddha Phase II for 10 years, the request to the Planning 
Commission now would have to be for more than 50 billion rupees.592 
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586 Director (RP) to Desk Officer (IMY), August 16, 2007. 
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588 Balghour to Director (RP), January 1, 2008. 
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In July 2008, MWCD Secretary objected to that amount (50 billion rupees) and 
asked his subordinates to explain why the figure was so high.593  The amount was high, 
ministry officials responded, because Swayamsiddha Phase II sought to raise state 
expenditure per self-help group to a level higher than that under the early years of 
IMY.594  The Secretary did not approve.  Since Phase II was simply an extension of Phase 
I, expenditure per SHG should remain the same as before, he said.595  In response, the 
MWCD revised the new 10-year budget for Swayamsiddha Phase II to around 30 billion 
rupees.596  In addition, the Secretary said, for the remaining years of the 11th Plan (2007-
2012), the ministry should take care to use only as much funding for Swayamsiddha 
Phase II as was allotted to it for this program at the start of the 11th Plan.597  This amount 
was 5 billion rupees, 13 billion short of what would be required to extend Swayamsiddha 
to all blocks in the country.598  To keep 11th Plan budget within 5 billion, the ministry 
decided not to expand the program to all blocks during the plan period.  During the 11th 
Plan, the ministry decided then, Swayamsiddha would be extended from 650 blocks to 
1670 blocks.  When more funding was available after the 11th Plan, the program would 
be extended further to the remaining 3927 blocks.599  After these changes were made to 
the draft note on Swayamsiddha Phase II, the note was finally circulated to 14 concerned 
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ministries and departments, including to the Planning Commission, for comments on 9 
April 2009.600 
F. An early death 
In January 2010, after eight months of mostly uninterrupted silence, the Planning 
Commission finally responded to the note.  In it, it objected to the continuation of 
Swayamsiddha on many counts, most of which amounted to a request for further 
information on program design.  Two of the more fundamental critiques, however, 
questioned the very rationale behind the program and formed the basis of the 
Commission’s conclusion that the program did not merit extension.  The paragraphs 
below discuss these two critiques. 
First, the Commission argued, it made little sense to extend Swayamsiddha 
because the program was very close in nature to two other programs – the Swarnjayanti 
Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY)601 and Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana 
(SJSRY)602 -- of the GoI.603  SGSY and SJRSY were programs designed to boost self-
employment to reduce poverty in rural and urban areas respectively.  These goals, said 
the Planning Commission, likened the programs to Swayamsiddha enough to make 
Swayamsiddha redundant.  Both programs, the Commission’s response said,  
…follow the Self-Help Group [SHG] model for empowerment and economic 
betterment of the poorer sections of society which is also the target group of 
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Swayamsidha.  Though the SGSY and SJSRY are not exclusively for women, 
more than 2/3rd of the SHGs under SGSY are exclusively women SHGs and 
formation of women SHGs is given priority under SJSRY.  The empowerment of 
women gets facilitated [by] formation of a SHG and the journey of the SHG from 
a purely lending institution (among the members) to the ultimate setting up of a 
micro enterprise are [sic] major milestones in the process of empowerment.604 
 
To drive the point home, the Commission also included in the appendix to the report a 
table that compared Swayamsiddha, SGSY, and SJSRY in order to highlight the 
similarities between the three.  The information in the table, reproduced below exactly as 
it appears in the policy file accessed at the MWCD, suggested that the three programs 
had very similar content: all of them encouraged self-help groups, income generation, and 
self-employment to fight poverty.  Where the programs differed, however, was in terms of 
their coverage (SGSY and SJSRY had broader reach) as well as in terms of their costs 
(more funding was committed to SGSY than to Swayamsiddha). 
Table 5.1: Comparison chart used to show similarities between programs 
 
Components of SS II, SGSY, SJSRY with Identical Objective and Coverage605 
SI. 
No. 
Swayamsidha 
Phase II 
Swarna Jayanti Gram 
Swarozgar Yojana 
(SGSY) 
Swarna Jayanti Shahri 
Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) 
I. Component 
 •  Self Help Group 
Formation 
•  Formation of Cluster 
•  Income Generation 
Training 
•  SHGs Formation 
•  Self Employment 
•  Universalisation of SHG 
•  Interest Subsidy and 
Marketing through PPP 
•  Urban Women Self Help 
Programme 
•  Urban Self Employment 
Programme 
•  Urban Wage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 Deputy Advisor (Project Appraisal & Management Division, Planning Commission) to Joint Secretary 
(Ministry of Women and Child Development). 
605 Title, chart text, and layout (including any errors) are reproduced exactly as they appear in the internal 
records of the Ministry of Women and Child Development.  “Lakh” in the Indian numbering system refers 
to 100,000.  “Crore” is equivalent to 10 million.  Source: Deputy Advisor (Project Appraisal & 
Management Division, Planning Commission) to Joint Secretary (Ministry of Women and Child 
Development).  Unlike in the rest of this project, PPP in this table refers to public private partnerships, not 
purchasing power parity. 
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Programme 
•  Capacity Building 
•  Community Service 
•  Centres (CSC) 
•  Revolving Fund 
•  Innovative Fund 
•  Convergence of 
other Government 
Schemes, etc. 
Model 
•  Skill Development and 
Placement 
•  Capacity Building and 
Training Programme 
•  Dedicated 
Implementation Structure 
•  Revolving Fund 
•  Capital Subsidy 
•  Convergence of technical 
and other inputs 
Employment Programme 
•  Urban Programme for 
Poverty Reduction 
among SC/STs 
•  Urban Capacity Building 
Programme 
•  Micro Business Centre 
•  Urban Community 
Development Network 
•  Thrift and Credit Society 
II, Coverage 
 5597 Blocks – Target 
8.39 Lakh Self Help 
Group by the end of 
12th Plan 
Rural area of all the 
districts in the country 
(except Delhi and 
Chandigarh) – Target  
45 lakh SGHs will be 
formed by 2014-15  
In all the towns of the 
country except 
Lakshwadeep with the 
emphasis on Urban 
Poverty Alleviation as 
thrust/priority area. 
III. Estimated Cost 
 Rs.3358 Crores Rs.34229 Crores – 11th 
Plan 
Rs.61168 Crores – 12th 
Plan 
Rs.95397 Crores -- Total 
Rs.3920 Crores 
Centre’s Share Rs.2940 
Crores 
    
 
The second fundamental critique the Planning Commission offered 
problematized the small size of Swayamsiddha.  The Commission explained that 
Swayamsiddha, even in its expanded Phase-II version, would still be too small to cover a 
sufficient number of women.  Swayamsiddha’s target of 150 self-help groups, consisting of 
10 or so members, in each block of the country would translate to coverage of fewer than 
10% of the country’s eligible women.  SGSY, on the other hand, aimed to cover every 
rural poor household.  Therefore, the Planning Commission’s appraisal said, “the truly 
universal coverage can only be achieved under SGSY and SJSGY [sic],” not under 
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Swayamsiddha.606  If Swayamsiddha had additional elements that were missing from 
SGSY/SJSRY, the appraisal continued, these could easily be integrated into the two 
programs.  In the concluding paragraph of its note, the Planning Commission invoked 
again both the existence of SGSY/SJSRY and the smaller size of Swayamsiddha to argue 
that there was “no case for continuation of Swayamsiddha.”607 
On receiving the Commission’s letter, the MWCD, UN Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM), and other interested parties organized a meeting of experts in April 
2010 to discuss how to respond to the Planning Commission’s comments.  Not accepting 
the Commission’s charge that Swayamsiddha simply duplicated the work of SGSY and 
SJSRY, the group agreed that Swayamsiddha was “an entirely different scheme in its 
objectives and vision” and that the MWCD should continue to make a case for it.608  The 
group also feared that termination of Swayamsidha would weaken the MWCD, which, as 
the key state agency for women, was supposed to have a “major a role in mobilization of 
women into groups while ensuring overall empowerment.”609  Encouraged by the positive 
feedback received from gathered experts, the MWCD decided to continue to argue for 
Swayamsiddha.  The Ministry Secretary agreed to be the one to take the case to the 
Planning Commission.610 
The following month, the Secretary wrote a letter to the Planning Commission on 
behalf of the MWCD.  In it, he offered a point-by-point rebuttal of the Commission’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Deputy Advisor (Project Appraisal & Management Division, Planning Commission) to Joint Secretary 
(Ministry of Women and Child Development). 
607 Deputy Advisor (Project Appraisal & Management Division, Planning Commission) to Joint Secretary 
(Ministry of Women and Child Development). 
608 Consultant (IWEP) to Section Officer (IWEP), May 6, 2010. 
609 Consultant (IWEP) to Section Officer (IWEP). 
610 Unknown official to Director (LS), May 24, 2010. 
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comments from earlier that year.  Disagreeing with the assertion that Swayamsiddha was 
simply a smaller version of SGSY, the Secretary argued that microcredit does not 
“automatically” bring about economic empowerment of women – that goal, he said, 
requires “deliberate efforts and strategies aiming at women’s broader social and political 
empowerment,” which Swayamsiddha was designed to provide.  He continued: 
…it is important to recognize the fact that the supply of credit to women (which 
SGSY ensures), and women’s empowerment through micro- credit (which 
Swayamsidha envisions) are two different goals requiring different pathways.  In 
the latter approach, women’s agency must be given primacy, women’s rights over 
property need to be enhanced, and women’s access, control and decision making 
needs are to be ensured in all program processes.611 
 
If empowerment is the aim, in other words, microcredit cannot but be only one 
component of a “manifold strategy” that includes “social empowerment and 
intermediation” through awareness generation trainings.  Drawing a “fine distinction” 
between income generation through self-employment and economic empowerment, the 
Secretary’s letter argued that awareness generation helps translate the former into the 
latter by enhancing women’s control over income: 
It is not always the fact that a woman’s access to resources that enable her to 
pursue income generation activities and consequently earn lead her to be 
economically empowered.  The empowerment does not happen at all if she does 
not have control over her income.  This could only be ensured when she is aware 
about her rights and entitlements.  Swayamsidha II aims at addressing these 
concerns of awareness generation and capacity building…612 
 
In addition, he wrote, while SGSY targeted below-poverty-line households, 
Swayamsiddha was open to all women who “have remained marginalized and deprived” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 Secretary (MWCD) to Secretary (Planning Commission), “Expenditure Finance Commission (EFC) 
Memorandum for Continuation of the Scheme of ‘Swayamsidha as Swayamsidha Phase-II’ during the 11th 
Plan Period.” 
612 Secretary (MWCD) to Secretary (Planning Commission). 
 
	  
239 
no matter their official poverty status, which was ultimately an artificial designation in 
any case. “It is also important to recognize,” he added, “that SGSY is [a] gender neutral 
scheme which eventually graduated into women oriented program by coincidence or by 
circumstance.”  Unlike SGSY – and its cousin, the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) – Swayamsiddha was a “100% women oriented 
programme by design and therefore its components are more responsive to the needs of 
women.”  In fact, the letter said, a group of gender experts and practitioners from around 
the country that the ministry consulted agreed that economic and financial empowerment 
had to be combined with a “deliberate strategy” for social empowerment for the former 
to be successful.613 
Adopting the Planning Commission’s own strategy, the MWCD too included a 
table in its response.  By pointing out the differing motivations and objectives of SGSY 
and Swayamsiddha, the table, reproduced below verbatim as Table 5.2, served to 
challenge the Planning Commission’s framing of Swayamsiddha as an anti-poverty 
program along the lines of SGSY. 
Table 5.2: Comparison chart used to show differences between the programs614 
 
Particulars SGSY Swayamsidha II 
Ideology Self Employment Self Empowerment 
Vision Poverty Alleviation Holistic Empowerment as 
envisioned in ‘National Policy for 
Empowerment of Women’ and Xth 
five year plan document 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Secretary (MWCD) to Secretary (Planning Commission). 
614 Chart text and layout (including any errors) reproduced exactly as they appear in the internal records of 
the Ministry of Women and Child Development.  Source: Secretary (MWCD) to Secretary (Planning 
Commission).  BPL refers to below poverty line. 
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Objective •   To provide sustainable 
income to rural BPL 
families through 
formation of SHGs for 
creation of income 
generating assets, credit 
linkage with banks and 
back ended subsidy from 
government. 
•   To reduce poverty by 
brining poor families 
above poverty line 
through improved 
livelihoods. 
•   To achieve an all round 
empowerment of women- 
socially, economically, 
politically, legally by 
ensuring their direct access 
to and control over resources 
through a sustained process 
of mobilization 
•   To ensure that gender 
inequality is addressed 
through awareness 
generation and rights based 
perspective with a broader 
aim of challenging 
conventional societal 
structures that inhibits 
women’s abilities and 
prospects of development 
and empowerment 
•   To ensure women’s 
participation in decision 
making and bringing them 
in mainstream 
•   To ensure convergence of 
ongoing sectoral programs 
for long term sustainability 
and viability. 
Major 
Components 
Economic empowerment 
through skill development 
trainings. 
Holistic empowerment inclusive of 
social, political, legal and economic 
through significant capacity 
building, skill development as well as 
awareness generation components. 
Target group Rural BPL families not 
necessarily women.  Although 
SGSY does not aim for 
‘empowerment’ of women per 
se, its guidelines require that 
women should be at least 40% 
of beneficiaries in a year. 
All women 
Implementation 
Strategy 
DRDA, Block level 
functionaries and PRIs.  
Mission mode in proposed 
NRLM (National Rural 
Livelihood Mission) 
•   Separate structure specially 
created for the purposes of 
the project at central, state 
and district level 
•   Implementation of scheme at 
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the grassroots level through 
NGOs. 
 
Although it is likely that the Secretary in his letter exaggerated the differences 
between Swayamsiddha and SGSY – as the earlier part of this chapter showed, the 
aspects of Swayamsiddha that had little to do with microcredit had already been 
deemphasized since the late 1990s – the defense of Swayamsiddha offered by the 
Secretary was not entirely without basis: in his enumeration of all that is unique to 
Swayamsiddha, the Secretary was invoking and resurrecting the original vision on which 
the program was based,615 showing that the vision was alive beneath the tendency to 
prioritize poverty/class over other dimensions of social stratification.  The analytical 
section below discusses this in further detail. 
There is no evidence that the Planning Commission ever responded to the spirited 
defense of Swayamsiddha that the Secretary provided.  The deliberation on 
Swayamsiddha within the MWCD, as records available in the relevant file indicate, 
fizzled out soon after this letter was written in May 2010.  The paper trail in the file, too, 
ended abruptly in 2011, with no indication of whether the Expenditure Finance 
Committee (EFC), the inter-ministerial committee in charge of approving programmatic 
proposals, ever met to evaluate the Swayamsiddha proposal. 
The Planning Commission officer responsible for writing the January 2010 
appraisal of the Swayamsiddha that argued against the extension of the program, 
however, did recall participating in an EFC meeting to discuss the future of the program.  
Committee members agreed with his appraisal, he said.  Convinced that Swayamsiddha 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 See earlier parts of this section 
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added no value over SGSY and SJSRY, they voted not to extend the program.  The 
MWCD tried to defend the program, but, as a smaller ministry with limited political 
clout, it did not succeed in its efforts.616  Even though the ministry, hoping to obtain 
approval for extension, continued to allocate funds to Swayamsiddha every year until 
2012,617 the program lay dead since 2008. 
III. Discussion   
This section serves three functions.  First, it shows why IMY, in its early stages, promised 
to be a strong and rare program for women.   Next, it discusses the ways in which IMY’s 
elaboration and modification after 1995 spelled the end of the program and weighs 
various possible explanations for why policymakers in India view the problems of gender 
through the lens of poverty.  Third, it pokes holes in the arguments offered by the 
Planning Commission to dissolve Swayamsiddha, suggesting that there was sufficient 
rationale to continue and even expand the program.  
A. Setting IMY apart 
Before we discuss the reasons behind the rise and fall of IMY, let us first consider 
what, if anything, was special about IMY.  The foregoing narrative has suggested that 
IMY stood out for its promised size, scope, and funding – that is, its country-wide reach, 
its aim to integrate many services for women under a one-stop shop, and the 
extraordinary amount of funding earmarked for it. 
Yet, beyond these features, what set IMY substantively apart from other women’s 
programs of the GoI was the deeper gender analysis from which it emerged.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616 Former Deputy Advisor, Planning Commission, Interview # 20. 
617 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2011-12.” 
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conceptual framework underpinning the earliest version of IMY, as reflected in the 
blueprint for IPDWC, borrowed from feminist analyses of Marxist thought to identify two 
root causes of women’s troubles.618  “The low status of women in our society is due to 
profound and persisting inequities in the two reproduction systems,” it said.619  The two 
systems at fault were the demographic reproduction system and the material reproduction 
system, and inequities in each were said to reinforce those in the other. The demographic 
reproduction system restricted women’s ability to make free marital, sexual, and 
reproductive choices, and the material reproduction system curtailed their ability to 
participate in the paid economy on an equal footing with men.620 
The proof of injustice against women in these two systems lay in various 
indicators: women’s low status in the demographic reproduction system was reflected in 
high maternal morbidity and mortality, high infant mortality, women’s low age of 
marriage, and a poor sex ratio, and women’s disadvantage in the material reproduction 
system was visible in the high female illiteracy, low participation of women in paid work, 
a wage gap unfavorable to women, women’s limited inheritance and property ownership 
rights.621  In other words, India’s poor performance on all frequently cited indicators 
showing women’s low status could be traced to women’s disadvantaged position in these 
two systems of economic and social reproduction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 See Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive 
Union” for an effort to foster a “healthier marriage” between Marxism and feminism. 
619 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Integrated Programme of 
Development for Women and Children (IPDWC),” 13. 
620 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, 13–14. 
621 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, 13–14. 
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The IPDWC document went on to address why women found themselves unable 
to rise above their disadvantage in these two systems.  The reason, it said, was the three 
fears that women experienced: fear of government, fear of society, and fear of (men in 
the) family.  The only solution was an intervention that would help women overcome all 
these fears.  It is worth quoting the intended strategy of the program at length: 
The holistic women development programme must aim at fighting the fear in all 
its three aspects.  It must enhance the self-esteem through heightening the 
awareness and building the self-confidence.  It must restore the equal status of the 
woman in the demographic reproduction system.  This would mean, first and 
foremost, creation of a sense of awareness in women (and also men) that such an 
equal status is the natural order of things and the present state of affairs is a 
distortion created through social customs, sanctified by religion and reinforced by 
the inequities in the material reproduction system.  It must make women the 
masters and not the means of reproduction.  It must equip them with relevant 
information, knowledge, skills and techniques.  Simultaneously, the programme 
should aim at redressing inequities in the material reproduction system…The 
programme must provide them with the opportunities for economic betterment in 
situ.  The new programme should integrate all these three elements.  It would not 
be complete, nor effective, if it leaves out any one of them for one reason or the 
other (emphasis in original).622 
 
Smaller-scale programs from across the country provided inspiration for the social 
betterment goals outlined in the above paragraph.  Among these were two of the 
country’s most celebrated interventions for women: Women’s Development Program 
(WDP) in Rajasthan and Mahila Samakhya (MS) in Gujarat, Karnataka, and Uttar 
Pradesh.623  Although the programs differed in their precise strategies, the one element 
common to them was the formation of women’s groups, not for provision of joint credit (as 
women’s groups have now become associated with) but for collective deliberation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, 15. 
623 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, 26; Former Secretary, 
Department of Women and Child Development, Interview # 29. 
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action.  For instance, the purpose of WDP, a pilot program launched by Rajasthan 
government in 1984, was: 
to form groups which will consolidate themselves for their own development.  It is 
implicit that these groups, once formed, will initiate the action which they need 
and decide upon…Almost all government programs in women’s development 
have stressed the need to build awareness and confidence among women, but 
before WDP there had never been a program that saw this as a paramount pre-
requisite for integrating women into the development process.624 
 
This was a departure from the original goals of WDP.  The original plan was to 
build women’s groups to facilitate women’s access to credit for income generation.  Early 
experiences with the program, however, “brought about a fundamental change in the 
WDP approach.”625  The transformative potential of bringing rural women and local 
female facilitators or front-line workers, called saathins (helpers), together in small groups 
to discuss “individual issues as they affect the lives of particular women”626 and devise 
solutions soon became clear, and the emphasis on credit and technical skills was replaced 
with a focus on mobilizing women through group formation.  When the four senior civil 
servants convened to formulate IPDWC visited some of the resulting groups as part of 
their research, they were impressed.  One of them remembered the experience in this 
way: 
…an individual doesn’t have that strength or courage [but] in a group that 
courage comes in.  And we could see that that when they held this jajam as they 
call – jajam is the weekly meeting or the daily meeting – they get together, sit 
together, and then they become bold.  Suddenly there is a change….They will talk 
about the husbands’ habits of drinking, they’ll talk about the beating, they’ll talk 
about the saas [mother-in-law], they will talk about the need to know the writing 
on the bus, because [they will say] ‘I want to go to such and such a place, but I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 Das, “The Women’s Development Program in Rajasthan: A Case Study in Group Formation for 
Women’s Development,” 13–14. 
625 Das, 62. 
626 Das, 39. 
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don’t know where it [the bus] is going [because of inability to read].  I once sat in 
it, and went to some other place.  Now, I know where to and how to go.’  And 
[that brings] a great sense of, you know, pride.627 
 
Women’s groups also bring gender consciousness – a sense of identification as women.  
The same former civil servant recalled: 
Even Marx talks of new class emerging, you know, that history of British working 
class…They saw their birth, they were witness to their birth, because they were 
getting on the shop floor, they were having the same problems, they exchanged, 
then a new sense of consciousness arose ki [that] we belong, we belong to a group 
or a class, where our problems are there and we find a solution.  Now the class is 
born, they are witness to their birth.  Similarly, the jajam is a witness to the 
birth…So it’s a very elemental thing…then you get over the fear.  Get over the 
fear, even talking to the police inspector…[The idea is] I can do it better when 
I’m in a group.628 
 
The focus, then, was not on achieving tangible benefits – such as increased 
earnings – but on building an intangible sense of solidarity, awareness, and efficacy 
among women.  In accordance with this vision, WDP lacked quantitative targets.  
Instead, WDP workers focused their attention on the process of group formation and left 
agenda-setting largely to saathins and women attendees of group meetings: a rare bottom-
up approach.629 
Mahila Samakhya (Women’s Confederation), another program for women, used 
WDP’s group-formation strategy to promote women’s non-formal education.630  
Launched in 1988, the program defined education as acquisition not only of academic 
knowledge but of any knowledge deemed to be relevant to women’s lives and needs – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Former Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development, Interview # 29. 
628 Former Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development. 
629 Das, “The Women’s Development Program in Rajasthan: A Case Study in Group Formation for 
Women’s Development,” 13. 
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such as literacy and numeracy, knowledge of laws regarding child marriage and domestic 
violence, how to determine which bus to take to reach the desired destination, or how to 
exert collective pressure on village councils for decisions more favorable to women, 
among others.  In the words of one of the guiding principles of the program: 
The ‘banking’ approach to education – where we merely ‘deposit’ various sets of 
information and skills in people, so that at the end of a given period their 
‘accounts’ are supposedly full – must be broken.  History shows that this approach 
does not necessarily equip people to think, analyse, apply, or innovate.  Instead, 
education must be understood as a process which enables us to question, 
conceptualise, find answers, act and reflect on our actions, and raise new 
questions.631 
 
Research on the impact of MS is full of stories of group members working together to 
move local authorities to exact justice for survivors of rape, exert social pressure to keep 
abusive husbands at bay, prevent girls in their communities from being initiated as devdasis 
(customary sex slaves), dissuade members’ families from forcing members to marry 
against their wishes or while under age of consent, and others.632  Like WDP, MS too 
refused quantitative targets and top-down agenda setting, leaving groups to set their own 
agendas.633  As a recent review suggests, the key achievements of MS have less to do with 
poverty reduction and more with empowering women to claim “both physical and 
abstract space.”634  And while some groups eventually choose to participate in 
microfinance, “no one joins Mahila Samakhya for access to credit.”635 
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IPDWC was a direct descendant of and an effort to scale up these types of 
initiatives for women – ones that saw women’s “empowerment” not as a simple process of 
ensuring lines of credit to women but instead as a deeply political process requiring 
women to mobilize around their gender identity, understand the structural nature of their 
inferior social positions, and imagine and work toward the possibility of alternative 
arrangements.  It is this more radical vision of systemic change for gender justice that 
IPDWC sought to implement on a country-wide scale and that its successors, IMY and 
Swayamsiddha, moved away from before long. 
This is not to say that Swayamsiddha’s narrower focus on credit was without 
merit: for women seeking to build livelihoods in places where jobs are few, credit-enabled 
self-employment may be the only viable means to an independent income.  The point is 
therefore not that Swayamsiddha’s attempt to channel credit to women was misplaced; it 
is that in going from broad-based IPDWC to narrower Swayamsiddha and further from 
women-specific Swayamsiddha to sex-unspecific SGSY/SJSRY, IMY lost something 
uniquely helpful to women: a program, designed only for women, that took gender 
seriously as a distinct dimension of social disadvantage not collapsible into poverty status. 
B. Explaining IMY’s trajectory 
1. The rise 
Why and how did IMY come about in the first place?  Studies of women’s status 
in the 1980s continued to portray a dire picture of the condition of Indian women.636  
The need for the state to do more, then, was obvious.637  But not every existing obvious 
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need is able to conjure up efforts to meet it.  What happened in the late 1980s to put 
women and women’s social policy on the political agenda? 
Three developments heightened the political salience of women and women’s 
policy issues in the late 1980s.  First, the quota proposal of the 64th and 65th Constitution 
Amendment bills raised the prospect of millions of women holding elected office in local 
governments across the country, which in turn triggered concerns about the availability of 
a sufficiently large pool of poor rural women able to assume the roles of public 
representatives in a society that still believed that women’s place was not only in the home 
but behind the purdah (screen or veil used to seclude women).  As the foregoing historical 
narrative shows, realizing that the passage of the 64th and 65th amendments would require 
an army of women able to undertake the responsibility of elected representatives, political 
actors felt the need to raise the level of women’s social development.  IPDWC was an 
effort to accomplish this task. 
Second, 1989 was a difficult election year for the Congress party: regional parties 
were challenging the Congress across the country, the opposing Hindu Right was 
growing stronger, and a major corruption scandal had tarnished Gandhi’s “Mr. Clean” 
image, jeopardizing his chances in the upcoming election.638  The party had also lost 
several regional elections in the preceding years.639  Judging by the vigorous effort Gandhi 
put into the campaign and by some of his policy actions and reversals in advance of the 
election season, it was clear that he was aware of the electoral difficulties that lay ahead.640  
To make matters worse, the Gandhi-led Congress party had won the 1984 election not 
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on the basis of his appeal but in the aftermath of his mother’s, the then-prime minister’s, 
assassination.  The election in 1989 was then the first that Gandhi would fight on the 
strength of his own record.  The political stakes were high, which served to set the stage 
for women’s votes to matter significantly. 
Third, in 1986, a mere three years before the election, Rajiv Gandhi had made 
what quickly came to be considered one of the biggest blunders of his administration: he 
had botched his response to the famous Shah Bano case.  Shah Bano was an Indian 
Muslim woman who had moved the courts to procure adequate maintenance from her 
estranged husband.  In an effort to appear sensitive to minority rights and curry favor 
with conservative Muslim communities, Gandhi led the passage of a law that, overturning 
a Supreme Court judgement favoring Shah Bano, diluted divorced Muslim women’s 
right to maintenance from former spouses.  According to the autobiography of Margaret 
Alva, then minister of women and child development in Gandhi’s administration, Alva 
personally urged Gandhi not to pilot the bill, citing the example of former prime minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi’s grandfather, who had refused to yield to conservative Hindu 
groups’ demands for special treatment during his own time in office.  Gandhi dismissed 
Alva’s request: “’Yes, my grandfather was a Hindu dealing with Hindu law,’” she recalls 
him saying, “’Here I am a Hindu dealing with Muslim law.  Do you see the 
difference?’”641 
Yet, Gandhi proceeded with the bill, alienating women’s organizations and 
secularist groups all over the country and attracting some of the sharpest censure his 
administration had seen.  Alva reports she understood then that the “slide [of the 
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Congress party] will begin.”642 Arif Mohammed Khan, a minister in Gandhi’s own 
administration sympathetic to the cause of divorced women’s rights, resigned in protest 
against the law.643  Progressive Muslims banded together to form the Committee for the 
Protection of Rights of Muslim Women (CPRMW), which sent a signed memorandum to 
the prime minister urging him to support the rights of Muslim women.644  The All-India 
Democratic Women’s Association, the women’s wing of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), organized demonstrations.645  Women’s groups blocked traffic outside the 
parliament building in an act of civil disobedience that spread across the country.646  
Women’s vote at this time was considered “concentrated” and their allegiance known to 
waver – women were said to have hurt the Congress party in 1977 and helped it come 
into power in 1980 and 1984.647  In 1989, then, women represented a crucial swing vote.  
Gandhi’s handling of the Shah Bano episode had created a need for the Congress to 
regain women’s confidence. 
The combination of the three factors described above – the possibility of women’s 
quotas in local governments, the tough upcoming election, and the need to revive the 
Congress party’s standing with women voters – explains the political logic behind the 
creation of IMY. 
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2. The decline 
The historical narrative suggests three proximal causes of the small size and scope 
as well as the early death of IMY: the “microcreditification” of the program, its emphasis 
on self-sustainability, and GoI’s prioritization of anti-poverty initiatives over gender-
focused ones.  Let us discuss how each wielded causal influence. 
We saw earlier that, starting in 1998, Department of Women and Child 
Development began to present IMY as a microcredit scheme first and foremost.  Other 
government entities soon followed suit, and IMY became framed as an economic 
empowerment program for women, even though its origins lay in an effort to alleviate not 
economic but primarily social challenges faced by women.  This “microcreditification” of 
IMY mattered in later years because it enabled the Planning Commission to argue that 
IMY/Swayamsiddha was no different from SGSY, another microcredit program, in its 
aims. 
Had the other two pillars of Swayamsiddha, namely social mobilization and 
service convergence, been developed and retained as equally important features of the 
program, the commission could not have so easily argued that Swayamsiddha presented 
no added value over SGSY.  Strong social mobilization and service convergence efforts 
would have also enabled the MWCD to illustrate the program’s uniqueness and argue 
forcefully for its extension.  Instead, that these elements were weakened under the effort 
to promote private enterprise as a method of poverty reduction meant that by the time 
the Planning Commission objected to the extension of Swayamsiddha in 2010, the 
program had long become associated with microcredit, a linkage that the commission 
then used to justify the termination of the program.  The end of Swayamsiddha, then, 
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was partly an unintended, long-term consequence of a policy change made earlier in its 
life.   
Second, we also see above that, starting in 1995, the Indian state began to stress 
that IMY had to become a non-subsidized, self-sustaining program, a feature not 
mentioned in discussions of IMY before this time.  The effort to make IMY self-
sustaining, too, proved highly consequential for the program.  Because the entire point of 
a self-sustaining program is that it does not require infusions of large amounts of state 
funding, self-sustainability meant that IMY received much less funding than what its early 
architects had envisioned and what the Congress party under Gandhi had pledged.  As 
the historical narrative in the previous section shows, the relative underfunding of the 
program was, in turn, invoked by the Planning Commission to eliminate the program 
altogether.  Since Swayamsiddha was simply a smaller version of SGSY, the commission 
argued, it made sense to terminate Swayamsiddha and continue SGSY. 
Third and perhaps most importantly, the prioritization of anti-poverty and social 
protection initiatives provided the proverbial straws that broke the camel’s back.  As we 
saw in the historical section, the Planning Commission discounted even the theoretical 
importance of an empowerment initiative targeted at women, dismissing Swayamsiddha’s 
unique non-financial interventions with the suggestion that these features were insufficient 
to allow Swayamsiddha to continue and could simply be appended to SGSY in case they 
were deemed necessary.  It is this discounting of non-financial interventions that allowed 
the Planning Commission to build the third and final plank of the argument that 
Swayamsiddha did not merit extension: when anti-poverty initiatives serving both men 
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and women are already in place, what was the need to duplicate their effort through a 
women-specific program, it asked. 
All three factors above reflect an economistic view of the source of women’s 
troubles: the idea that gender-based inequalities can be boiled down to poverty and 
should therefore be addressed using general anti-poverty tools such as microcredit and 
employment programs.  It is only in the context of such an understanding of the roots of 
gender inequalities that the (1) foregrounding of microcredit in Swayamsiddha, (2) the 
emphasis on funding the program through women’s own earnings rather than public 
monies, and the (3) clear prioritization of anti-poverty initiatives over gender-focused ones 
make sense. 
In absence of this poverty-centric view, it would be difficult to frame 
Swayamsiddha as a primarily microcredit program without any internal objection from 
the GoI; argue that the program’s ability to generate enough funds for its beneficiaries to 
make public funding necessary would be paramount; and explicitly prioritize a non-sex-
specific anti-poverty program over a women-specific empowerment measure.  The 
occurrence of all three factors suggests blindness to gender as a system of social 
stratification independent of poverty and class.  If gender is not problematized and the 
particular hardships of women attributed unquestioningly to their poverty, the question of 
continuing to fund a program that sought to address women’s specific and multifaceted 
needs beyond poverty does not arise. 
C. Accounting for the dominance of the poverty frame 
This raises the question: how did poverty come to be the master narrative around 
which social policy – at least women’s social policy – in India is built?  There are four 
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possible reasons for India’s poverty-centrism: (1) rapid economic growth in recent years, 
(2) “feminization of poverty,” (3) neoliberalism, and (4) caste-based mobilization in India.     
First, societal focus on poverty likely results in large part from economic growth.  
In early twentieth-century United States, for instance, rapid economic growth that raised 
the average standard of living threw into sharp relief the lives of those who did not share 
in the prosperity.  The presence of wealth made poverty appear evitable and 
unconscionable.  Observers who recognized that the rising tide had not lifted all boats 
problematized and popularized the condition of those left behind.  Poverty began to be 
understood less as a condition resulting from individual vice and more as a systemic 
problem, less a problem of “dependency” and more one of “insufficiency and 
insecurity.”648  This was the “discovery of poverty” in the United States in the early 
1900s.649 
Although this explanation emerged from an analysis of the recognition of 
widespread poverty in the United States, it applies to the Indian case as well.  The 
problematization of poverty in the global south appears to have followed rapid economic 
growth in other parts of the world – a development that served to make the global south 
poorer by comparison.  And that the rise of a contrasting phenomenon – widespread 
wealth and improved livings standards – in one place would draw attention to its opposite 
in others is not surprising.  Yet, this explanation alone does not suffice because it fails to 
explain why poverty trumps gender as an axis of inequality problematized by society.  If 
the contrast between rich and poor societies leads to the problematization of poverty, why 
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does the contrast between men’s freer lives and women’s restricted ones not lead to equal 
problematization of the latter?  For this reason, while global economic growth partially 
explains the problematization of poverty in non-rich countries, it does not account fully 
for the downplaying of gender in the predominant conception of social disadvantage in 
India. 
A second reason is the emergence in developing thinking of the concept of 
“feminization of poverty,” which refers to the disproportionately high and rising share of 
women among the world’s poor.  The feminization of poverty literature, which became 
popular in the 1990s, pointed to the poverty of female-headed households as key evidence 
of the female face of poverty.650  In recent years, however, research has emerged 
questioning both the equation of female-headed households with poverty and the 
interpretation of “feminization of poverty” in a manner that emphasizes not the gendered 
experience of poverty but the concentration of women among the poor.651  Still, at the 
height of its popularity, the feminization of poverty literature provided strong rationale to 
carve out a greater space for women in development activity.652  Yet, since the rationale 
was rooted in poverty, it would be unsurprising if the interventions for women that 
resulted from it remained rooted in poverty as well.  The IMY of the late 1990s provides 
a fitting example. 
Third, the poverty-centricity of modern social policy can also be attributed to 
neoliberal thought.  There are various manifestations of this argument.  The first suggests 
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that under the pro-market worldview, all social disadvantage is, in the final analysis, 
economic disadvantage.653  Hence, organizations operating with a pro-market stance seek 
to provide economic redress for social inequality.  It is no surprise, then, that such 
organizations – chiefly international financial institutions such as the World Bank – 
attempt also to empower poor women by problematizing poverty more than gender.  As 
one observer reflects on women’s employment-generation programs in India: “For most 
governments, donors and international financial institutions, women’s active participation 
in the market economy is a vital sign of empowerment.”654 
The key recent text in the other version of the argument is Development Beyond 
Neoliberalism?: Governance, poverty reduction and political economy by David Craig and Doug 
Porter (2006).  In it, the authors trace the evolution of development thinking, particularly 
since 1990s, to show the increasing importance of poverty reduction in development 
discourse and policy.  They find this shift to be of such consequence that they write of it in 
paradigmatic terms, calling the intellectual convergence on the centrality of poverty 
reduction the “Poverty Reduction paradigm.”655  But how do they explain the emergence 
of this paradigm in the first place?  The authors attribute the shift to the criticism leveled 
at neoliberalism after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  “Calls for the head of the IMF 
came thick and fast” in the aftermath of the crisis, they argue, “and impelled both IMF 
and World Bank to reposture themselves around Poverty Reduction.”656 
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Other observers claim that the turn to poverty reduction is not only a response to 
external critiques but also a result of innovations in neoclassical economics that have 
allowed the World Bank to incorporate challenges of social inclusion into its domain of 
study and work. 657  Still others offer a similar explanation for the poverty reduction 
paradigm at the country level, arguing, for example, that India’s anti-poverty, 
employment-generation programs were an effort by the state to appear to be working for 
the poor and co-opt potentially restive groups in the wake of economic reforms.658  All 
these arguments, though different in their specifics, imply the same broad point: that the 
rising attention to poverty was in some sense an effort to make market economies more 
palatable in the face of stringent critiques and is therefore intertwined with the spread of 
pro-market changes. 
This explanation makes sense in the Indian context well.  Because economic 
reforms in India and elsewhere were a set of changes to economic policy, the detractors of 
neoliberal thought pointed to its most obvious economic failures: continued poverty and 
rising financial insecurity.  The increased attention to poverty in the aftermath of reforms 
would therefore seem to be the logical response to the poverty-centric critique of a set of 
market-friendly changes to economic policy. 
A final explanation emerges from an analysis of India’s political economy in the 
1980s and 1990s.  During these two decades, the country experienced mass political 
mobilization along the lines of caste.  The rise of explicitly caste-based parties, such as 
Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi Party, created to represent the interests of the Dalit 
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groups and other “backward” castes, has transformed electoral politics in India.  
Mobilization along caste lines and enactment of caste-based reservation policies, which 
mandate quotas in legislative bodies, civil service, and university admissions for various 
caste groups, have strengthened caste identities.659 
As the reservation policies – the most explicit and controversial of caste-based 
interventions of the state – show, however, caste disadvantage in India has been 
interpreted largely as an economic disadvantage.  Reservation is justified on the grounds 
that those belonging to the lower castes or Dalit groups have been denied opportunities, 
such as access to education and jobs, that would enable improvement in their material 
conditions.  Reservation, then, is based on “the assumption that a one-to-one correlation 
exists between the ritual status of a caste and the material condition of its members.”660  
In other words, caste disadvantage manifests as poverty.  As a Supreme Court judge 
ruling on the constitutionality of reservation policies in 1992 argued: 
…in the Indian context, social backwardness leads to educational backwardness 
and both of them together lead to poverty – which in turn breeds and perpetuates 
the social and educational backwardness.  They feed upon each other constituting 
a vicious circle [emphasis added].661 
 
If caste inequality is interpreted as an economic disadvantage leading to poverty, it is 
understandable why caste-based mobilization of the 1980s and 1990s would draw greater 
attention to poverty.  That even parties traditionally opposed to caste-based reservations 
began to voice support for such policies in the 1990s speaks to the salience of caste at this 
time.  In addition, to the extent that caste-based mobilization strengthened caste identities 
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and undercut others, the subordination of gender as dimension of social inequality is no 
surprise.  It is likely, then, that the final reason for the economism or poverty-centricity of 
social policymaking around gender during IMY’s lifespan was the increased political 
salience of class/poverty resulting from caste-based mobilization that served to bring 
economic disadvantage (that is, poverty) to the forefront of the political agenda and 
relegated gender to a less salient position. 
This suggests that the dominance of the poverty frame in India results from a 
combination of (1) rapid economic growth in India in recent years, which drew attention 
to those left behind, (2) the rising popularity of the concept of “feminization of poverty” in 
development thinking, which justified anti-poverty interventions for women, (3) the onset 
of market-friendly economic reforms in the 1990s, the critics of which pointed to 
continued poverty to argue against structural adjustment not only in India but also 
around the world and on the international stage, and (4) caste-based mobilization in India 
in the 1980s and 90s, a development that brought not only greater attention to caste but 
also, because caste disadvantage came to be interpreted as a material disadvantage, to 
poverty.  These simultaneous developments raised the importance of poverty status or 
class as the organizing principle of the Indian social order while doing little to draw 
attention to gender as an equally important, intersecting principle.  The resulting poverty-
centricity of social policy thinking in India shaped women’s social policy by diverting 
resources, as the Planning Commission’s decision to terminate IMY showed, from 
women-specific socioeconomic empowerment programs to antipoverty programs 
designed to assist both men and women.  
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D. Critiquing the critique 
What of the intrinsic merit of the objections of the Planning Commission to the 
IMY, however?  Were SGSY and SJSRY, as the Commission suggested, perfect 
substitutes for Swayamsiddha?  This section argues that there are at least three reasons 
why using SGSY/SJSRY to justify the termination of Swayamsiddha was unwarranted. 
First, Swayamsiddha, as the MWCD insisted, differed from SGSY/SJSRY both in 
its objective and the manner in which it sought to attain this objective.  Let us consider 
the official mandates of the three programs, as described in state publications: 
•   SGSY: In the words of its official website, SGSY, now known as National Rural 
Livelihood Mission, “aimed at providing sustainable income to rural BPL [below-
poverty-line] households through income generating assets/economic activities in 
order to bring them out of poverty.”662  
•   SJSRY: As indicated by the very first paragraph of a government circular 
introducing the program, the official task of SJSRY is to “provide gainful 
employment to the urban unemployed and underemployed poor through 
encouraging the setting up of self employment ventures or provision of wage 
employment.”663 
•   Swayamsiddha: According to the DWCD annual report that introduced 
Swayamsiddha, the program’s objective “is the all-round empowerment of women 
by ensuring their direct access to, and control over, resources through a sustained 
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process of mobilization and convergence of all the on-going sectoral 
programmes.”664 
As these official statements of purpose indicate, SGSY and SJSRY both focused solely on 
poverty reduction.  Both statements use various words relating to poverty: “BPL,” 
“poverty,” “poor,” “income,” and “employment” feature several times in these 
statements.  Swayamsiddha’s mandate, however, stands out for its lack of reference to 
poverty.  Its goal, the statement suggests, was to enhance women’s control over their own 
lives.  Accordingly, the objective statement uses a very different terminology, including 
words such as “empowerment,” “women,” “access,” “control,” and “mobilization,” 
instead of the poverty-related language employed by SGSY/SJSRY.  The statements 
show that along with their goals, the programs’ methods differed as well.  SGSY and 
SJSRY relied heavily on promoting self-employment.  Swayamsiddha, on the other hand, 
sought to attain its goal of empowerment by raising women’s control over resources, 
mobilization of women, and convergence of existing programs for women.  The “fine 
distinction” between income-generation through self-employment and holistic (including 
economic) empowerment that the MWCD drew in its rebuttal of the Planning 
Commission’s appraisal of the program, then, is built into the official language used to 
describe the three programs from the start.  
Second, the programs differed in the manner in which they targeted women.  
Unlike Swayamsiddha, SGSY/SJSRY do not target women as individuals.  In fact, the 
programs do not target individuals at all – what they target are households, with women 
standing in as representatives of the families whose poverty the programs are designed to 
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alleviate.  To be sure, channeling credit to female members of households likely does 
empower women within the family by raising their control over household resources.  Yet 
the point remains that SGSY/SJSRY, to the extent that they target women, address them 
as members of households rather than as individuals.  Swayamsidha was different on this 
dimension too: it did not target women as representatives of families.  This is another 
reason why using the existence of SGSY/SJSRY to justify the termination of 
Swayamsiddha was unwarranted. 
Third, other arguments that the Planning Commission offered to justify 
termination of Swayamsiddha are better viewed as reasons to strengthen the program.  
For instance, the Commission argued that SGSY is superior to Swayamsiddha because 
SGSY can reach more women across the country.  The Commission presented this as an 
argument against Swayamsiddha, but it could instead be used as a reason to justify 
expansion of the program.  Similarly, in an interview, the author of the Commission’s 
appraisal dismissed the social-empowerment components of Swayamsiddha, implying 
that they were either not in place or ineffective.665  This observation could also be used to 
advocate strengthening those elements rather than ending the program on their basis.  It 
is the unwillingness of the Planning Commission to see even theoretical merit in the social 
interventions that formed the core of the original IMY and existed in reduced form in 
Swayamsiddha that led to the termination of the latter. 
Of course, none of this is to claim that Indira Mahila Yojana was, or any one 
program could ever be, the magic bullet that eliminate gender inequality.  The failures of 
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microcredit-based programs are many and well known.666  The aim here is not to 
romanticize IMY (and later Swayamsiddha), but to see where it added value over existing 
programs.  It differed from SGSY/SJSRY in that it recognized the real economic 
hardships of poor women but did not reduce women’s problems to poverty alone.  It 
acknowledged the need to tie livelihood initiatives to efforts to raise social consciousness, 
build social solidarity, and create an awareness of justiciable rights.  It also sought to 
empower women economically, not because poor women could function as entry points 
into poor households needing state assistance but because it recognized that women 
themselves – as individuals facing multiple barriers at the level of family, community, 
society, and beyond – could benefit from economic and social support.  In other words, 
while both SGSY and IMY made special attempts to target women, it was only the latter 
that was built on a gender analysis of Indian society.  There is little doubt, then, that the 
vision behind early IMY, if not the reality of its implementation, was more transformative 
from a gender perspective than that of SGSY.  Yet, a blindness to gender and the 
preference for narrowly focused anti-poverty programs meant that the IMY was dissolved 
in favor of the latter. 
IV. Alternative explanations 
If not the predominance of the poverty lens, what else could explain the small size and 
scale of IMY?  This section assesses some alternative explanations and shows why they 
are inadequate. 
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One alternative explanation might be that an anemic IMY can be attributed not 
to the under-appreciation of gender as a dimension of social stratification but to the 
inability of the Indian economy to accommodate additional labor.  In other words, if 
programs of women’s socioeconomic betterment succeed in their objectives, it is possible 
that women, now freer, would begin seeking employment, flooding labor markets and 
exacerbating unemployment, which stood at 2 to 4 percent (depending on urban or rural 
area, and on manner of calculation) in 2008, the year Swayamsiddha was terminated.667  
Under-employment at the same time ranged from 2 to 19 percent (based on 
demographics, area, and manner of calculation).668  On the surface, then, worries about 
fomenting an unemployment crisis would seem to be a likely reason for the weakness of 
socioeconomic empowerment measures such as IMY in women’s social policy. 
Yet, the explanation does not hold up to scrutiny.  The most important reason is 
that the history of IMY as we saw above contradicts this explanation.  It shows that, in 
the first half of the program’s life, policymakers turned IMY from a social empowerment 
program (as it was under IPDWC) to a livelihoods initiative.  If increased participation of 
women in the paid economy was a key worry of the state, a policy change designed to 
bring more women into the labor market would make little sense.  A second reason is 
that, far from being worried about too many women in the labor force, national and 
international policy officials have expressed serious concerns about the opposite problem: 
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too few, and declining numbers of, women in the workforce in India.669  And finally, the 
unemployment figures in the paragraph above mask two features of rural labor markets: 
(1) that male rates of unemployment and underemployment in 2008 were low (2 to 5%) in 
absolute terms and either very close to or lower than female rates, and (2) that most 
employment in India at this time was self-employment.670  The first of these factors means 
that some increase in the female labor force – which would not occur overnight in any 
case – was unlikely to threaten male employment seriously or overwhelm the labor 
market in general.  The preponderance of self-employment in all employment suggests 
that it is unlikely that widespread fears of a limited number of jobs being taken away from 
men drove India’s lack of investment in women’s socioeconomic programs: where self-
employment is the norm and paid work not the primary source of livelihood, any fears 
about women displacing men in employment are likely to be less intense.  For these 
reasons, the labor market explanation cannot explain IMY’s failure to take off. 
A second alternative explanation might blame the Indian population’s generally 
conservative attitudes on gender for IMY’s trajectory.  Because of conservative social 
attitudes, the argument would proceed, there was little support among the population for 
programs for women’s socioeconomic betterment.  Sensing this, neither political leaders 
nor policymakers saw reason to take interest in the program, allowing it to operate in 
neglect for many years before deciding to end it altogether.  While, on the surface, this 
explanation too would seem to ring true, it is complicated by the observation (made also 
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in previous chapters) that the share of funding available to socioeconomic programs has 
declined over the same period that social attitudes on gender have liberalized.  This 
suggests there is no direct relationship between social attitudes on gender and trajectories 
of women’s programs such as IMY. 
This above explanation does, however, raise another possibility: could it be that 
the reason IMY remained insignificant and died an early death was that there was no 
clear constituency vocally supporting the program?  While it is true that there was no 
large-scale mobilization of women in support of IMY, it would be inaccurate to argue 
that no one attempted to save it.  Within the government, as we saw in the historical 
narrative, the Ministry of Women and Child Development itself spoke strongly in favor of 
the program, giving the Planning Commission many reasons why it should be continued.  
Externally, UN Women and various other NGO representatives and researchers called 
on GoI to retain the program.  To be sure, these organizations and researchers do not 
form a “constituency” in the same way that a sizeable block of voters would.  Yet, NGOs 
working with rural women and recognized academics are the de facto spokespeople for 
the demographic of poor women that IMY targeted.  That the Planning Commission 
paid little heed to their objections suggests that absence of vocal support for IMY was not 
the reason for its demise – support for the program very much existed and was voiced. 
A final alternative explanation would invoke the international effort to 
“mainstream gender” in all policy work.  Gender mainstreaming is defined as a strategy 
that involves “integration of a gender perspective into the preparation, design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures and spending 
programmes, with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and 
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combating discrimination.”671  The idea is to make all policymaking more responsive to 
women and open to participation by women rather than isolate women in institutional 
silos and policy initiatives focused on women alone.  Gender, in other words, should be a 
mainstream concern rather than a marginal one.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
gender mainstreaming became especially popular among international organizations such 
as the UN, which have drafted nearly 100 official policy documents on gender 
mainstreaming since 2000, detailing the strategy and encouraging countries to adopt it 
domestically.672  On the surface, then, the termination of women-specific Swayamsiddha 
in favor of women-friendly (but not women-specific) SGSY and SJSRY would seem to be 
an instance of gender mainstreaming, raising the possibility that the that the popularity of 
gender mainstreaming fomented the end of Swayamsiddha.  Yet, this explanation, too, 
cannot withstand scrutiny.  The key observable implication of the causal effect of gender 
mainstreaming would be reference to ideas of gender mainstreaming in policy 
conversations regarding the future of Swayamsiddha in the mid-2000s. Yet, the original 
policy documents studied to understand the reasons behind termination of 
Swayamsiddha do not make any direct or indirect reference to the ideas that underpin 
gender mainstreaming: the Planning Commission did not argue that Swayamsiddha 
should be terminated because it relegated women to the margins of social policy instead 
of mainstreaming them.  In fact, its rationale for ending Swayamsiddha did not invoke 
mainstreaming at all: it argued simply that Swayamsiddha failed to add value over 
existing programs. 
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That none of the alternative explanations explain IMY’s trajectory suggests that 
the argument proposed by this chapter – that an anemic IMY resulted from the belief 
that such women-specific socioeconomic empowerment programs are unnecessary when 
there are other non-sex-specific poverty alleviation programs, because the root of poor 
women’s troubles is poverty, not gender – is the most tenable explanation for the 
program’s limited growth and early death. 
V. General implications 
What does IMY’s story tell us about women’s social policy in India?  One lesson we can 
derive from the experience of IMY is that, at least in the context of social policy 
formulation in India, gender inequality is not only taken less seriously than poverty but is 
also folded into the latter.  Gender matters only insofar as it feminizes poverty.  Other 
large and small manifestations of gender-based injustice – such as severe restrictions on 
women’s physical mobility and limited access to public space; women’s limited access to 
education, labor markets, and healthcare; women’s limited control over their own 
marital, sexual, and reproductive decisions; women’s limited control over household 
decisions; women’s care burden and time-poverty; women’s lower access to education 
beyond the primary level; violence against women; married women’s limited control over 
the extent to which they can stay in contact with their natal families; the daily 
humiliations women experience of being told how to dress, talk, walk, and laugh; social 
norms that place adult women at or near the bottom of the hierarchy of the extended 
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marital household; continued dowry-related harassment of women; and countless more – 
receive little, if any, attention.673 
Second, an excessive focus on poverty paradoxically undercuts women-specific 
socioeconomic empowerment programs.  The reason is that a focus on poverty 
unaccompanied by an understanding of the intersectionality of poverty and gender leads 
to inadequate appreciation of gender as an equally significant dimension of social 
stratification.  Once gender is thus downplayed or collapsed into class/poverty, little 
rationale remains for socioeconomic programs that serve women alone, especially where 
non-sex-specific anti-poverty interventions already exist.  In other words, because poverty 
is considered the main source of the hardships of both men and women, and existing anti-
poverty programs target both men and women, the need for women-specific 
socioeconomic empowerment programs is rarely recognized. 
Warnings that development thinking had begun to blur the distinction between 
gender and poverty were first shared in the 1990s.  One author, for instance, argued that: 
…the concept of poverty cannot serve as a proxy for the sub-ordination of 
women, that antipoverty policies cannot be expected to improve necessarily the 
position of women and that there is no substitute for a gender analysis, which 
transcends class divisions and material definitions of deprivation.674 
 
Yet, more than two decades later, that anti-poverty programs may alleviate women’s 
poverty but do not address the social manifestations of gender inequality remains 
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unrecognized.  Women’s social policy focused on alleviating women’s poverty therefore 
fails to acknowledge, let alone attempt to make less adverse, the true source of women’s 
tribulations: their gender.    
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified some key reasons why Indira Mahila Yojana, once a highly 
ambitious individualist program for women that was announced with much enthusiasm, 
ended in obscurity.  This chapter introduced traced the history of IMY, including efforts 
to revive the program after its death in 2008.  Using newly accessed policy documents 
and interviews with politicians, policy officials, and experts, it identified three proximate 
causes of the demise of IMY’s successor program, called Swayamsiddha.  These are: (1) 
the modification of the program in the late 1990s, designed to render microcredit the 
central pillar of the program at the expense of its other unique elements; (2) the sudden 
emphasis laid on ensuring that the program was not dependent on state subsidies for its 
operations; and (3) the privileging of non-sex-specific anti-poverty programs over women-
specific socioeconomic empowerment initiatives.  
It is worth taking a moment now to clarify why the combination points 1 and 3 
above led not to the perpetuation of IMY (as one might logically expect) but to its 
termination.  While the prioritization of anti-poverty measures mentioned in point 3 
would suggest that the feature identified in point 1 – the increasing likeness of IMY to 
anti-poverty programs – would work in favor of IMY, it instead had the effect of hurting 
the program by making it appear to be a weaker version of existing anti-poverty initiatives 
and therefore not worth continuing.  This was because of point 2, the need to keep IMY 
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free of state subsidies, which rendered the IMY a small scheme operating on a small 
budget.  Point 2 therefore solves the paradox of a program being terminated after being 
framed as an anti-poverty program at a time when poverty was being presented as the 
single most pressing problem deserving state attention and resources: because of point 2, 
IMY paled in comparison to larger anti-poverty programs, a fact that provided rationale 
for IMY’s termination.  In addition, the Planning Commission argued that if there are 
elements unique to IMY, such as its non-poverty-related features designed to empower 
women socially, they are not crucial enough to justify IMY’s continuation.  The 
combination of these three factors thus spelled the end of IMY/Swayamsiddha. 
The chapter traced the three proximal causes of IMY’s decline to the distal cause 
of the dominance of the poverty frame in social policy-related thinking in India.  The 
poverty frame collapsed gender and poverty, pushing gender to the margins: poor women 
were to be targeted as poor first and as women later, if at all.  Development, the message 
was, need concern itself with the poverty of women, not with women’s gendered existence 
beyond poverty.  Even within efforts to address poverty, the aim was not to address the 
real reason behind women’s differential experience of poverty (their gender) but to 
provide a quick fix that could alleviate the worst symptoms of poverty in general. 
After all, the thinking went, programs that help all poor households would 
naturally help poor women too.  If women’s poverty was indeed deeper than or different 
from that of men, or if women were harder to reach through the usual anti-poverty 
programs, earmarking funds for women within existing anti-poverty initiatives would 
surely set matters right: implementers would then be forced to ensure higher-than-default 
participation from women, which would translate into reduction in women’s poverty.  
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Because poor women’s poverty can be alleviated through women’s quotas in otherwise 
non-sex-specific self-employment programs, the narrative implied, there was no need to 
engage with the complicated sociological questions of gender, social norms, and their 
impact on women’s lives. 
In other words, political leaders and policymakers did not feel compelled to put 
IMY back on the track set out for the program in the IPWDC blueprint because, 
inattentive to gender in its social manifestations and focused only on women’s poverty, 
they failed to recognize gender as an independent dimension of social inequality – one 
that intersects with but cannot be reduced to or subsumed within poverty or class. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter begins by probing the extent to which the findings presented thus far travel 
beyond the timeframe and setting of this study.  Section III then briefly considers the 
possible role of the women’s movement in shaping India’s social programming for 
women.  Section IV discusses the implications of growing maternalism for women, 
arguing that India’s heavily maternalist social policy model is neither geared to advancing 
gender equality nor able to attain its key objective of reducing maternal mortality.  
Section V concludes the study. 
II. Do the findings travel? 
The key findings of this study are three-fold.  First, the study argues that women-
specific social programming in India is increasingly maternalist.  Second, it shows that the 
spotlight cast by international development organizations on maternal mortality explains 
expansion of India’s maternalist programming.  Third, it proposes that the conflation of 
gender with other dimensions of social stratification, particularly poverty status, accounts 
for the deficient growth of individualist women-specific programs.  Combined, the second 
and third findings explain the first.  The paragraphs below consider the extent to which 
the three findings are generalizable across time and space. 
A. Women-specific social programming in India since 2014-15 
The analysis presented in previous chapters ends in 2014-15.  Although systematic 
data on women-specific social programs were not collected for this project beyond this 
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time, further developments in India’s maternalist programs have prompted – often, front-
page, above-the-fold – coverage by the press and commentary by experts.675  These 
include: 
•   rapid growth since 2011 of allocation for Janani Shishu Suraksha 
Karyakram (JSSK),676 a program that entitles pregnant women and sick 
newborns to free delivery and related services (tests, treatment, 
medication, hospital stay, transport to and from medical facility, blood 
transfusions, meals, and others) in public institutions for several days after 
childbirth677; 
•   launch in 2016 of another program, called Pradhan Mantri Surakshit 
Matritva Abhiyan (PMSMA),678 to provide free antenatal care to pregnant 
women679; and 
•   dramatic expansion in outlay of a new conditional cash transfer program 
for pregnant women, called Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana 
(PMMVY). 
Of the above, the expansion of PMMVY is perhaps the most significant.  
Formerly called the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY),680 this program 
was launched by the Ministry of Women and Child Development in 2010 as a pilot 
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program covering part of the country.681  The purpose was to provide 4000 rupees (in 
addition to the Rs. 700-1400 available under Janani Suraksha Yojana) in conditional 
income support to pregnant women.682  The conditions included timely registration of 
pregnancy, antenatal checkups, registration of the child’s birth, immunization of the 
newborn, attendance at growth monitoring and counseling sessions, and exclusive 
breastfeeding.683  Although the purpose was to provide income support, the program was 
not linked to women’s employment status and pre-pregnancy wage rates.  Institutional 
delivery, already a condition under Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), was excluded from the 
list of conditions under IGMSY.  The paragraphs below briefly recount the story behind 
the recent growth of this program. 
 In 2013, after years of advocacy by the Right to Food campaign, the Indian 
Parliament signed into law the National Food Security Act (NFSA), which directed the 
the government, among other things, to provide “maternity benefit of not less than rupees 
six thousand” to pregnant women, excluding women already covered through benefits 
available to government employees or in the private sector.684  In 2014, Government of 
India (GoI) announced that it would expand IGMSY to meet its obligations under 
NFSA.685  In 2016, IGMSY was officially extended from a few pilot blocks to across the 
country, but in absence of a proportional increase in funding, the extension did not take 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 Government of India, NITI Aayog, “Quick Evaluation Study on Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog 
Yojana (IGMSY),” 1; Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 
2010-11,” 9. 
682 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2010-11,” 9.  In 
2010, 4000 INR = USD 54.55. 
683 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, 24. 
684 Government of India, “The National Food Security Act, 2013.” 
685 “Rejoinder Affidavit on Behalf of the Petitioner.” 
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effect immediately.686  By one estimate, the amount of funding required to expand 
coverage and enhance benefits as per NFSA requirements would require 40 times as 
much funding as was allocated to IGMSY in 2016-17.687 
 Finally, in late 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced plans to launch a 
program for cash benefits to women.  Although presented as a new program, Pradhan 
Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana was rather “old wine in a new bottle”: it merely extended 
IGMSY to all blocks of the country.688  PMMVY has begun to be implemented, and its 
funding has grown by a factor of close to 6 since 2016-17, adding another Rs. 24 to 27 
billion a year – more than the yearly expenditure on JSY – to maternalist spending.689  
Given continued pressure from food security activists, there is some chance that allocation 
to PMMVY would increase further, perhaps another 7-fold, to bring it in line with the 
demands of the NFSA in the coming years.690 
The expansion of IGMSY/PMMVY suggests that India’s maternalist spending 
has continued to expand in the years since the mid-2010s.  Anecdotally, at least, there is 
no indication of a similar increase in women’s individualist spending.  It is likely, then, 
that the divergence in spending on maternalist and individualist social programming for 
women that this project finds between 1989 and 2014 has continued to grow in the years 
since.  In addition, the role of food security activists in bringing about the passage of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686 “Maternity Entitlements: Recap,” 1. 
687 Right to Food Campaign (Secretariat), “Maternity Entitlements Were Legal Rights 3 Years Ago, Not a 
New Year Gift: Statement of the Right to Food Campaign.” 
688 Right to Food Campaign (Secretariat). 
689 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2017-
2018”; Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 
2018-2019”; Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Pradhan Mantri Matru 
Vandana Yojana.” 
690 “Maternity Entitlements: Recap.” 
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National Food Security Act and, relatedly, the expansion of IGMSY/PMMVY suggests 
that at least some of the determinants of maternalism discovered through the study of the 
evolution of JSY in Chapter 4 explain expansion of maternalist programs other than JSY 
as well.  
B. The global development agenda: impact on other programs in India and 
beyond 
This brings us to the generalizability of not only the findings of the descriptive 
analysis of Chapter 3 but of the causal explanations proposed by Chapters 4 and 5.  To 
what extent are they applicable to other women-specific social programs in India?  And to 
what extent do they explain developments in other parts of the global south?  Let us first 
consider if the spotlight cast by the world of international development on maternal 
mortality as the key indicator of women’s well-being in the context of development can 
explain the expansion of maternalist programs other than JSY.  The evolution of 
additional programs was not studied systematically for this project, but the language used 
to describe and justify them does provide suggestive support for the thesis that the rising 
importance of maternal mortality as an indicator contributed to the growing outlays of 
these programs. 
For instance, other than JSY and PMMVY (discussed above), one of the largest 
maternalist programs in India is the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS).  
Operational across the country, ICDS provides health and nutritional services to 
pregnant and nursing women and young children as well as non-formal educational 
services to young children.  Between 1988-89 and 2013-14, women-specific spending in 
ICDS grew nearly 18-fold in real terms.  If the emphasis on maternal mortality in the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was an important reason behind this growth, 
we would expect to see a rapid rise in expenditure in the mid-2000s, once the Goals, 
formulated in 2001, had been operationalized via targets and indicators and had been 
incorporated into national policy planning.  And indeed, just like with JSY, the sharpest 
spike in women-specific spending on ICDS occurred between 2003-04 and 2008-09.691  
In official discourse, too, ICDS’s interventions for pregnant women are often tied closely 
to and justified by invoking maternal mortality.692  For example, several of India’s 
progress reports on the MDGs present ICDS as one of India’s key strategies for achieving 
MDG 5 target of reducing the maternal mortality ratio.693  The timing of the rapid rise in 
expenditure on (women’s funding under) ICDS and its discursive link with maternal 
mortality in official rhetoric suggest that the MDG-driven placement of maternal 
mortality on India’s national development agenda was linked to the expansion not only of 
JSY but also of ICDS. 
This brings us, however, to a key difference between JSY and ICDS: while 
mothers are the direct and only beneficiaries of benefits under JSY, ICDS delivers 
assistance both to mothers and to young children.  This fundamental difference in the two 
maternalist programs suggests that there may be factors driving ICDS and other mother-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Because data for this project were collected at five-year intervals, the annual rate increase in ICDS’s 
women-specific spending between 2003-04 and 2008-09 is unknown.   
692 United Nations Children’s Fund, “India - Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)”; 
Government of Tamil Nadu, “Infant Mortality Rate - Tamil Nadu (as per Sample Registration System 
Results)”; Gragnolati et al., “India’s Undernourished Children: A Call for Reform and Action,” 4. 
693 Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium 
Development Goals India Country Report 2011,” 71; Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, “Millennium Development Goals India Country Report 2014,” 174; 
Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Millennium Development 
Goals India Country Report 2015,” 94; Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, “Millennium Development Goals: Final Country Report of India,” 98. 
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and-child programs that did not emerge as important themes in our study of JSY due to 
its predominant focus on mothers, not children.  Indeed, official descriptions of ICDS 
reveal one such factor: the pervasiveness in ICDS policy discourse of a set of ideas that 
the literature has called the “social investment perspective.”694  This perspective, which is 
said to have gained popularity among international policy communities (linked in 
particular to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the 
European Union) in the mid-1990s, emphasizes human capital spending for poverty 
reduction, social mobility, and improved life chances.  One of its components, early 
childhood education and care (ECEC), calls for investment in the early years of the life of 
a child on the grounds that interventions in early childhood cast a long shadow on a 
child’s life.  Echoing the ideas of the social investment perspective, the official description 
of ICDS on the “About ICDS” page of the government website for this program states, 
for instance, that ICDS is “one of the world’s largest and unique programmes for early 
childhood care and development.  It is…a response to the challenge of…breaking the 
vicious cycle of malnutrition, morbidity, reduced learning capacity and mortality.”695 
The same framing is presented also in a chapter in a recent Economic Survey – a 
high-profile annual publication reviewing the state of the Indian economy – produced by 
the Indian government.  The chapter, titled “Mother and Child,” begins with the 
following abstract: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694 Jenson, “The Fading Goal of Gender Equality: Three Policy Directions That Underpin the Resilience 
of Gendered Socio-Economic Inequalities,” 547–548. 
695 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) Scheme”; Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
“Millennium Development Goals India Country Report 2015,” 30. 
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Imagine the government were an investor trying to maximise India's long-run 
economic growth. Given fiscal and capacity constraints, where would it invest? 
This chapter shows that relatively low-cost maternal and early-life health and 
nutrition programs offer very high returns on investment because: (i) the most 
rapid period of physical and cognitive development occurs in the womb, so in 
utero and early-life health conditions significantly affect outcomes in adulthood; 
and (ii) the success of subsequent interventions—schooling and training—are 
influenced by early-life development. Despite recent progress, India generally 
under-performs on maternal and child health indicators: pre-pregnancy weights 
and weight-gain during pregnancy are both low. India is already halfway through 
its demographic dividend, and taking full advantage requires a healthy and 
educated population.696 
 
Although there are overlaps, it should be noted that the social investment perspective 
presented in the quote above differs from the maternal mortality focus of MDG 5 and 
JSY.  While both are concerned with pregnancy, the former presents pregnancy as a 
window of opportunity to boost economic growth by enhancing the physical and 
cognitive development of children, and the latter considers maternal mortality a 
humanitarian problem, whose reduction would not so much lead to development as 
comprise it.  In other words, the former is child-centric and frames healthier pregnancies 
as a means to development, while the latter is more woman-centric and considers healthier 
pregnancies as constitutive of development.  Although our study of JSY did not bring the 
former to the forefront to the same extent as the latter, it is likely that both sets of ideas 
have contributed to growth in India’s maternalism.  And, due to their attention to 
women, both are – to borrow words used elsewhere to describe the social investment 
perspective – “profoundly gender-aware without being egalitarian.”697 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, “Mother and Child,” 82. 
697 Jenson, “The Fading Goal of Gender Equality: Three Policy Directions That Underpin the Resilience 
of Gendered Socio-Economic Inequalities,” 547. 
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Thus, while the explanation relating to the MDGs’ focus on maternal mortality 
does appear to be a key reason behind the growth of other maternalist programs such as 
ICDS in recent years, the growing popularity of ECEC interventions for human capital 
accumulation has a role to play as well.  And, since both developments are international 
in scope, it stands to reason that, if they have succeeded in “maternalizing” social 
programming for women in India to a large extent, they have likely shaped women’s 
social programming in other parts of the developing world as well.  Hence, the first part 
of our causal explanation – that is, the causal thesis dealing with agenda-setting by MDGs 
and other such international developments – “travels” to programs other than JSY in, 
and likely beyond, India. 
C. Folding gender into poverty: impact on other programs in India 
The second cause identified in this project – the conflation of gender and other 
dimensions of social stratification – is generalizable beyond Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY) 
as well.  Again, although the history of no other individualist program was studied 
systematically for this project, the research yielded preliminary indications that the 
termination of IMY on charges of duplication of existing sex-unspecific program was not 
a unique occurrence: both Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas 
(DWCRA) and the National Programme for Women in Secondary and Higher 
Education, two large individualist programs promoting women’s independent livelihoods 
and participation in higher education, respectively, were terminated on the grounds that 
they provided no special benefit that existing sex-unspecific programs did not already 
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provide.698  This suggests that our second causal thesis travels beyond the case (IMY) that 
was used to generate the explanation.  However, although the explanation appears to 
apply to other individualist social programs in India, the extent to which it can be 
generalized beyond India is unclear.  No evidence supporting or contradicting this 
explanation in other countries of the global south was sought or serendipitously found 
during this research.  To the extent that the origins of the predominance of the poverty 
frame are to be found in developments occurring at the international level – the 
feminization of poverty narrative, for instance, as discussed in Chapter 5 – the possibility 
exists that this explanation, too, travels beyond India.  However, the dearth of research 
on individualist women-specific programming in the global south would make this a 
difficult proposition to test via secondary literature alone.  An assessment of the presence, 
degree, and sources of individualist social programming for women in other countries of 
the global south thus presents a promising direction for future research. 
III. The role of the women’s movement 
Before proceeding to assess the impact of maternalist social policy on women, it is worth 
taking a moment to consider the role of India’s women’s movement in shaping the 
character of social programming for women.  There are two reasons why this project has 
discussed this role only marginally thus far.  First, the methodology adopted by this study 
– inductive discovery of causal factors through examination of official policy documents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Mathura Krishna Foundation for Economic and Social Opportunity and Human Resource 
Management, “An Empirical Study of Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Bihar,” 71; Government of 
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Government on the Recommendations/Observations Contained in the Hundred Fifty Ninth Report on 
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and interviews with current and former civil servants – did not lend itself to thorough 
analysis of the women’s movement.  The official sources from which most information for 
this study was drawn gave no indication that the women’s movement had a direct impact 
on women’s social programming and thus did not lead me in the direction that would 
yield a deeper examination of it. 
Second, since the 1980s, the women’s movement has made three strategic choices 
that have limited its influence on social programming: it focused on legal reform rather 
than social policy; distanced itself from party politics, “taking a much more 
confrontational and oppositional approach to the state”699; and strengthened its linkages 
with international donors, who emphasized issues of sexual violence.  These three factors 
pushed the women’s movement away from the policy areas studied as part of this project 
– government programming for maternal health and socioeconomic advancement – and 
into the world of legal strategies to ban dowry, challenge the application in civil courts of 
religious family law unfavorable to women, forbid sati (the practice of widow self-
immolation) and outlaw (sexual) violence against women.700  In other words, the attention 
of the women’s movement has in large part been directed away from the social 
programming studied here.  Hence, at least as per the dominant historiography of the 
women’s movement, women’s activists since the 1980s have focused on areas other than 
those of direct concern to us here.  Accordingly, references to them have emerged only 
sporadically in this project.   
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700 See Deo, 108–130; Kumar, The History of Doing, 115–181. 
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IV. Assessing the impact of maternalism 
What are the implications of growing maternalism for women?  In the paragraphs below, 
I consider the impact of India’s women-specific programs on three outcomes relating to 
women: gender equality, maternal mortality, and women’s social citizenship. 
A. Gender equality 
There are two broad possible definitions of gender equality and they invoke the 
familiar equality-difference debate.701  The first defines gender equality as an equality of 
status despite differences in roles.  Under this conception of gender equality, men and 
women can have equal status despite having gender-differentiated roles and 
responsibilities in and outside the home.  Thus, women can be caregivers at home and 
men breadwinners for the family, but without accompanying differences in status.  The 
first wave of feminism advanced this notion of gender equality.702  The second model of 
gender equality conceptualizes equality as parity between men and women in 
traditionally masculine (and, to some extent, traditionally feminine) roles.  This view of 
equality is premised on the assumption that genuine equality cannot be built on 
difference: if the social roles of men and women are sharply differentiated, their statuses 
cannot be made equal.  This gendered version of “separate but equal is inherently 
unequal” perspective underpins calls for greater participation of women in traditionally 
masculine roles of higher education, paid work, and public affairs.  The parity model of 
gender equality is today the predominant model at the discursive level: gender equality 
discourse around the world, and especially in works of international organizations like the 
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Comparative Historical Approach”). 
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UN, invokes the parity model.  The UN’s famous “Planet 50-50 by 2030: Step It Up for 
Gender Equality” campaign, which aims to close gender gaps in legal rights, leadership 
positions, access to education and health services, and labor participation, among others, 
gives explicit voice to this model of gender equality.703  Given the popularity of the parity 
model today, here I define gender equality as gender parity in traditionally masculine and 
feminine domains.   
Has India’s universe of women’s social programs succeeding in promoting gender 
parity?  In contrast to the discursive support the idea of gender equality as gender parity 
attracts from a variety of actors around the world, the reality of policy on the ground – as 
shown by analysis of public expenditure trends in India – suggests that very little is being 
done to promote gender parity.  In spending the lion’s share of its women-specific 
resources on women as mothers, India is making limited and only sporadic investment in 
women as individual people.  Thus, even though the Indian government continues to pay 
lofty tributes to the parity agenda,704 the money rarely follows.  This represents a missed 
opportunity for gender equality.  A range of studies in India and elsewhere has shown 
that promoting women’s participation in activities outside the home, particularly in the 
paid workforce (with fair pay), improves women’s autonomy, health, and overall social 
status.705  The exceptionally low rate of women’s workforce participation in India – 
around 27% by recent estimates706 – makes GoI’s limited investment in individualist 
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704 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “National Policy for Women 2016: 
Articulating a Vision for Empowerment of Women (DRAFT).” 
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programs for women even more striking.  This paucity of stronger efforts to promote 
women’s participation in traditionally male roles limits GoI’s ability to help women reach 
parity with men and makes it likely that the gender division of labor will persist and 
gender will continue to be a key dimension of social stratification for the coming decades 
in India. 
B. Maternal mortality 
Yet it might not be fair to assess the performance of maternalist social policy using 
gender equality as a yardstick.  After all, it is not as if maternalist policy is designed to 
boost gender equality in the first place.  Let us therefore consider whether maternalist 
policy meets its own (non-equality) objectives for women?  Unfortunately, the final answer 
there is negative as well.  The record of Janani Suraksha Yojana, our key example of 
maternalist programming, provides evidence.  While India’s maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR) has declined in the years since the introduction of JSY, the pace of reduction is 
no different from the pace before JSY.  This suggests that, contrary to expectation, JSY 
has not accelerated the secular trend of declining MMR (See Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1: Maternal mortality ratio in India, 1990-2015707 
      
Note: The red dotted line represents the introduction of JSY in 2005 
 
More rigorous studies of the impact of JSY have reached the same conclusion.  They find 
that although JSY has succeeded in raising rates of institutional delivery,708 it has not 
brought about a discernible reduction in the maternal mortality ratio.709 
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These estimates are somewhat different from the estimates presented in Chapter 4 because those were 
drawn only from the sources that were available by 2005 (because the purpose was to understand the data 
on which the decision to launch JSY was made).  The estimates presented in this figure are drawn from 
retrospective analysis produced in 2015 (WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and the United 
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Why has increased use of institutional care during childbirth not translated into 
higher maternal survival?  According to most evaluations, the culprit is a mix of the poor 
quality of care provided at medical institutions, the inability of institutions to 
accommodate high demand for care by pregnant women, and the availability of care at 
the moment of childbirth rather than in the days after birth, which is when the threat of 
fatal complications peaks.710  In other words, the studies argue that the poor quality of 
India’s medical infrastructure and inappropriate timing of interventions are to blame.  
While these explanations make some sense, I argue they are incomplete in the 
same way that JSY is incomplete: both they and JSY locate the causes of poor maternal 
health in the lack of access to medical care in the days surrounding childbirth, 
discounting the deeper socioeconomic determinants of health.  In other words, GoI’s 
programmatic spending on maternalist initiatives – driven primarily by programs 
designed to provide better nutrition to women during pregnancy and incentivize them to 
deliver in hospitals under medical care – reflects a very narrow and technical view of the 
causes of poor maternal health.  As scholars of social determinants of health have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
al., “Program Evaluation of the Janani Suraksha Yojana”; Randive, Diwan, and Costa, “India’s 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (the JSY) to Promote Institutional Birth: Is There an Association 
between Institutional Birth Proportion and Maternal Mortality?” 
709 Gupta et al., “Impact of Janani Suraksha Yojana on Institutional Delivery Rate and Maternal 
Morbidity and Mortality: An Observational Study in India”; Khan, Hazra, and Bhatnagar, “Impact of 
Janani Suraksha Yojana on Selected Family Health Behaviors in Rural Uttar Pradesh”; Lim et al., “India’s 
Janani Suraksha Yojana, a Conditional Cash Transfer Programme to Increase Births in Health Facilities: 
An Impact Evaluation”; Ng et al., “An Assessment of the Impact of JSY Cash Transfer Program on 
Maternal Mortality Reduction in Madhya Pradesh, India”; Randive, Diwan, and Costa, “India’s 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (the JSY) to Promote Institutional Birth: Is There an Association 
between Institutional Birth Proportion and Maternal Mortality?” 
710 Chaturvedi, De Costa, and Raven, “Does the Janani Suraksha Yojana Cash Transfer Programme to 
Promote Facility Births in India Ensure Skilled Birth Attendance? A Qualitative Study of Intrapartum Care 
in Madhya Pradesh”; Rai and Singh, “Janani Suraksha Yojana: The Conditional Cash Transfer Scheme to 
Reduce Maternal Mortality in India -- a Need for Reassessment”; Sri B, N, and Khanna, “An Investigation 
of Maternal Deaths Following Public Protests in a Tribal District of Madhya Pradesh, Central India.” 
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established in various settings, the most fundamental causes of poor health lie in social 
disadvantage, such as lack of access to “water, sanitation, education, and employment.”711  
An effort to promote maternal health only through ensuring medical attention to women 
in the final months of pregnancy takes a purely technical view of health and strips the 
concept of its social and political content.  This “medical model”712 of maternal health 
does little to subvert gendered hierarchies that make women poorly fed, anemic, unable 
to seek medical advice without prior permission from family members, regularly subject 
to violence, and unable to exercise autonomy in their daily lives. 
A long-term solution to high maternal mortality, it is clear, can come only from 
interventions that help undo gender hierarchies responsible for women’s subordinate 
status and that increase women’s control over their own bodies and lives – that is, from 
individualist efforts that empower women as individuals.  In absence of this understanding 
and accompanying efforts to empower women as individuals, the potential impact of 
growing maternalism in the global south is compromised from the start.  While 
maternalist programs might assist and even empower women in some ways, then, in the 
final analysis they reinforce the very structures that undermine women’s position in the 
first place, without doing much to improve maternal health.  
C. Social citizenship for women 
The final consideration is the impact of maternalism on women’s social 
citizenship.  As discussed in earlier chapters, women’s social policy that is heavily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 Beckingham, “Maternal Health and Care in India: Why a Major Public Health Strategy Is Essential,” 
89; World Health Organization, “Annex 7. Handout: Selected Issues in Conducting Gender Analysis of 
Maternal Health.” 
712 Beckingham, “Maternal Health and Care in India: Why a Major Public Health Strategy Is Essential,” 
87. 
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maternalist runs the risk of curtailing women’s enjoyment of their social citizenship rights 
by rendering maternity or motherhood the near-exclusive basis for these rights.  As 
discussed in earlier chapters, in T.H. Marshall’s canonical definition, social citizenship is 
the condition of having “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the 
life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society.”713  If our political 
citizenship assures us the right to participate in the political affairs of our communities, 
and our civil citizenship guarantees us a range of rights and freedoms, including the right 
to equal treatment under law and the freedoms of thought, speech, assembly, and others, 
the principle of social citizenship allows us to make claims for our socioeconomic well-
being.  It is this principle, then, that justifies citizens’ claims to social services and social 
security. 
Because, in many countries, social citizenship rights, especially those relating to 
social transfers rather than social services, are tied to the performance of paid work or are 
held by the family or the household rather than the individual, de jure gender-blind social 
citizenship rights are in practice enjoyed differently by men and women.  Women’s claim 
to socioeconomic well-being under these systems of social provisioning has been both 
limited due to women’s lower labor participation rates and indirect because it is often 
based on women’s relationships with male breadwinners (“paternalist” welfare systems) or 
with children (“maternalist” systems).714  Women-specific social policy, then, is one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class., 8. 
714 Borchorst, “Welfare State Regimes, Women’s Interests and the EC.”, 27; Sainsbury, Gender, Equality and 
Welfare States., 41-43 
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possible way to repair the cracks in the ostensibly gender-blind system of social 
provisioning – cracks through which women are far likelier than men to slip.715  
Yet, when entitlements under this women-specific social policy, too, are made 
contingent on women’s familial relationships – as in India and possibly across the 
developing world – the cracks remain unplugged.  The opportunity of gendering social 
citizenship without subordinating women to families is lost.  If women’s social position 
keeps them from benefiting fully from the mainstream system of social provisioning 
(which in practice is available mostly to men), and the women-specific system of social 
provisioning concerns itself with women only around the time of their pregnancies, most 
women are excluded from social citizenship benefits for most of their lives. 
This has material consequences for women.  As this study shows, for instance, 
under the fragmented women-specific system of social provisioning built by the Indian 
government, most spending targets pregnant women.  An average Indian woman today is 
likely to bear 2.2 children through the course of her expected life of 70 years.716  In other 
words, an average Indian woman is expected to spend fewer than 2 years of her life 
pregnant, so she is eligible to meaningfully exercise her social citizenship rights for about 
20 months out of her 624 alive (as an adult woman).  Of course, the 20 months of 
pregnancy are consequential for both women and children, but the need for 
socioeconomic well-being predates and outlasts pregnancy.  For the 97% or so of her 
adult life that an average woman spends not pregnant, she can claim little by way of state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715 Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations 
and Welfare States,” 314–15; Giacaman, Jad, and Johnson, “For the Common Good? Gender and Social 
Citizenship in Palestine,” 14. 
716 “Big Concern! Fertility Rate for Many Indian Communities Dips below the Replacement Rate”; “Life 
Expectancy in India Goes up by 5 Years in a Decade.” 
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support in her own name for her socioeconomic well-being.  Women’s social citizenship 
contingent on pregnancy status, in other words, is no social citizenship at all. 
V. Conclusion 
None of the above is to minimize the importance of maternal health initiatives per se, 
however.  High levels of maternal and infant mortality do necessitate significant 
investment in women’s maternal role.  In fact, a range of observes has noted that India 
does not spend nearly enough on maternal health.717  The point here is not that maternal 
health is a cause unworthy of state attention or investment.  Instead, the objective is to 
show that even though India’s social spending is lacking for both maternalist and 
individualist programs, it is particularly deficient in individualist programs for women. 
Accordingly, the study demonstrates that India makes little systematic, large-scale 
effort to promote gender equality in traditionally masculine domains of higher education, 
paid work and enterprise, and public affairs.  Adopting terminology popular in gender 
literature, we might say GoI spends more to advance “practical gender interests” such as 
safe motherhood and much less to promote “strategic gender interests” such as greater 
gender equality.718  Its programmatic efforts to promote better maternal health, while 
surely necessary, focus almost exclusively on pregnancy, and within that, on the days 
surrounding childbirth.  Not only have they done little to boost maternal survival (at least 
if the performance of JSY is any indication), they serve to obscure the fact that pregnancy 
is only one (possible) aspect of women’s lives.  Social programming that targets women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 Goli et al., “High Spending on Maternity Care in India: What Are the Factors Explaining It?,” 14. 
718 Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in 
Nicaragua,” 232–235. 
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predominantly as mothers carries the risk not only of using women instrumentally for the 
benefit of children but also of equating women with mothers, to the exclusion of women’s 
other roles and identities.  It is this equation that modern feminism has fought against, 
only to see it reintroduced into social policy via maternal health programming more 
attuned to the medical than the socioeconomic determinants of poor health.  
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APPENDICES 
	  
Appendix 1: List of keywords used to locate women-specific programs listed 
in word-searchable budget documents: 
 
English Hindi719 
women “mahila” (woman) 
woman “stree” (woman) 
girl “balika” (girl) 
female  
lady/ladies  
widow  
“matern”  
“preg”  
mother  
wife/wives  
“tubec”  
“reproduc”  
“sterili”  
gender  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 Keywords in English outnumber those in Hindi because the information was gathered from the English 
editions of the budget files.  Hence, the program descriptions that were the primary source of information on 
each program were in English.  Some program titles, however, were in Hindi.  Hindi words were thus added 
as a precautionary measure, in the unlikely case the English descriptions of women-specific programs did 
not use any of the words on the English list. 
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Appendix 2: Adult women-specific programs of the Government of India, 
1985-2015 
 
No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
1. Condensed 
Courses of 
Education 
and 
Vocational 
Training for 
Women 
1958 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The objective is to 
enable women to 
complete their 
education and 
acquire training and 
later employment.  
Under this 
programme 
voluntary 
organisations are 
given grants to 
conduct courses for 
primary/middle/hig
her school level 
examinations”720 
Worker Individualist 
2. Welfare 
Extension 
Projects 
(including 
Border Area 
Projects) 
1959 Central Social 
Welfare 
Board 
“These Projects 
were started in the 
Border Areas with 
the object of 
providing composite 
welfare services 
which include 
maternity services, 
medical aid, 
balwadis, craft 
training, social 
education etc. to 
children and 
women”721 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1987-
1988,” 138.  
721 Government of India, Central Social Welfare Board, “Annual Report 1988-89,” 15. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
3. Mahila 
Mandal 
Programme
722  
1961 Central Social 
Welfare 
Board 
Program aims to 
provide social 
services for women 
and children in rural 
areas.  “The services 
like Balwadies for 
children, Craft 
Activities, Social 
Education and 
Maternity Services 
for Women etc. are 
provided under this 
programme”723 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
4. Short Stay 
Homes for 
Women and 
Girls 
1969 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
--“The objective of 
the scheme is to 
protect and 
rehabilitate those 
women and girls, 
who are facing 
social and moral 
danger due to family 
problems, mental 
strain, social 
ostracism, 
exploitation or other 
causes”724 
--“Target groups are 
as follow: 
-Those who are 
being forced into 
prostitution or have 
been sexually 
assaulted. 
-Those who as a 
result of family 
tension or discord, 
Multiple 
familial 
roles 
Familialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722 Literal translation: Women’s Clubs Programme 
723 Government of India, Central Social Welfare Board, “Annual Report 2003-04,” 16. 
724 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 1989-90,” 17. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
are made to leave 
their homes without 
any means of 
subsistence and 
have no social 
protection from 
exploitation and 
facing litigation on 
account of marital 
disputes. 
-Victims of mental 
mal-adjustment, 
emotional 
disturbances and 
social ostracism. 
-Those who escape 
from their homes 
due to family 
problems, 
mental/physical 
torture and in need 
of shelter, 
treatment and 
counseling.”725  
5. Post Partum 
Programme 
1969-70 Ministry of 
Health and 
Family 
Welfare 
‘The objective of the 
programme is to 
provide anti-natal 
[sic], natal and post-
natal services to 
expectant mothers 
and also to provide 
Family Planning 
Services besides 
diagnosing early 
cases of cervical 
cancer”726 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 International Labour Organization, “MOWCD9: Shelter to Women in Distress - Short Stay Home 
(CSW) (MOWCD).” 
726 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1991-
1992,” 93. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
6. Hostels for 
Working 
Women 
1972 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“Assistance is given 
to voluntary 
organisations for the 
construction of 
Working Women’s 
hostels to provide 
suitable and 
economical 
accommodation to 
working women and 
for the purchase of 
ready-built hostels 
for the purpose.  
Women, whose 
income does not 
exceed Rs. 2000 
(consolidated) are 
eligible for hostel 
accommodation”727 
Worker Individualist 
7. Integrated 
Child 
Developmen
t Services* 
1975 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The scheme aims 
at providing 
integrated health, 
nutrition and 
educational services 
to children below six 
years, pregnant 
women and 
lactating mothers.  It 
offers 
supplementary 
nutrition, 
immunization, 
health check-up, 
referral services, 
nutrition & health 
education and non-
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1987-
1988,” 139. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
formal pre-school 
education”728 
8. Creches/ 
Day Care 
Centres for 
Children of 
Working/ 
Ailing 
Mothers (or, 
Day Care 
Centres) 
1975 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The scheme is to 
assist voluntary 
organisations 
engaged in 
providing services 
for children (0-5 
years) of poor, 
working and ailing 
women belonging 
mainly to the non-
organised sector of 
labourers.  The 
creches run under 
the scheme also 
provide health care, 
supplementary 
nutrition, medical 
check-up and 
immunisation 
etc.”729 
Worker 
and 
Mother 
Individualist 
and 
Familialist 
(maternalist) 
9. National 
Sports 
Champions
hips for 
Women 
1975 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
Aims to “afford 
more opportunities 
to women for 
participation in the 
sports activities at 
the national 
level”730 
Other Individualist 
10. Women’s 
Training 
Programmes
/Vocational 
Training 
Programme 
1977 Ministry of 
Labour and 
Employment 
Aims to “provide 
equitable 
opportunities for 
women’s 
employment in the 
industry and service 
Worker Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728 Government of India, 138. 
729 Government of India, 138. 
730 Government of India, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, “Outcome Budget 2009-10,” 96. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
for Women sectors and in self-
employment”731 
11. Non-formal 
Education 
for Women 
and Girls in 
Adult 
Education 
1979 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
Scheme “is funded 
by UNICEF with 
the objective of 
linking Literacy [sic] 
with vocational 
education through 
Non-formal [sic] 
approaches, 
preparation of 
materials based on 
‘Facts of life’, 
focussing on 
participation of 
women and girls in 
Total Literacy 
Campaigns”732 
Student Individualist 
12. Science and 
Technology 
for Women 
Early 
1980s 
Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
“The projects 
funded under the 
scheme are aimed 
at: 
(i)   Application of 
Science and 
Technology to 
improve the 
living conditions 
of women; and 
(ii)  Ensuring greater 
involvement of 
women in 
Science and 
Technology”733 
Other Individualist 
13. Developmen
t of Women 
1982 Ministry of 
Rural Areas 
“The scheme of 
Development of 
Entrepren Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Government of India, Ministry of Labour, “Annual Report 1998-99,” 265. 
732 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1993-
1994,” 116. 
733 Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, “Annual Report 1989-90,” 27. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
and 
Children in 
Rural Areas 
(DWRCA) 
and 
Employment 
Women and 
Children in Rural 
Areas is meant to 
focus attention on 
women members of 
the families of the 
target group of the 
rural poor so as to 
increase their 
income and to 
provide supporting 
services needed to 
enable them to take 
up income 
generating 
activities”734 
eur 
14. Training-
cum-
production 
Centres (or, 
Setting up of 
Employmen
t and 
Income 
Generation 
Training-
cum-
Production 
Centres for 
Women, or 
Swavalamba
n/NORAD) 
1982 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The scheme is for 
training of women 
belonging to weaker 
sections in the non-
traditional trades 
and then employing 
them on sustained 
basis”735 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
15. Family 
Counseling 
Centre (or 
Voluntary 
1982-84 Central Social 
Welfare 
Board 
--“The objectives of 
the Voluntary 
Action 
Bureaux/Family 
Multiple 
familial 
roles 
Familialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1997-
1998,” 19. 
735 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1987-
1988,” 139. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Action 
Bueaux) 
Counselling Centres 
are to provide 
preventive, curative 
and rehabilitative 
services to women 
and children who 
are victims of 
atrocities, 
exploitation and 
mal-adjustment and 
also create 
awareness in the 
community on social 
problems affecting 
the harmony of 
family and laws 
pertaining to the 
welfare of 
women”736 
--“The concept of 
family counselling 
was developed in 
India by the Central 
Social Welfare 
Board. In the 1980s 
there was a spate of 
dowry related 
mtmlers. The Board 
spearheaded the 
campaign (0 bring 
about an end to this 
horrendous crime 
and in response 
established the 
programme of 
Voluntary Action 
Bureaus. which 
subsequently took 
the shape of Family 
Counselling 
Centres. Some of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 Government of India, Central Social Welfare Board, “Annual Report 1988-89,” 14. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
the most 
complicated 
problems of family 
discord can be 
reconciled through 
counselling.”737  
16. Support to 
Training 
and 
Employmen
t 
Programme 
(STEP) 
1986 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The Scheme 
intends to 
strengthen and 
improve women’s 
work and 
employment in the 
area of agriculture, 
animal husbandry, 
dairying, fisheries, 
handlooms, 
handicrafts, khadi 
and village 
industries and 
sericulture”738 
Worker Individualist 
17. Awareness 
Generation 
Programme 
1986-87 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The scheme 
provides a platform 
for the rural and 
poor women to 
come together, 
exchange their 
experience and 
ideas and in the 
process develop an 
understanding of 
their problems and 
also ways to tackle 
these problems and 
fulfill their needs”739 
Other Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Government of India, Central Social Welfare Board, “Annual Report 2003-04,” 13. 
738 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1987-
1988,” 139. 
739 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 1989-90,” 31.  
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
18. Mahila 
Samakhya 
(MS)740 
1988 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
The program 
“envisages an area 
of integrated 
approach to women 
development and 
education in 
selected districts by 
starting educational 
activities, support 
services, vocational 
training and 
advanced condensed 
courses backed by 
voluntary support, 
community 
participation and a 
well-developed 
instructors’ and 
teachers’ training 
and orientation 
programme”741 
Other Individualist 
19. Post 
Doctoral 
Fellowships 
for Women 
(formerly, 
Part-time 
Research 
Associateshi
ps for 
Women) 
1988-89 University 
Grants 
Commission 
Aims to “provide an 
opportunity to 
research scholars to 
take up post-
doctoral research 
independently or on 
project assignment 
basis in Science, 
Humanities, Social 
Sciences and 
Engineering and 
Technology”742 
Worker Individualist 
20. Legal 
Literacy 
Early 
1990s** 
Central Social 
Welfare 
“In order to 
promote knowledge 
and awareness 
Other Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 Literal translation unclear. 
741 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1989-
1990,” 109. 
742 Government of India, University Grants Commission, “Annual Report 1996-97,” 164. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Camps Board about the legislative 
provisions for 
women, Legal 
Literacy Camps are 
organised in the 
Family Counselling 
Centres of those 
districts that have 
been classified as 
being low in the 
social development 
of women”743 
21. Mahila 
Samriddhi 
Yojana 
(MSY)744 
1993 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“Under this scheme 
every rural adult 
woman is 
encouraged to have 
an MSY account of 
her own in the Post 
Office to which she 
may deposit 
whatever amount of 
money she can save.  
For an amount upto 
Rs. 300/- in a year 
with a one year 
lock-in period 
Government 
contributes 25 
percent”745 
Other Individualist 
22. Rashtriya 
Mahila 
Kosh 
(National 
Credit Fund 
for Women) 
1993 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
The Fund “aims to 
reach the poorest of 
the poor and 
assetless women 
who are in need of 
credit but cannot 
reach the formal 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 Government of India, Central Social Welfare Board, “Annual Report 1998-99,” 16. 
744 Literal translation: Woman Prosperity Scheme 
745 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1994-
1995,” 116. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
banking or credit 
systems.  This would 
help to develop a 
national net work 
[sic] of credit 
services for women 
in the informal 
sector and expect to 
boost the self-
employment 
ventures of 
women”746  
23. Central 
Sector 
Scheme for 
Women in 
Agriculture/
Training of 
Women in 
Agriculture 
1993-94 Ministry of 
Agriculture 
The scheme 
“envisages to 
motivate and 
mobilize farm 
women to be 
organized into 
groups so that the 
agricultural support 
such as input 
technology and 
extension support 
could be smoothly 
channelized through 
the network of these 
groups”747 
Worker Individualist 
24. Assistance to 
Women’s 
Cooperative
s/Deveopm
ent of 
Women’s 
Cooperative
s 
1993-94 Ministry of 
Agriculture 
“The objective of 
the scheme is to 
focus special 
attention on the 
needs of women and 
providing [sic] 
assistance in the 
form of assured 
work and income by 
organizing 
cooperative societies 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
746 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 1993-94,” vi. 
747 Government of India, Department of Agriculture, “Annual Report 1998-99,” 79. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
for taking up 
economic 
activities”748 
25. Mahila Coir 
Yojana749 
1994 Ministry of 
Small Scale 
Industries 
“Under this 
programme women 
are provided 
training and ratts for 
carrying out 
spinning activity and 
increasing their 
earnings”750 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
26. Special 
Scheme for 
Constructio
n of 
Women’s 
Hostels 
Mid-
1990s 
University 
Grants 
Commission 
“With a view to 
increase women 
enrolment [sic] by 
providing a safe 
environment and to 
encourage the 
mobility of women 
students to pursue 
higher education in 
the universities and 
colleges of their 
choice, the 
Commission 
introduced a special 
scheme during the 
latter half of the 
Eighth Plan period 
for the construction 
of women’s 
hostels”751 
Student Individualist 
27. National 
Maternity 
Benefit 
1995 Ministry of 
Rural Areas 
and 
“Under this scheme, 
maternity benefit is 
provided as a 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 Government of India, Department of Agriculture, 88. 
749 Literal translation: Woman Coir Scheme 
750 Government of India, Ministry of Mico, Small and Medium Enterprises, “Annual Report 2009-10,” 
146. 
751 Government of India, University Grants Commission, “Annual Report 1998-99,” 144. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Scheme Employment lumpsum cash 
assistance to women 
of households below 
the poverty line 
subject to… 
[various] 
conditions”752 
28. Indira 
Mahila 
Yojana753 
1995 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
The program “is an 
effort to mobilise 
women around an 
integrated delivery 
system and is a 
major step towards 
participation of 
women in planning 
and development.”  
It has three 
components: 
•   “Convergence 
of inter-sectoral 
services; 
•   Income 
generation 
activities; and 
•   A sustained 
process of 
awareness 
generation/edu
cation”754 
Entrepren
eur/ 
Other 
Individualist 
29. Reproductiv
e and Child 
Health 
Programme 
(Including 
Janani 
1997 Ministry of 
Health & 
Family 
Welfare 
“The programme 
aims to meet the 
unmet needs of 
Family Welfare 
Programme by 
improving health 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, “Annual Report 1995-96,” 51. 
753 Literal translation: Indira Woman Scheme 
754 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 1995-96,” 53.  
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Suraksha 
Yojana755 
and Janani 
Shishu 
Suraksha 
Karyakram
756)* 
status of women and 
children, especially 
the poor and 
underserved, by 
reducing Infant, 
Child and Maternal 
mortality and 
morbidity”757 
30. Swashakti758 
(formerly, 
Integrated 
Project for 
Developmen
t of Women, 
a.k.a. Rural 
Women’s 
Developmen
t and 
Empowerm
ent Project) 
1998 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“The project aims at 
enhancing women’s 
access to resources 
for better quality of 
life through use of 
drudgery and time 
reduction devices, 
health, literacy & 
confidence 
enhancement and 
increasing their 
control over their 
income through 
their involvement in 
skill development 
and income 
generating 
activities”759 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
31. Trade-
related 
Entrepreneu
rship 
Assistance 
and 
Developmen
t Scheme for 
1998 Ministry of 
Small Scale 
Industries 
“The Scheme 
envisages 
development of 
micro/tiny 
enterprises in the 
country both in the 
urban and in the 
rural areas.  The 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755 Literal translation: Mother Protection Scheme 
756 Literal translation: Mother Child Protection Programme 
757 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1998-
1999,” 96. 
758 Literal translation: Self-power 
759 Government of India, Department of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2001-02,” 68. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Women 
(TREAD) 
main objective of 
the scheme is to 
empower women 
economically 
through 
development of their 
entrepreneurial skills 
by eliminating 
constraints faced by 
women in matters of 
trade”760 
32. National 
Programme 
for Women 
in 
Secondary 
and Higher 
Education/ 
Free 
Education 
for Girls 
1998-99 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“As envisaged in the 
‘National Agenda 
for Governance’, a 
scheme is being 
formulated in the 
Deopartment [sic] 
of Education to 
provide ‘free 
education for girls 
up to college level, 
including 
Professional 
Courses’”761 
Student Individualist 
33. Swayamsidd
ha 
(Integrated 
Scheme for 
Women’s 
Empowerm
ent) 
2001 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
The program is a 
“country-wide 
integrated project 
for development and 
empowerment of 
women based on the 
formation of self-
help groups with an 
emphasis on 
convergence of 
various schemes and 
access to micro 
credit and 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760 Government of India, Ministry of Small Scale Industries, “Performance Budget 2004-05,” 123–24. 
761 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1999-
2000,” 113.  
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
promotion of micro 
enterprise”762 
34. Swadhar/ 
Swadhar 
Greh763 
2001-02 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
--“Recognising the 
need for a project 
based approach to 
address the 
requirements of 
women in difficult 
circumstances, a 
new scheme 
Swadhar has been 
introduced in 2001-
02.  The objective of 
the scheme is to 
comprehensively 
rehabilitate widows, 
victims of 
trafficking, victims 
of natural calamities 
mentally disorderd 
[sic] and destitute 
women.  The 
scheme provides for 
support like food 
and shelter, 
counseling, medical 
facilities and 
vocational training.  
The scheme also 
envisages setting up 
help-lines for 
women in distress.  
Projects of 
counseling and help-
lines sanctioned 
under the scheme 
will complement 
efforts at 
Multiple 
familial 
roles 
Familialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2002-
2003,” 119. 
763 Translation: Self-reliance Home. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
implementing 
provisions of the 
Domestic Violence 
Bill proposed to be 
introduced by the 
department”764 
--“The benefit of the 
component could be 
availed by women 
above 18 years of 
age of the following 
categories:  
a)  Women who are 
deserted and are 
without any social 
and economic 
support;  
b)  Women survivors 
of natural disasters 
who have been 
rendered homeless 
and are without any 
social and economic 
support;  
c)  Women prisoners 
released from jail 
and are without 
family, social and 
economic support;  
d)  Women victims 
of domestic 
violence, family 
tension or discord, 
who are made to 
leave their homes 
without any means 
of subsistence and 
have no special 
protection from 
exploitation and/ or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2002-
2003,” 119.  
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
facing litigation on 
account of marital 
disputes; and  
e)  Trafficked 
women/girls 
rescued or runaway 
from brothels or 
other places where 
they face 
exploitation and 
Women affected by 
HIV/AIDS who do 
not have any social 
or economic 
support. However 
such women/ girls 
should first seek 
assistance under 
UJJAWALA 
Scheme in areas 
where it is in 
operation.”765 
 
35. Anganwadi 
Karyakatri 
Bima 
Yojana766 
2004 Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
This “is one of the 
welfare measures 
extended to the 
grassroots 
functionaries of the 
ICDS Scheme.”767 
Benefits include 
survivors’ benefits 
and disability 
benefits. 
Worker Individualist 
36. Women 
Component 
Plan of 
Mid-
2000s 
Ministry of 
Science and 
This includes 
“several field based 
extension, 
Ambiguou
s 
Ambiguous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Swadhar Greh: A Scheme That 
Caters to Primary Needs of Women in Difficult Circumstances.” 
766 Literal translation: Childcare Centre Female Worker Insurance Scheme. 
767 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Annual Report 2012-13,” 46. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Biotechonlo
gy for Social 
Developmen
t 
Technology demonstration and 
training projects on 
proven and field-
tested technologies 
for women…In 
health sector, 
projects will be 
implemented for 
awareness and 
counselling on 
genetic disorders 
and creating 
awareness on 
nutrition including 
traditional food and 
healthcare”768 
37. Capacity 
Building for 
Women 
Managers in 
Higher 
Education 
Mid-
2000s 
University 
Grants 
Commission 
“The specific 
objectives of the 
scheme are to 
develop a 
perspective plan and 
strategy for reducing 
the gender gap in 
the higher education 
system, to offer 
various training 
programmes at 
different levels to 
women for 
stimulating them to 
aspire to become 
administrators, to 
develop relevant 
training materials 
for various 
programmes in print 
and electronic 
media, to support 
gender positive 
Worker Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2008-
2009,” 201. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
initiatives such as 
gender equity cell 
and developing 
sensitivity index, 
etc., to increase and 
support 
development of 
linkages among 
women managers in 
higher education 
through networking, 
etc.”769 
38. Rajiv 
Gandhi 
National 
Creche 
Scheme for 
the Children 
of Working 
Mothers 
2006 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“The scheme aims 
to provide day care 
services for children 
below 5 years, 
belonging to 
economically 
weaker sections of 
society, whose 
family income does 
not exceed Rs. 
12,000 a month.  
The creches running 
under the scheme 
provide health care, 
supplementary 
nutrition, medical 
check-up and 
immunization, etc. 
to the children 
whose parents are 
away at work sites or 
are incapacitated 
due to sickness and 
are unable to look 
after them”770 
Worker 
and 
Mother 
Individualist 
and 
Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 Government of India, University Grants Commission, “Annual Report 2008-09,” 242. 
770 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2006-
2007,” 135. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
39. Restorative 
Justice for 
Rape 
Victims (or 
Relief to 
and 
Rehabilitati
on of Rape 
Victims) 
2007 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“The Scheme seems 
to provide 
restorative justice to 
victims of rape 
through financial 
assistance as well as 
support services 
such as medical, 
shelter, counseling, 
etc.”771 
Ambiguou
s 
Ambiguous 
40. Ujjawala772 2007 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“This scheme aims 
at prevention of 
trafficking and at 
providing support 
for rescue, 
rehabilitation and 
reintegration of 
victims of 
trafficking.  The 
scheme is being 
implemented mainly 
through NGOs”773 
Ambiguou
s 
Ambiguous 
41. Panchayat 
Mahila 
Evam Yuva 
Shakti 
Abhiyan774* 
2007 Ministry of 
Panchayati 
Raj 
The program is 
“implemented with 
a view to organize 
the elected women 
and youth 
representatives of 
Panchayati Raj 
institutions so as to 
increase their voice, 
Citizen Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
771 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2011-
2012,” 358. 
772 Literal translation: Lustrous 
773 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2010-
2011,” 252. 
774 Literal translation: Panchayat Women and Youth Power Campaign 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
visibility and work 
performance”775 
42. Scheme for 
Leadership 
Developmen
t of Minority 
Women (or 
Nai Roshni) 
2007-08 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“…Muslim women 
are doubly 
disadvantaged…Thr
ough this scheme, 
such women would 
be provided with 
support, leadership 
training and skill 
development so that 
they can move out 
of the confines of 
their homes and 
community and 
begin to assume a 
leadership role in 
accessing services, 
skills and 
opportunities”776 
Citizen Individualist 
43. Priyadarshin
i 
2008 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“Women’s 
empowerment and 
livelihood project in 
socially/economicall
y backward blocks 
of Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar through 
IFAD assistance”777 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
44. Indira 
Gandhi 
National 
Widow 
Pension 
Scheme 
2009 Ministry of 
Rural 
Development 
Under this scheme, 
“pension at the rate 
of Rs. 200 per 
month is granted to 
a widow in the age 
group of 40-64 years 
and belonging to a 
Widow Familialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2008-
2009,” 170. 
776 Government of India, 246. 
777 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Outcome Budget 2009-10,” 21. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
household below the 
poverty line 
according to the 
criteria prescribed 
by the Government 
of India”778 
45. Indira 
Gandhi 
Matritva 
Sahyog 
Yojana779 
(formerly 
Conditional 
Maternity 
Benefit 
Scheme) 
2009-10 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
The scheme 
provides “cash 
directly to pregnant 
and lactating 
women (P&L 
Women) during 
pregnancy right up 
to lactation period 
of six months in 
response to fulfilling 
specific 
conditions”780 
Mother Familialist  
(maternalist) 
46. Mahila 
Kisan 
Sashaktikara
n 
Pariyojana
781 
2010-11 Ministry of 
Rural 
Development 
Program was 
designed “to meet 
the specific needs of 
women farmers and 
achieve socio-
economic technical 
empowerment of the 
rural women 
farmers, 
Worker Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 Government of India, Department of Rural Development, “Outcome Budget 2009-10,” 97. 
779 Literal translation: Indira Gandhi Motherhood Assistance Scheme.  Although sometimes presented as a 
program that sought to partly compensate women for wage loss due to pregnancy, Indira Gandhi Matritva 
Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY) neither tied eligibility to women’s employment status nor linked benefits to prior 
wages.  For this reason, the program is best understood as a conditional cash transfer program for pregnant 
women rather than as a wage-replacement program that encourages or enables post-pregnancy 
employment.  Hence it is coded entirely as maternalist and not as individualist in the dataset I use in this 
project.  In 2017, the program was renamed Pradhan Mantri Matritva Sahyog Yojana (Prime Minister 
Motherhood Assistance Scheme, or PMMVY) and GoI pledged to expand it from 50 or so districts in 
which it operated to across the country. 
780 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2010-
2011,” 252. 
781 Literal translation: Female Farmer Empowerment Program 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
predominantly small 
and marginal 
farmers”782 
47. Grants-in-
aid to 
National 
Bank for 
Agriculture 
and Rural 
Developmen
t for 
Creation of 
Women’s 
Self-Help 
Groups 
Developmen
t Fund 
2011-12 Ministry of 
Finance 
“The provision is for 
creating Women’s 
Self Help Groups 
(SHGs) 
Development Fund 
with NABARD to 
empower women to 
promote their Self 
Help Groups in 
pursuance to the 
Budget 
announcement 
2011-12”783 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
48. Assistance to 
States for 
Implementa
tion of 
Protection 
of Women 
from 
Domestic 
Violence 
Act 
2012 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“Under this scheme 
the Central 
Government will 
support States in the 
appointment of 
independent 
Protection Officers 
by sharing their 
salary with the State 
Governments on a 
50-50 basis.  The 
Scheme would also 
provide support for 
establishing 
Counselling 
Facilities/Family 
counselling Centres.  
It would also have 
components for 
capacity building of 
Wife Familialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
782 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2012-
2013,” 279. 
783 Government of India, 119. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
the officials and 
infrastructural 
support to the 
Protection Officers 
such as transport 
costs and mobile 
costs”784 
49. Disha 
Programme 
for Women 
in Science 
2012** Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
“Disha is a special 
scheme to facilitate 
the mobility of 
women scientists.  
The scheme aims to 
avoid or reduce 
difficulties faced by 
employed women in 
mid career to move 
from one place of 
employment to 
another within in 
[sic] India on 
account of family 
reasons”785 
Worker Individualist 
50. Women’s 
Helpline 
2013 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“Recognizing that 
women in distress 
and difficult 
circumstances 
require immediate 
access to assistance 
and may not have 
recourse to or 
information about 
the availability of 
such support 
services, it is 
proposed to work 
towards creation of 
a universalised 
Ambiguou
s 
Ambiguous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784 Government of India, 371. 
785 Government of India, 288. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
women [sic] 
helpline”786 
51. One Stop 
Crisis 
Centre 
2013 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
“In order to deal 
with a situation of 
violence, women 
require support at 
various levels that 
address their 
multiple needs.  
Recognising this, the 
Ministry would 
examine the 
possibility of 
developing a pilot of 
One Stop Crisis 
Centre for women 
which would serve 
as an integrated 
facility where 
various needs of 
victims of violence, 
such as medicl aid, 
legal assistance, 
assistance in filing a 
police case, 
counselling and 
emotional support, 
temporary shelter 
for herself and her 
children and basic 
necessities for the 
period of stay can be 
met, at a single 
place”787 
Ambiguou
s 
Ambiguous 
52. Nirbhaya 
Fund for 
Safety of 
2013 Ministry of 
Finance 
--Fund for 
“implementation of 
initiatives aimed at 
enhancing the safety 
Other Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
786 Government of India, 370. 
787 Government of India, 371. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
Women and security for 
women in the 
country”788 
--“Violence in 
public spaces is an 
everyday occurrence 
for women and girls 
around the world, 
both in urban and 
rural areas.  Women 
and girls experience 
various types of 
violence in public 
spaces from 
harassment to 
assault including 
stalking, 
molestation, rape 
etc.  Women face 
violence on streets, 
public transport and 
park, in and around 
schools and 
workplaces, in 
public sanitation 
facilities and water 
and food 
distribution sites, or 
in their own 
neighbourhoods.  
This reality reduces 
women’s and girl’s 
freedom of 
movement.  It 
reduces their ability 
to participate in 
school, work and in 
public life….Central 
Government 
Ministries/Departm
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Clarification Regarding 
Utilisation of Nirbhaya Fund.” 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
ents and State 
Governments/UT 
Administrations 
may formulate 
proposals factoring 
in women safety 
issues in their sector 
within the public 
sphere for seeking 
funding under 
Nirbhaya Fund.”789 
53. Assistance 
for 
Constructio
n of Shelter 
Homes for 
Single 
Women/De
stitute and 
Widows 
2014 Ministry of 
Women and 
Child 
Development 
Scheme “addresses 
the concerns of 
women belonging to 
the most vulnerable 
groups including 
single women and 
widows.”  It 
provides for 
“construction of 
integrated Shelter 
Homes as support 
hubs wherein 
assistance ranging 
from immediate 
attention to long 
term rehabilitation 
can be provided to 
women in crises or 
in need”790 
Wife/Wid
ow 
Familialist 
54. Maternal 
and Child 
Health/Mat
ernity and 
Child 
Health 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Health and 
Family 
Welfare 
“The maternal and 
child health services 
are provided as a 
part of total health 
care to the 
community through 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789 Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, “Guidelines for Proposals from 
Central Government Ministries/Departments, States/UTs to Be Funded under the Nirbhaya Fund.” 
790 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2014-
2015,” 396. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
program the existing health 
infrastructure in 
rural and urban 
areas.  The health 
infrastructure is 
gradually being 
expanded to reach 
the population as 
near to the door-
steps as 
possible….[The 
Ministry has also] 
sponsored 
immunization 
schemes for infants 
and children and 
mothers against 
common vaccine-
preventable diseases, 
Prophylaxis schemes 
against nutritional 
anemia among 
mothers and 
children and 
prophylaxis against 
blindness due to 
Vitamin ‘A’ 
deficiency, etc.”791 
55. Women’s 
Hostels in 
Polytechnics 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
A scheme “for 
financial assistance 
for the construction 
of women’s hostel in 
the existing 
polytechnics in 
order to enhance 
women participation 
Student Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791 Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, “Annual Report 1988-89,” 200. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
in polytechnic 
education”792  
56. Women’s 
Component 
Plan of 
Science and 
Technology 
Programme 
for 
Socioecono
mic 
Developmen
t 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
Initiatives under this 
category aim to 
achieve “gender 
parity in the science 
sector” and include 
“schemes for 
empowerment of 
rural women…by 
enhancing 
livelihood through 
S&T interventions 
and also schemes for 
providing 
opportunities to 
women scientists to 
return to careers in 
science after a 
break”793 
Worker Individualist 
57. Socio-
economic 
Programme 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“Under this 
programme, 
financial assistance 
is extended to 
voluntary 
institutions to take 
up a wide variety of 
income generating 
activities like small 
industry, handloom, 
handicrafts, dairy, 
animal husbandry 
etc. with the object 
of providing 
opportunities of full 
time or part time 
work to needy 
Worker Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 2008-
2009,” 145. 
793 Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, “Annual Report 2011-12,” 19. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
women, destitutes, 
widows and deserted 
women”794 
58. Setting Up 
of 
Residential 
Polytechnics 
for Women 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
[No description 
found] 
Student Individualist 
59. Supplement
ary 
Nutrition for 
Additional 
Beneficiaries
* 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
“A new Centrally 
sponsored scheme of 
wheat based 
supplementary 
nutrition for pre-
school children and 
nursing/expectant 
mothers has been 
introduced from 1 
January 1986.  The 
new programme is 
meant to enlarge the 
scope of the existing 
nutrition 
programme by 
covering additional 
beneficiaries, 
primarily in the 
tribal areas, urban 
slums and backward 
rural areas”795 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
60. Sterilization 
Beds scheme 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Health and 
Family 
Welfare 
“Under this scheme 
assistance @Rs. 
3,000/- per bed per 
annum is admissible 
as maintenance 
grant subject to 
Mother Familialist 
(maternalist) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1988-
1989,” 145. 
795 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1989-
1990,” 122. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
performance of 60 
tubectomies per bed 
per annum”796 
61. Promotion 
of Sports 
among 
Women/Pr
omotion of 
Women’s 
Sports 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
[Description not 
found] 
Other Individualist 
62. Improveme
nt in 
Working 
Condition of 
Child and 
Women 
Labour* 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Labour and 
Employment 
Provides for the 
formulation, co-
ordination and 
implementation of 
policies and 
programmes 
concerning the 
welfare of 
child/women 
labour”797 
Worker Individualist 
63. New 
Industrial 
Training 
Institutes/W
ings of 
Institutes for 
Women 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Labour and 
Employment 
“The scheme 
envisages 
establishment of 100 
new ITIs/Wings for 
Women in different 
States in a phased 
manner”798 
Student/ 
Worker 
Individualist 
64. Biotechnolo
gy-based 
Programmes 
for Women 
[Unclear] Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
Objectives include: 
“To develop, 
promote & use 
biotechnological 
Worker/ 
Entrepren
eur 
Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1991-
1992,” 94. 
797 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1999-
2000,” 154. 
798 Government of India, “Union Expenditure Budget Volume II: Notes on Demands for Grants, 1993-
1994,” 138. 
 
	  
329 
No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
processes and tools 
for entrepreneurship 
develo-pment [sic] 
& provide 
employment 
opportunities to 
women. 
To set up facilities 
for economic 
empowerment of 
urban as well as 
rural women 
through linkages 
between research 
institu-tions and 
industrial units & 
also scale up the 
basic technologies 
for comer-cial [sic] 
utilization and 
impart training in 
relevant areas to 
develop a pool of 
skilled and well 
trained women 
To support R&D 
projects specifically 
addressing the 
problems or for 
developing techno-
logies [sic] packages 
relevant to them”799 
65. University 
Grants 
Commission
’s grants to 
women’s 
colleges 
[Unclear] University 
Grants 
Commission 
“As part of its 
functions, the 
Commission 
provides grants to 
Central and State 
Universities, 
institutions deemed 
Student Individualist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 Government of India, Department of Bio-Technology, “Outcome Budget 2009-10,” 18–19. 
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No. Program Year 
launched 
Ministry or 
body in 
charge (at 
the time of 
launch, or in 
the mid-
1980s, 
whichever is 
later) 
Brief Description Role in 
which 
women 
are 
targeted 
Coded as 
to be universities 
and colleges which 
are eligible to 
receive grants from 
the U.G.C”800  
 
*program targets both women and children.  When women-specific spending on these programs 
could not be found in official reports, it was calculated or estimated from available data 
**most likely 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 Government of India, University Grants Commission, “Annual Report 1988-89,” 1. 
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